Deck 5: Nontariff Trade Barriers

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Question
The imposition of a tariff on imported steel for the home country results in

A) improving terms of trade and rising volume of trade.
B) higher steel prices and falling steel consumption.
C) lower profits for domestic steel companies.
D) higher unemployment for domestic steel workers.
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Question
Empirical studies show that because voluntary export quotas are typically administered by exporting countries, foreign exporters tend to

A) raise their export prices, thus capturing much of the quota's revenue effect.
B) lower their export prices, thus losing much of the quota's revenue effect.
C) raise their export prices, thus selling more goods overseas.
D) lower their export prices, thus selling fewer goods overseas.
Question
Assume the U.S.has a competitive advantage in producing calculators, while the rest of the world has a competitive advantage in steel.Suppose the U.S.and the rest of the world enter into an agreement to lower import quotas below existing levels on calculators and steel.Which of the following would least likely occur for the U.S.? Rising levels of

A) consumer surplus for American buyers of steel.
B) producer surplus for American steelmakers.
C) production in the American calculator industry.
D) producer surplus for American calculator producers.
Question
The U.S.-Japanese agreement in 1981 to limit imports of small Japanese cars to the U.S.

A) affected Japanese automakers uniformly.
B) resulted in losses to the Japanese auto industry.
C) cost the U.S. consumer an extra $660 or so per Japanese import purchased.
D) did not save any U.S. jobs.
Question
Tariffs and quotas on imports tend to involve larger sacrifices in national welfare than would occur under domestic subsidies.This is because, unlike domestic subsidies, import tariffs and quotas

A) permit less efficient home production.
B) distort choices for domestic consumers.
C) result in higher tax rates for domestic residents.
D) redistribute revenue from domestic producers to consumers.
Question
Domestic content legislation applied to autos would tend to

A) support wage levels of American autoworkers.
B) lower auto prices for American autoworkers.
C) encourage American automakers to locate production overseas.
D) increase profits of American auto companies.
Question
A firm that faces problems of falling sales and excess productive capacity might resort to international dumping if it

A) can charge higher prices in markets that are elastic to price changes.
B) earns revenues on foreign sales that at least cover variable costs.
C) can sell at that price where domestic and foreign demand elasticities equate.
D) is able to force foreign prices below marginal production costs.
Question
Compared to an import quota, an equivalent tariff may provide a less certain amount of protection for home producers since

A) a tariff has no deadweight loss in terms of production and consumption.
B) foreign firms may absorb the tariff by offering exports at lower prices.
C) tariffs are effective only if home demand is perfectly elastic.
D) quotas do not result in increases in the price of the imported good.
Question
Which trade restriction stipulates the percentage of a product's total value that must be produced domestically in order for that product to be sold domestically?

A) import quota
B) orderly marketing agreement
C) local content requirement
D) government procurement policy
Question
Suppose the government grants a subsidy to its export firms that permits them to charge lower prices on goods sold abroad.The export revenue of these firms would rise if the foreign demand is

A) elastic in response to the price reduction.
B) inelastic in response to the price reduction.
C) unit elastic in response to the price reduction.
D) weak.
Question
The imposition of a domestic content requirement by the United States would cause consumer surplus for Americans to

A) rise.
B) fall.
C) remain unchanged.
D) impose downward pressure on wages of workers.
Question
Concerning the restrictive impact of an import quota, assume there occurs an increase in the domestic demand for the import product.As long as the quota falls short of what would be imported under free market conditions, the economy's adjustment to the increase in demand would take the form of

A) a decrease in domestic production of the import good.
B) an increase in the amount of the good being imported.
C) an increase in the domestic price of the import good.
D) a decrease in domestic consumption of the import good.
Question
A producer successfully practicing international dumping would charge

A) a relatively higher price in the more inelastic market.
B) a relatively higher price in the more elastic market.
C) the same price in all markets, regardless of their elasticities.
D) different prices in all markets, regardless of their elasticities.
Question
The United Auto Workers union attempted to win the approval of legislation that would moderate the practice of foreign sourcing on the part of American auto manufacturers.Which of the following best represents this legislation?

A) voluntary export quotas
B) trigger price mechanism
C) tariff quotas
D) local content laws
Question
Suppose the government grants a subsidy to domestic producers of an import-competing good.The subsidy tends to result in deadweight losses for the domestic economy in the form of the

A) consumption effect.
B) redistribution effect.
C) revenue effect.
D) protective effect.
Question
Which of the following refers to a market-sharing pact negotiated by trading partners to moderate the intensity of international competition?

A) orderly marketing agreement
B) local content requirements
C) import quota
D) trigger price mechanism
Question
Because export subsidies tend to result in domestic exporters charging lower prices on their goods sold overseas, the home country's

A) export revenues will decrease.
B) export revenues will rise.
C) terms of trade will worsen.
D) terms of trade will improve.
Question
Antidumping law has been called unfair for all of the following reasons EXCEPT

A) they do not reflect currency fluctuations.
B) they are based on average variable cost.
C) they are based on average total cost.
D) U.S. firms selling at home are not subject to the same rules.
Question
If a tariff and an import quota lead to equivalent increases in the domestic price of steel, then

A) the quota results in efficiency reductions but the tariff does not.
B) the tariff results in efficiency reductions but the quota does not.
C) they have different impacts on how much is produced and consumed.
D) they have different impacts on how income is distributed.
Question
Suppose the United States and Japan enter into a voluntary export agreement in which Japan imposes an export quota on its automakers.The largest share of the export quota's "revenue effect" would tend to be captured by

A) the U.S. government.
B) Japanese automakers.
C) American auto consumers.
D) American autoworkers.
Question
Figure 5.1 illustrates the steel market for Mexico, assumed to be a "small" country that is unable to affect the world price. Suppose the world price of steel is given and constant at $200 per ton. Now suppose the Mexican steel industry is able to obtain trade protection.
Figure 5.1. Alternative Nontariff Trade Barriers Levied by a "Small" Country <strong>Figure 5.1 illustrates the steel market for Mexico, assumed to be a small country that is unable to affect the world price. Suppose the world price of steel is given and constant at $200 per ton. Now suppose the Mexican steel industry is able to obtain trade protection. Figure 5.1. Alternative Nontariff Trade Barriers Levied by a Small Country   Consider Figure 5.1.Suppose instead that the Mexican government provides a subsidy of $200 per ton to its steel producers, as indicated by the supply schedule S<sub>M (with subsidy)</sub>.As a result of the subsidy, the welfare loss to Mexico due to inefficient domestic production equals</strong> A) $200. B) $400. C) $600. D) $800. <div style=padding-top: 35px>
Consider Figure 5.1.Suppose instead that the Mexican government provides a subsidy of $200 per ton to its steel producers, as indicated by the supply schedule SM (with subsidy).As a result of the subsidy, the welfare loss to Mexico due to inefficient domestic production equals

A) $200.
B) $400.
C) $600.
D) $800.
Question
A specification of a maximum amount of a foreign produced good that will be allowed to enter the country over a given time period is referred to as

A) a domestic subsidy.
B) an export subsidy.
C) an import quota.
D) an export quota.
Question
Figure 5.1 illustrates the steel market for Mexico, assumed to be a "small" country that is unable to affect the world price. Suppose the world price of steel is given and constant at $200 per ton. Now suppose the Mexican steel industry is able to obtain trade protection.
Figure 5.1. Alternative Nontariff Trade Barriers Levied by a "Small" Country <strong>Figure 5.1 illustrates the steel market for Mexico, assumed to be a small country that is unable to affect the world price. Suppose the world price of steel is given and constant at $200 per ton. Now suppose the Mexican steel industry is able to obtain trade protection. Figure 5.1. Alternative Nontariff Trade Barriers Levied by a Small Country   Consider Figure 5.1.Suppose the Mexican government provides a subsidy of $200 per ton to its steel producers, as indicated by the supply schedule S<sub>M (with subsidy)</sub>.The quantity of imports equals</strong> A) 1 ton. B) 2 tons. C) 3 tons. D) 4 tons. <div style=padding-top: 35px>
Consider Figure 5.1.Suppose the Mexican government provides a subsidy of $200 per ton to its steel producers, as indicated by the supply schedule SM (with subsidy).The quantity of imports equals

A) 1 ton.
B) 2 tons.
C) 3 tons.
D) 4 tons.
Question
Figure 5.1 illustrates the steel market for Mexico, assumed to be a "small" country that is unable to affect the world price. Suppose the world price of steel is given and constant at $200 per ton. Now suppose the Mexican steel industry is able to obtain trade protection.
Figure 5.1. Alternative Nontariff Trade Barriers Levied by a "Small" Country <strong>Figure 5.1 illustrates the steel market for Mexico, assumed to be a small country that is unable to affect the world price. Suppose the world price of steel is given and constant at $200 per ton. Now suppose the Mexican steel industry is able to obtain trade protection. Figure 5.1. Alternative Nontariff Trade Barriers Levied by a Small Country   Referring to Figure 5.1, suppose the Mexican government imposes an import quota equal to 2 tons of steel.If Mexican steel importers behave as monopoly buyers and foreign exporters behave as competitive sellers, the overall welfare loss of the quota to Mexico equals</strong> A) $200. B) $400. C) $600. D) $800. <div style=padding-top: 35px>
Referring to Figure 5.1, suppose the Mexican government imposes an import quota equal to 2 tons of steel.If Mexican steel importers behave as monopoly buyers and foreign exporters behave as competitive sellers, the overall welfare loss of the quota to Mexico equals

A) $200.
B) $400.
C) $600.
D) $800.
Question
Figure 5.1 illustrates the steel market for Mexico, assumed to be a "small" country that is unable to affect the world price. Suppose the world price of steel is given and constant at $200 per ton. Now suppose the Mexican steel industry is able to obtain trade protection.
Figure 5.1. Alternative Nontariff Trade Barriers Levied by a "Small" Country <strong>Figure 5.1 illustrates the steel market for Mexico, assumed to be a small country that is unable to affect the world price. Suppose the world price of steel is given and constant at $200 per ton. Now suppose the Mexican steel industry is able to obtain trade protection. Figure 5.1. Alternative Nontariff Trade Barriers Levied by a Small Country   Consider Figure 5.1.With free trade, Mexico's consumer surplus and producer surplus respectively equal</strong> A) $2000 and $1200. B) $3200 and $200. C) $3600 and $800. D) $4000 and $600. <div style=padding-top: 35px>
Consider Figure 5.1.With free trade, Mexico's consumer surplus and producer surplus respectively equal

A) $2000 and $1200.
B) $3200 and $200.
C) $3600 and $800.
D) $4000 and $600.
Question
If import licenses are auctioned off to domestic importers in a competitive market, their scarcity value (revenue effect) accrues to

A) foreign corporations.
B) foreign workers.
C) domestic corporations.
D) the domestic government.
Question
Figure 5.1 illustrates the steel market for Mexico, assumed to be a "small" country that is unable to affect the world price. Suppose the world price of steel is given and constant at $200 per ton. Now suppose the Mexican steel industry is able to obtain trade protection.
Figure 5.1. Alternative Nontariff Trade Barriers Levied by a "Small" Country <strong>Figure 5.1 illustrates the steel market for Mexico, assumed to be a small country that is unable to affect the world price. Suppose the world price of steel is given and constant at $200 per ton. Now suppose the Mexican steel industry is able to obtain trade protection. Figure 5.1. Alternative Nontariff Trade Barriers Levied by a Small Country   Consider Figure 5.1.Suppose the Mexican government provides a subsidy of $200 per ton to its steel producers, as indicated by the supply schedule S<sub>M (with subsidy)</sub>.The overall deadweight welfare loss to Mexico equals</strong> A) $200. B) $400. C) $600. D) $800. <div style=padding-top: 35px>
Consider Figure 5.1.Suppose the Mexican government provides a subsidy of $200 per ton to its steel producers, as indicated by the supply schedule SM (with subsidy).The overall deadweight welfare loss to Mexico equals

A) $200.
B) $400.
C) $600.
D) $800.
Question
If the home country's government grants a subsidy on a domestically produced good, domestic producers tend to

A) capture the entire subsidy in the form of higher profits.
B) increase their level of production.
C) reduce wages paid to domestic workers.
D) consider the subsidy as an increase in production cost.
Question
In certain industries, Japanese employers do not lay off workers.Therefore, they sometimes have excess supplies of goods that they cannot sell on the home market without lowering prices.To hold down losses, they sell goods in overseas markets at prices well beneath those in Japan.This practice is best referred to as

A) orderly marketing.
B) trigger pricing.
C) domestic content pricing.
D) dumping.
Question
Figure 5.1 illustrates the steel market for Mexico, assumed to be a "small" country that is unable to affect the world price. Suppose the world price of steel is given and constant at $200 per ton. Now suppose the Mexican steel industry is able to obtain trade protection.
Figure 5.1. Alternative Nontariff Trade Barriers Levied by a "Small" Country <strong>Figure 5.1 illustrates the steel market for Mexico, assumed to be a small country that is unable to affect the world price. Suppose the world price of steel is given and constant at $200 per ton. Now suppose the Mexican steel industry is able to obtain trade protection. Figure 5.1. Alternative Nontariff Trade Barriers Levied by a Small Country   Referring to Figure 5.1, suppose the Mexican government imposes an import quota equal to 2 tons of steel.If foreign exporters behave as monopoly sellers, and Mexican importers behave as competitive buyers, the overall welfare loss of the quota to Mexico equals</strong> A) $200. B) $400. C) $600. D) $800. <div style=padding-top: 35px>
Referring to Figure 5.1, suppose the Mexican government imposes an import quota equal to 2 tons of steel.If foreign exporters behave as monopoly sellers, and Mexican importers behave as competitive buyers, the overall welfare loss of the quota to Mexico equals

A) $200.
B) $400.
C) $600.
D) $800.
Question
Figure 5.1 illustrates the steel market for Mexico, assumed to be a "small" country that is unable to affect the world price. Suppose the world price of steel is given and constant at $200 per ton. Now suppose the Mexican steel industry is able to obtain trade protection.
Figure 5.1. Alternative Nontariff Trade Barriers Levied by a "Small" Country <strong>Figure 5.1 illustrates the steel market for Mexico, assumed to be a small country that is unable to affect the world price. Suppose the world price of steel is given and constant at $200 per ton. Now suppose the Mexican steel industry is able to obtain trade protection. Figure 5.1. Alternative Nontariff Trade Barriers Levied by a Small Country   Referring to Figure 5.1, suppose the Mexican government imposes an import quota equal to 2 tons of steel.If the Mexican government auctions import licenses to the highest foreign bidder, the overall welfare loss of the quota to Mexico equals</strong> A) $200. B) $400. C) $600. D) $800. <div style=padding-top: 35px>
Referring to Figure 5.1, suppose the Mexican government imposes an import quota equal to 2 tons of steel.If the Mexican government auctions import licenses to the highest foreign bidder, the overall welfare loss of the quota to Mexico equals

A) $200.
B) $400.
C) $600.
D) $800.
Question
If a tariff and an import quota lead to equivalent increases in the domestic price of steel, then

A) the quota results in efficiency reductions but the tariff does not.
B) the tariff results in efficiency reductions but the quota does not.
C) they have identical impacts on how much is produced and consumed.
D) they have identical impacts on how income is distributed.
Question
Figure 5.1 illustrates the steel market for Mexico, assumed to be a "small" country that is unable to affect the world price. Suppose the world price of steel is given and constant at $200 per ton. Now suppose the Mexican steel industry is able to obtain trade protection.
Figure 5.1. Alternative Nontariff Trade Barriers Levied by a "Small" Country <strong>Figure 5.1 illustrates the steel market for Mexico, assumed to be a small country that is unable to affect the world price. Suppose the world price of steel is given and constant at $200 per ton. Now suppose the Mexican steel industry is able to obtain trade protection. Figure 5.1. Alternative Nontariff Trade Barriers Levied by a Small Country   Consider Figure 5.1.Suppose the Mexican government provides a subsidy of $200 per ton to its steel producers, as indicated by the supply schedule S<sub>M (with subsidy)</sub>.As a result of the subsidy Mexican steel producers gain ____ of producer surplus.</strong> A) $200 B) $400 C) $600 D) $800 <div style=padding-top: 35px>
Consider Figure 5.1.Suppose the Mexican government provides a subsidy of $200 per ton to its steel producers, as indicated by the supply schedule SM (with subsidy).As a result of the subsidy Mexican steel producers gain ____ of producer surplus.

A) $200
B) $400
C) $600
D) $800
Question
Import quotas tend to lead to all of the following EXCEPT

A) domestic producers of the imported good being harmed.
B) domestic consumers of the imported good being harmed.
C) prices increasing in the importing country.
D) prices falling in the exporting country.
Question
From the perspective of the American public as a whole, export subsidies levied by overseas governments on goods sold to the United States

A) help more than they hurt.
B) hurt more than they help.
C) are equivalent to an import quota.
D) are equivalent to an export quota.
Question
To maintain that South Koreans are dumping their VCRs in the United States is to maintain that

A) Koreans are selling VCRs in the United States below their production cost.
B) Koreans are selling VCRs in the United States above their production cost.
C) the cost of manufacturing VCRs in Korea is lower in Korea than in the United States since wages are lower in Korea.
D) the cost of manufacturing VCRs in Korea is higher in Korea than in the United States since wages are higher in Korea.
Question
Figure 5.1 illustrates the steel market for Mexico, assumed to be a "small" country that is unable to affect the world price. Suppose the world price of steel is given and constant at $200 per ton. Now suppose the Mexican steel industry is able to obtain trade protection.
Figure 5.1. Alternative Nontariff Trade Barriers Levied by a "Small" Country <strong>Figure 5.1 illustrates the steel market for Mexico, assumed to be a small country that is unable to affect the world price. Suppose the world price of steel is given and constant at $200 per ton. Now suppose the Mexican steel industry is able to obtain trade protection. Figure 5.1. Alternative Nontariff Trade Barriers Levied by a Small Country   Consider Figure 5.1.With free trade, the quantity of steel imported by Mexico equals</strong> A) 2 tons. B) 4 tons. C) 6 tons. D) 8 tons. <div style=padding-top: 35px>
Consider Figure 5.1.With free trade, the quantity of steel imported by Mexico equals

A) 2 tons.
B) 4 tons.
C) 6 tons.
D) 8 tons.
Question
Government subsidies may take the form of all of these EXCEPT

A) cash disbursements.
B) tax breaks.
C) bank credits.
D) insurance arrangements.
Question
Export subsidies levied by foreign governments on products in which the United States has a comparative disadvantage

A) lower the welfare of all Americans.
B) lead to increases in U.S. consumer surplus.
C) encourage U.S. production of competing goods.
D) encourage U.S. workers to demand higher wages.
Question
Figure 5.1 illustrates the steel market for Mexico, assumed to be a "small" country that is unable to affect the world price. Suppose the world price of steel is given and constant at $200 per ton. Now suppose the Mexican steel industry is able to obtain trade protection.
Figure 5.1. Alternative Nontariff Trade Barriers Levied by a "Small" Country <strong>Figure 5.1 illustrates the steel market for Mexico, assumed to be a small country that is unable to affect the world price. Suppose the world price of steel is given and constant at $200 per ton. Now suppose the Mexican steel industry is able to obtain trade protection. Figure 5.1. Alternative Nontariff Trade Barriers Levied by a Small Country   Consider Figure 5.1.Suppose the Mexican government provides a subsidy of $200 per ton to its steel producers, as indicated by the supply schedule S<sub>M (with subsidy)</sub>.The total cost of the subsidy to the Mexican government equals</strong> A) $200. B) $400. C) $600. D) $800. <div style=padding-top: 35px>
Consider Figure 5.1.Suppose the Mexican government provides a subsidy of $200 per ton to its steel producers, as indicated by the supply schedule SM (with subsidy).The total cost of the subsidy to the Mexican government equals

A) $200.
B) $400.
C) $600.
D) $800.
Question
Figure 5.3. Sweden's Apple Market <strong>Figure 5.3. Sweden's Apple Market   Consider Figure 5.3.Assume that Swedish import companies behave as competitive buyers while foreign export companies behave as monopoly sellers.Compared to free trade, Sweden's import quota results in domestic welfare</strong> A) gains totaling $3.20. B) gains totaling $4.80. C) losses totaling $3.20. D) losses totaling $4.80. <div style=padding-top: 35px>
Consider Figure 5.3.Assume that Swedish import companies behave as competitive buyers while foreign export companies behave as monopoly sellers.Compared to free trade, Sweden's import quota results in domestic welfare

A) gains totaling $3.20.
B) gains totaling $4.80.
C) losses totaling $3.20.
D) losses totaling $4.80.
Question
Figure 5.3. Sweden's Apple Market <strong>Figure 5.3. Sweden's Apple Market   Consider Figure 5.3.If the Swedish government auctions import licenses to the highest bidder in a competitive market, it could realize revenues of up to</strong> A) $3.20. B) $4.00. C) $4.80. D) $5.60. <div style=padding-top: 35px>
Consider Figure 5.3.If the Swedish government auctions import licenses to the highest bidder in a competitive market, it could realize revenues of up to

A) $3.20.
B) $4.00.
C) $4.80.
D) $5.60.
Question
Figure 5.3. Sweden's Apple Market <strong>Figure 5.3. Sweden's Apple Market   Consider Figure 5.3.If S<sub>Sweden+Quota</sub> represents the supply schedule after a quota is levied, Sweden's imports will equal</strong> A) 6 apples. B) 8 apples. C) 10 apples. D) 12 apples. <div style=padding-top: 35px>
Consider Figure 5.3.If SSweden+Quota represents the supply schedule after a quota is levied, Sweden's imports will equal

A) 6 apples.
B) 8 apples.
C) 10 apples.
D) 12 apples.
Question
Figure 5.2. International Dumping <strong>Figure 5.2. International Dumping   Consider Figure 5.2.Compared with the total revenue and total profit that ABC Inc.realizes in the absence of dumping, with dumping the firm attains a</strong> A) fall in revenue of $18; fall in profits of $15. B) fall in revenue of $18, fall in profits of $18. C) rise in revenue of $18, rise in profits of $15. D) rise in revenue of $18, rise in profits of $18. <div style=padding-top: 35px>
Consider Figure 5.2.Compared with the total revenue and total profit that ABC Inc.realizes in the absence of dumping, with dumping the firm attains a

A) fall in revenue of $18; fall in profits of $15.
B) fall in revenue of $18, fall in profits of $18.
C) rise in revenue of $18, rise in profits of $15.
D) rise in revenue of $18, rise in profits of $18.
Question
Figure 5.3. Sweden's Apple Market <strong>Figure 5.3. Sweden's Apple Market   Consider Figure 5.3.In the absence of trade, Sweden's equilibrium price and quantity of apples would be</strong> A) $0.60 and 22 pounds. B) $0.60 and 14 pounds. C) $1.00 and 18 pounds. D) $1.40 and 14 pounds. <div style=padding-top: 35px>
Consider Figure 5.3.In the absence of trade, Sweden's equilibrium price and quantity of apples would be

A) $0.60 and 22 pounds.
B) $0.60 and 14 pounds.
C) $1.00 and 18 pounds.
D) $1.40 and 14 pounds.
Question
Figure 5.4. Venezuelan Calculator Market <strong>Figure 5.4. Venezuelan Calculator Market   Consider Figure 5.4.The cost of the production subsidy to the Venezuelan government totals</strong> A) $32. B) $40. C) $48. D) $54. <div style=padding-top: 35px>
Consider Figure 5.4.The cost of the production subsidy to the Venezuelan government totals

A) $32.
B) $40.
C) $48.
D) $54.
Question
Figure 5.3. Sweden's Apple Market <strong>Figure 5.3. Sweden's Apple Market   Consider Figure 5.3.At the free-trade price of $0.60 per pound, Sweden's consumer surplus totals ____ and producer surplus totals ____.</strong> A) $10.80, $2.40 B) $14.60, $3.90 C) $24.20, $1.80 D) $32.40, $2.30 <div style=padding-top: 35px>
Consider Figure 5.3.At the free-trade price of $0.60 per pound, Sweden's consumer surplus totals ____ and producer surplus totals ____.

A) $10.80, $2.40
B) $14.60, $3.90
C) $24.20, $1.80
D) $32.40, $2.30
Question
Figure 5.3. Sweden's Apple Market <strong>Figure 5.3. Sweden's Apple Market   Consider Figure 5.3.After the quota is levied, the price of apples in Sweden will equal</strong> A) $0.60 per pound. B) $1.00 per pound. C) $1.40 per pound. D) $1.80 per pound. <div style=padding-top: 35px>
Consider Figure 5.3.After the quota is levied, the price of apples in Sweden will equal

A) $0.60 per pound.
B) $1.00 per pound.
C) $1.40 per pound.
D) $1.80 per pound.
Question
Figure 5.3. Sweden's Apple Market <strong>Figure 5.3. Sweden's Apple Market   Consider Figure 5.3.Suppose the rest of the world can supply apples to Sweden at a price of $0.60 per pound.With free trade, Sweden produces ____ pounds of apples and imports ____ pounds of apples.</strong> A) 10, 8 B) 10, 18 C) 6, 22 D) 6, 16 <div style=padding-top: 35px>
Consider Figure 5.3.Suppose the rest of the world can supply apples to Sweden at a price of $0.60 per pound.With free trade, Sweden produces ____ pounds of apples and imports ____ pounds of apples.

A) 10, 8
B) 10, 18
C) 6, 22
D) 6, 16
Question
Figure 5.3. Sweden's Apple Market <strong>Figure 5.3. Sweden's Apple Market   Consider Figure 5.3.Assume that Swedish import companies behave as monopoly buyers while foreign export companies behave as competitive sellers.Compared to free trade, Sweden's import quota results in domestic welfare</strong> A) gains totaling $1.60. B) gains totaling $3.20. C) losses totaling $1.60. D) losses totaling $3.20. <div style=padding-top: 35px>
Consider Figure 5.3.Assume that Swedish import companies behave as monopoly buyers while foreign export companies behave as competitive sellers.Compared to free trade, Sweden's import quota results in domestic welfare

A) gains totaling $1.60.
B) gains totaling $3.20.
C) losses totaling $1.60.
D) losses totaling $3.20.
Question
Figure 5.1 illustrates the steel market for Mexico, assumed to be a "small" country that is unable to affect the world price. Suppose the world price of steel is given and constant at $200 per ton. Now suppose the Mexican steel industry is able to obtain trade protection.
Figure 5.1. Alternative Nontariff Trade Barriers Levied by a "Small" Country <strong>Figure 5.1 illustrates the steel market for Mexico, assumed to be a small country that is unable to affect the world price. Suppose the world price of steel is given and constant at $200 per ton. Now suppose the Mexican steel industry is able to obtain trade protection. Figure 5.1. Alternative Nontariff Trade Barriers Levied by a Small Country   Consider Figure 5.1.Suppose the rest of the world voluntarily agrees to reduce steel shipments to Mexico vis-a-vis an export quota equal to 2 tons.Assuming Mexican importers behave as competitive buyers while foreign exporters behave as monopoly sellers, the overall welfare loss of the quota to Mexico is</strong> A) $200. B) $400. C) $600. D) $800. <div style=padding-top: 35px>
Consider Figure 5.1.Suppose the rest of the world voluntarily agrees to reduce steel shipments to Mexico vis-a-vis an export quota equal to 2 tons.Assuming Mexican importers behave as competitive buyers while foreign exporters behave as monopoly sellers, the overall welfare loss of the quota to Mexico is

A) $200.
B) $400.
C) $600.
D) $800.
Question
Figure 5.4. Venezuelan Calculator Market <strong>Figure 5.4. Venezuelan Calculator Market   Consider Figure 5.4.Assume the Venezuelan government grants its manufacturers a production subsidy of $4 per calculator.After the subsidy is granted, Venezuelan imports total</strong> A) 8 calculators. B) 12 calculators. C) 16 calculators. D) 20 calculators. <div style=padding-top: 35px>
Consider Figure 5.4.Assume the Venezuelan government grants its manufacturers a production subsidy of $4 per calculator.After the subsidy is granted, Venezuelan imports total

A) 8 calculators.
B) 12 calculators.
C) 16 calculators.
D) 20 calculators.
Question
Figure 5.4. Venezuelan Calculator Market <strong>Figure 5.4. Venezuelan Calculator Market   Consider Figure 5.4.Suppose the rest of the world supplies calculators to Venezuela at a price of $4 each.With free trade, Venezuelan imports total</strong> A) 8 calculators. B) 16 calculators. C) 20 calculators. D) 24 calculators. <div style=padding-top: 35px>
Consider Figure 5.4.Suppose the rest of the world supplies calculators to Venezuela at a price of $4 each.With free trade, Venezuelan imports total

A) 8 calculators.
B) 16 calculators.
C) 20 calculators.
D) 24 calculators.
Question
Figure 5.2. International Dumping <strong>Figure 5.2. International Dumping   Consider Figure 5.2.In the absence of international dumping, ABC Inc.maximizes profits by selling ____ calculators at a price of $____; the firm realizes profits totaling $____.</strong> A) 27, 5, 54 B) 27, 5, 36 C) 24, 4, 46 D) 24, 4, 28 <div style=padding-top: 35px>
Consider Figure 5.2.In the absence of international dumping, ABC Inc.maximizes profits by selling ____ calculators at a price of $____; the firm realizes profits totaling $____.

A) 27, 5, 54
B) 27, 5, 36
C) 24, 4, 46
D) 24, 4, 28
Question
Figure 5.3. Sweden's Apple Market <strong>Figure 5.3. Sweden's Apple Market   Consider Figure 5.3.The quota's revenue effect equals</strong> A) $1.60. B) $2.40. C) $3.20. D) $4.00. <div style=padding-top: 35px>
Consider Figure 5.3.The quota's revenue effect equals

A) $1.60.
B) $2.40.
C) $3.20.
D) $4.00.
Question
Figure 5.3. Sweden's Apple Market <strong>Figure 5.3. Sweden's Apple Market   Consider Figure 5.3.The quota leads to a deadweight welfare loss for Sweden of an amount equaling</strong> A) $0.80. B) $1.60. C) $2.40. D) $3.20. <div style=padding-top: 35px>
Consider Figure 5.3.The quota leads to a deadweight welfare loss for Sweden of an amount equaling

A) $0.80.
B) $1.60.
C) $2.40.
D) $3.20.
Question
Figure 5.1 illustrates the steel market for Mexico, assumed to be a "small" country that is unable to affect the world price. Suppose the world price of steel is given and constant at $200 per ton. Now suppose the Mexican steel industry is able to obtain trade protection.
Figure 5.1. Alternative Nontariff Trade Barriers Levied by a "Small" Country <strong>Figure 5.1 illustrates the steel market for Mexico, assumed to be a small country that is unable to affect the world price. Suppose the world price of steel is given and constant at $200 per ton. Now suppose the Mexican steel industry is able to obtain trade protection. Figure 5.1. Alternative Nontariff Trade Barriers Levied by a Small Country   Consider Figure 5.1.Suppose the rest of the world voluntarily agrees to reduce steel shipments to Mexico vis-a-vis an export quota equal to 2 tons.Assuming Mexican importers behave as monopoly buyers while foreign exporters behave as competitive sellers, the overall welfare loss of the quota to Mexico is</strong> A) $200. B) $400. C) $600. D) $800. <div style=padding-top: 35px>
Consider Figure 5.1.Suppose the rest of the world voluntarily agrees to reduce steel shipments to Mexico vis-a-vis an export quota equal to 2 tons.Assuming Mexican importers behave as monopoly buyers while foreign exporters behave as competitive sellers, the overall welfare loss of the quota to Mexico is

A) $200.
B) $400.
C) $600.
D) $800.
Question
Figure 5.2. International Dumping <strong>Figure 5.2. International Dumping   Consider Figure 5.2.ABC Inc.sells 27 calculators at a price of $5 each, realizing profits totaling $54.Of this quantity, ABC Inc.sells ____ calculators in Canada and realizes revenues totaling $____; the firm sells ____ calculators in France and realizes revenues totaling $____.</strong> A) 15, 35, 9, 45 B) 15, 45, 9, 35 C) 21, 105, 6, 30 D) 21, 30, 6, 105 <div style=padding-top: 35px>
Consider Figure 5.2.ABC Inc.sells 27 calculators at a price of $5 each, realizing profits totaling $54.Of this quantity, ABC Inc.sells ____ calculators in Canada and realizes revenues totaling $____; the firm sells ____ calculators in France and realizes revenues totaling $____.

A) 15, 35, 9, 45
B) 15, 45, 9, 35
C) 21, 105, 6, 30
D) 21, 30, 6, 105
Question
Figure 5.2. International Dumping <strong>Figure 5.2. International Dumping   Consider Figure 5.2.With international dumping, ABC Inc.sells ____ calculators to Canadian buyers at a price of $____ and ____ calculators to French buyers at a price of $____.</strong> A) 15, 4, 12, 7 B) 15, 7, 12, 4 C) 9, 5, 15, 6 D) 9, 6, 15, 5 <div style=padding-top: 35px>
Consider Figure 5.2.With international dumping, ABC Inc.sells ____ calculators to Canadian buyers at a price of $____ and ____ calculators to French buyers at a price of $____.

A) 15, 4, 12, 7
B) 15, 7, 12, 4
C) 9, 5, 15, 6
D) 9, 6, 15, 5
Question
Figure 5.3. Sweden's Apple Market <strong>Figure 5.3. Sweden's Apple Market   Consider Figure 5.3.As a result of the quota, Sweden's consumer surplus</strong> A) increases by $6. B) increases by $8. C) decreases by $6. D) decreases by $8. <div style=padding-top: 35px>
Consider Figure 5.3.As a result of the quota, Sweden's consumer surplus

A) increases by $6.
B) increases by $8.
C) decreases by $6.
D) decreases by $8.
Question
Under U.S.law, a(n) ___________duty is levied when the U.S.Department of Commerce determines a class or kind of foreign merchandise is being sold at less than fair value (LTFV).

A) dumping
B) antidumping
C) margin of dumping
D) below-cost sales
Question
Which is NOT a material injury caused by LTFV?

A) unemployment
B) lost sales
C) lost profit
D) general expenses
Question
When voluntary export limits are imposed on the world's chief exporter

A) the exports of the nonrestrained suppliers may be deterred.
B) a trade diversion effect may occur.
C) the exports of the non-restrained suppliers may not be deterred.
D) a trade diversion effect will not occur.
Question
Figure 5.6 Domestice Supply and demand for Wine - U.S. <strong>Figure 5.6 Domestice Supply and demand for Wine - U.S.   Consider Figure 5.6.In the global market for wine, the EU is willing to supply as much wine as the U.S.demands at $8 per bottle.What will happen to the price of a bottle of wine in the U.S.if a quota of 15 bottles of wine is imposed?</strong> A) increase to $15 B) increase to $10 C) stay the same at $8 D) decrease to $5 <div style=padding-top: 35px>
Consider Figure 5.6.In the global market for wine, the EU is willing to supply as much wine as the U.S.demands at $8 per bottle.What will happen to the price of a bottle of wine in the U.S.if a quota of 15 bottles of wine is imposed?

A) increase to $15
B) increase to $10
C) stay the same at $8
D) decrease to $5
Question
Figure 5.4. Venezuelan Calculator Market <strong>Figure 5.4. Venezuelan Calculator Market   Consider Figure 5.4.The increase in Venezuelan producer surplus under the production subsidy totals</strong> A) $16. B) $20. C) $24. D) $32. <div style=padding-top: 35px>
Consider Figure 5.4.The increase in Venezuelan producer surplus under the production subsidy totals

A) $16.
B) $20.
C) $24.
D) $32.
Question
Assume that a U.S.importer imports furniture from China.If the Commerce Department makes a preliminary investigation and finds evidence of dumping, the U.S.importer must pay a special tariff equal to the

A) estimated dumping margin on all imports of that product.
B) estimated dumping margin on all sales of that product.
C) estimated manufacturing cost on all imports of that product.
D) estimated dumping margin on all exports of that product.
Question
Figure 5.6 Domestice Supply and demand for Wine - U.S. <strong>Figure 5.6 Domestice Supply and demand for Wine - U.S.   Consider Figure 5.6.In the global market for wine, the EU is willing to supply as much wine as the U.S.demands at $8 per bottle.If the U.S.imposes a quota of 15 bottles of wine, how much wine will U.S.consumers demand, how much wine will U.S.producers produce and how much wine will be imported?</strong> A) 30 bottles, 20 bottles, 10 bottles B) 40 bottles, 25 bottles, 15 bottles C) 30 bottles, 30 bottles, 0 bottles D) 30 bottles, 15 bottles, 15 bottles <div style=padding-top: 35px>
Consider Figure 5.6.In the global market for wine, the EU is willing to supply as much wine as the U.S.demands at $8 per bottle.If the U.S.imposes a quota of 15 bottles of wine, how much wine will U.S.consumers demand, how much wine will U.S.producers produce and how much wine will be imported?

A) 30 bottles, 20 bottles, 10 bottles
B) 40 bottles, 25 bottles, 15 bottles
C) 30 bottles, 30 bottles, 0 bottles
D) 30 bottles, 15 bottles, 15 bottles
Question
A home appliance manufacturer observes the following and determines that his competitors are pricing their imported goods below-cost sale.Which point would have helped him come to this conclusion?

A) The amount of general expenses was 12 percent of the cost of manufacturing.
B) The cost of packaging the merchandise for shipment was included.
C) The cost of product in the U.S. is below that in the home market.
D) The amount of profit was equal to 9 percent of the manufacturing cost plus general expenses.
Question
In recent years, the average antidumping duty imposed by the United States has been about

A) 70 percent.
B) 50 percent.
C) 45 percent.
D) >100 percent.
Question
The margin of dumping is calculated as

A) difference between the local market value and the U.S. price.
B) difference between the foreign market value and the U.S. price.
C) difference between the U.S. market value and the foreign price.
D) difference between the foreign market value and the foreign price.
Question
Assume that the Commerce Department makes a preliminary investigation on imports of furniture by a company and finds evidence of dumping and collects an estimated dumping margin on all imports of that product.On further investigation it is determined that dumping has NOT happened.Then, the special tariff collected is

A) replaced with a permanent tariff, collected from the importer.
B) returned partially to the importer.
C) retained fully by the Commerce Department.
D) rebated to the importer.
Question
Figure 5.6 Domestice Supply and demand for Wine - U.S. <strong>Figure 5.6 Domestice Supply and demand for Wine - U.S.   Consider Figure 5.6.In the global market for wine, the EU is willing to supply as much wine as the U.S.demands at $8 per bottle.If the U.S.imposes a quota of 15 bottles of wine what will happen to consumer surplus?</strong> A) decreases by $210 B) decreases by $245 C) stays the same D) increases by $70 <div style=padding-top: 35px>
Consider Figure 5.6.In the global market for wine, the EU is willing to supply as much wine as the U.S.demands at $8 per bottle.If the U.S.imposes a quota of 15 bottles of wine what will happen to consumer surplus?

A) decreases by $210
B) decreases by $245
C) stays the same
D) increases by $70
Question
Why do you think Whirlpool had to file multiple lawsuits before it won import protection?

A) due to the tough import competition it faced from Samsung and LG.
B) due to the country-hopping technique that Samsung and LG indulged in
C) due to president Donald Trump's "America First" slogan
D) because Samsung and LG practiced unlawful pricing of washing machines imported from South Korea and Mexico
Question
Figure 5.6 Domestice Supply and demand for Wine - U.S. <strong>Figure 5.6 Domestice Supply and demand for Wine - U.S.   Consider Figure 5.6.In the global market for wine, the EU is willing to supply as much wine as the U.S.demands at $8 per bottle.If the U.S.imposes a quota of 15 bottles of wine, how much revenue will the U.S.government collect?</strong> A) 0 B) $35 C) $70 D) $105 <div style=padding-top: 35px>
Consider Figure 5.6.In the global market for wine, the EU is willing to supply as much wine as the U.S.demands at $8 per bottle.If the U.S.imposes a quota of 15 bottles of wine, how much revenue will the U.S.government collect?

A) 0
B) $35
C) $70
D) $105
Question
Figure 5.6 Domestice Supply and demand for Wine - U.S. <strong>Figure 5.6 Domestice Supply and demand for Wine - U.S.   Consider Figure 5.6.In the global market for wine, the EU is willing to supply as much wine as the U.S.demands at $8 per bottle.How much will the U.S.produce and import in these circumstances?</strong> A) 5 bottles, 40 bottles B) 40 bottles, 0 bottles C) 5 bottles, 35 bottles D) 5 bottles, 0 bottles <div style=padding-top: 35px>
Consider Figure 5.6.In the global market for wine, the EU is willing to supply as much wine as the U.S.demands at $8 per bottle.How much will the U.S.produce and import in these circumstances?

A) 5 bottles, 40 bottles
B) 40 bottles, 0 bottles
C) 5 bottles, 35 bottles
D) 5 bottles, 0 bottles
Question
A voluntary export agreement

A) typically applies only to the world's most important exporting nation(s).
B) typically applies only to the world's least important exporting nation (s).
C) is always more restrictive on trade than a tariff or import quota.
D) allows producers with superior products to participate in market.
Question
Concerning international dumping, many economists argue that "fair value" should be based on

A) average variable cost.
B) average fixed cost.
C) marginal cost.
D) total cost.
Question
Figure 5.4. Venezuelan Calculator Market <strong>Figure 5.4. Venezuelan Calculator Market   Consider Figure 5.4.The production subsidy results in an overall welfare loss for Venezuela totaling</strong> A) $8. B) $12. C) $16. D) $20. <div style=padding-top: 35px>
Consider Figure 5.4.The production subsidy results in an overall welfare loss for Venezuela totaling

A) $8.
B) $12.
C) $16.
D) $20.
Question
Assume that the manufacturing cost of a company is $50,0000 and the general expenses is $50,000.Then, the amount of profit must be equal to at least _____ for the cost-based definition criterion of foreign market value to be met.

A) $44,000
B) $6,500
C) $56,000
D) $49,000
Question
Subsidies to domestic firms may lead to

A) an increase in prices.
B) higher volume of exports.
C) higher volume of imports.
D) increase in welfare of the trading partner.
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Deck 5: Nontariff Trade Barriers
1
The imposition of a tariff on imported steel for the home country results in

A) improving terms of trade and rising volume of trade.
B) higher steel prices and falling steel consumption.
C) lower profits for domestic steel companies.
D) higher unemployment for domestic steel workers.
higher steel prices and falling steel consumption.
2
Empirical studies show that because voluntary export quotas are typically administered by exporting countries, foreign exporters tend to

A) raise their export prices, thus capturing much of the quota's revenue effect.
B) lower their export prices, thus losing much of the quota's revenue effect.
C) raise their export prices, thus selling more goods overseas.
D) lower their export prices, thus selling fewer goods overseas.
raise their export prices, thus capturing much of the quota's revenue effect.
3
Assume the U.S.has a competitive advantage in producing calculators, while the rest of the world has a competitive advantage in steel.Suppose the U.S.and the rest of the world enter into an agreement to lower import quotas below existing levels on calculators and steel.Which of the following would least likely occur for the U.S.? Rising levels of

A) consumer surplus for American buyers of steel.
B) producer surplus for American steelmakers.
C) production in the American calculator industry.
D) producer surplus for American calculator producers.
producer surplus for American steelmakers.
4
The U.S.-Japanese agreement in 1981 to limit imports of small Japanese cars to the U.S.

A) affected Japanese automakers uniformly.
B) resulted in losses to the Japanese auto industry.
C) cost the U.S. consumer an extra $660 or so per Japanese import purchased.
D) did not save any U.S. jobs.
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5
Tariffs and quotas on imports tend to involve larger sacrifices in national welfare than would occur under domestic subsidies.This is because, unlike domestic subsidies, import tariffs and quotas

A) permit less efficient home production.
B) distort choices for domestic consumers.
C) result in higher tax rates for domestic residents.
D) redistribute revenue from domestic producers to consumers.
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6
Domestic content legislation applied to autos would tend to

A) support wage levels of American autoworkers.
B) lower auto prices for American autoworkers.
C) encourage American automakers to locate production overseas.
D) increase profits of American auto companies.
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7
A firm that faces problems of falling sales and excess productive capacity might resort to international dumping if it

A) can charge higher prices in markets that are elastic to price changes.
B) earns revenues on foreign sales that at least cover variable costs.
C) can sell at that price where domestic and foreign demand elasticities equate.
D) is able to force foreign prices below marginal production costs.
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8
Compared to an import quota, an equivalent tariff may provide a less certain amount of protection for home producers since

A) a tariff has no deadweight loss in terms of production and consumption.
B) foreign firms may absorb the tariff by offering exports at lower prices.
C) tariffs are effective only if home demand is perfectly elastic.
D) quotas do not result in increases in the price of the imported good.
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9
Which trade restriction stipulates the percentage of a product's total value that must be produced domestically in order for that product to be sold domestically?

A) import quota
B) orderly marketing agreement
C) local content requirement
D) government procurement policy
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10
Suppose the government grants a subsidy to its export firms that permits them to charge lower prices on goods sold abroad.The export revenue of these firms would rise if the foreign demand is

A) elastic in response to the price reduction.
B) inelastic in response to the price reduction.
C) unit elastic in response to the price reduction.
D) weak.
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11
The imposition of a domestic content requirement by the United States would cause consumer surplus for Americans to

A) rise.
B) fall.
C) remain unchanged.
D) impose downward pressure on wages of workers.
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12
Concerning the restrictive impact of an import quota, assume there occurs an increase in the domestic demand for the import product.As long as the quota falls short of what would be imported under free market conditions, the economy's adjustment to the increase in demand would take the form of

A) a decrease in domestic production of the import good.
B) an increase in the amount of the good being imported.
C) an increase in the domestic price of the import good.
D) a decrease in domestic consumption of the import good.
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13
A producer successfully practicing international dumping would charge

A) a relatively higher price in the more inelastic market.
B) a relatively higher price in the more elastic market.
C) the same price in all markets, regardless of their elasticities.
D) different prices in all markets, regardless of their elasticities.
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14
The United Auto Workers union attempted to win the approval of legislation that would moderate the practice of foreign sourcing on the part of American auto manufacturers.Which of the following best represents this legislation?

A) voluntary export quotas
B) trigger price mechanism
C) tariff quotas
D) local content laws
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15
Suppose the government grants a subsidy to domestic producers of an import-competing good.The subsidy tends to result in deadweight losses for the domestic economy in the form of the

A) consumption effect.
B) redistribution effect.
C) revenue effect.
D) protective effect.
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16
Which of the following refers to a market-sharing pact negotiated by trading partners to moderate the intensity of international competition?

A) orderly marketing agreement
B) local content requirements
C) import quota
D) trigger price mechanism
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17
Because export subsidies tend to result in domestic exporters charging lower prices on their goods sold overseas, the home country's

A) export revenues will decrease.
B) export revenues will rise.
C) terms of trade will worsen.
D) terms of trade will improve.
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18
Antidumping law has been called unfair for all of the following reasons EXCEPT

A) they do not reflect currency fluctuations.
B) they are based on average variable cost.
C) they are based on average total cost.
D) U.S. firms selling at home are not subject to the same rules.
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19
If a tariff and an import quota lead to equivalent increases in the domestic price of steel, then

A) the quota results in efficiency reductions but the tariff does not.
B) the tariff results in efficiency reductions but the quota does not.
C) they have different impacts on how much is produced and consumed.
D) they have different impacts on how income is distributed.
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20
Suppose the United States and Japan enter into a voluntary export agreement in which Japan imposes an export quota on its automakers.The largest share of the export quota's "revenue effect" would tend to be captured by

A) the U.S. government.
B) Japanese automakers.
C) American auto consumers.
D) American autoworkers.
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21
Figure 5.1 illustrates the steel market for Mexico, assumed to be a "small" country that is unable to affect the world price. Suppose the world price of steel is given and constant at $200 per ton. Now suppose the Mexican steel industry is able to obtain trade protection.
Figure 5.1. Alternative Nontariff Trade Barriers Levied by a "Small" Country <strong>Figure 5.1 illustrates the steel market for Mexico, assumed to be a small country that is unable to affect the world price. Suppose the world price of steel is given and constant at $200 per ton. Now suppose the Mexican steel industry is able to obtain trade protection. Figure 5.1. Alternative Nontariff Trade Barriers Levied by a Small Country   Consider Figure 5.1.Suppose instead that the Mexican government provides a subsidy of $200 per ton to its steel producers, as indicated by the supply schedule S<sub>M (with subsidy)</sub>.As a result of the subsidy, the welfare loss to Mexico due to inefficient domestic production equals</strong> A) $200. B) $400. C) $600. D) $800.
Consider Figure 5.1.Suppose instead that the Mexican government provides a subsidy of $200 per ton to its steel producers, as indicated by the supply schedule SM (with subsidy).As a result of the subsidy, the welfare loss to Mexico due to inefficient domestic production equals

A) $200.
B) $400.
C) $600.
D) $800.
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22
A specification of a maximum amount of a foreign produced good that will be allowed to enter the country over a given time period is referred to as

A) a domestic subsidy.
B) an export subsidy.
C) an import quota.
D) an export quota.
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23
Figure 5.1 illustrates the steel market for Mexico, assumed to be a "small" country that is unable to affect the world price. Suppose the world price of steel is given and constant at $200 per ton. Now suppose the Mexican steel industry is able to obtain trade protection.
Figure 5.1. Alternative Nontariff Trade Barriers Levied by a "Small" Country <strong>Figure 5.1 illustrates the steel market for Mexico, assumed to be a small country that is unable to affect the world price. Suppose the world price of steel is given and constant at $200 per ton. Now suppose the Mexican steel industry is able to obtain trade protection. Figure 5.1. Alternative Nontariff Trade Barriers Levied by a Small Country   Consider Figure 5.1.Suppose the Mexican government provides a subsidy of $200 per ton to its steel producers, as indicated by the supply schedule S<sub>M (with subsidy)</sub>.The quantity of imports equals</strong> A) 1 ton. B) 2 tons. C) 3 tons. D) 4 tons.
Consider Figure 5.1.Suppose the Mexican government provides a subsidy of $200 per ton to its steel producers, as indicated by the supply schedule SM (with subsidy).The quantity of imports equals

A) 1 ton.
B) 2 tons.
C) 3 tons.
D) 4 tons.
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24
Figure 5.1 illustrates the steel market for Mexico, assumed to be a "small" country that is unable to affect the world price. Suppose the world price of steel is given and constant at $200 per ton. Now suppose the Mexican steel industry is able to obtain trade protection.
Figure 5.1. Alternative Nontariff Trade Barriers Levied by a "Small" Country <strong>Figure 5.1 illustrates the steel market for Mexico, assumed to be a small country that is unable to affect the world price. Suppose the world price of steel is given and constant at $200 per ton. Now suppose the Mexican steel industry is able to obtain trade protection. Figure 5.1. Alternative Nontariff Trade Barriers Levied by a Small Country   Referring to Figure 5.1, suppose the Mexican government imposes an import quota equal to 2 tons of steel.If Mexican steel importers behave as monopoly buyers and foreign exporters behave as competitive sellers, the overall welfare loss of the quota to Mexico equals</strong> A) $200. B) $400. C) $600. D) $800.
Referring to Figure 5.1, suppose the Mexican government imposes an import quota equal to 2 tons of steel.If Mexican steel importers behave as monopoly buyers and foreign exporters behave as competitive sellers, the overall welfare loss of the quota to Mexico equals

A) $200.
B) $400.
C) $600.
D) $800.
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25
Figure 5.1 illustrates the steel market for Mexico, assumed to be a "small" country that is unable to affect the world price. Suppose the world price of steel is given and constant at $200 per ton. Now suppose the Mexican steel industry is able to obtain trade protection.
Figure 5.1. Alternative Nontariff Trade Barriers Levied by a "Small" Country <strong>Figure 5.1 illustrates the steel market for Mexico, assumed to be a small country that is unable to affect the world price. Suppose the world price of steel is given and constant at $200 per ton. Now suppose the Mexican steel industry is able to obtain trade protection. Figure 5.1. Alternative Nontariff Trade Barriers Levied by a Small Country   Consider Figure 5.1.With free trade, Mexico's consumer surplus and producer surplus respectively equal</strong> A) $2000 and $1200. B) $3200 and $200. C) $3600 and $800. D) $4000 and $600.
Consider Figure 5.1.With free trade, Mexico's consumer surplus and producer surplus respectively equal

A) $2000 and $1200.
B) $3200 and $200.
C) $3600 and $800.
D) $4000 and $600.
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26
If import licenses are auctioned off to domestic importers in a competitive market, their scarcity value (revenue effect) accrues to

A) foreign corporations.
B) foreign workers.
C) domestic corporations.
D) the domestic government.
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27
Figure 5.1 illustrates the steel market for Mexico, assumed to be a "small" country that is unable to affect the world price. Suppose the world price of steel is given and constant at $200 per ton. Now suppose the Mexican steel industry is able to obtain trade protection.
Figure 5.1. Alternative Nontariff Trade Barriers Levied by a "Small" Country <strong>Figure 5.1 illustrates the steel market for Mexico, assumed to be a small country that is unable to affect the world price. Suppose the world price of steel is given and constant at $200 per ton. Now suppose the Mexican steel industry is able to obtain trade protection. Figure 5.1. Alternative Nontariff Trade Barriers Levied by a Small Country   Consider Figure 5.1.Suppose the Mexican government provides a subsidy of $200 per ton to its steel producers, as indicated by the supply schedule S<sub>M (with subsidy)</sub>.The overall deadweight welfare loss to Mexico equals</strong> A) $200. B) $400. C) $600. D) $800.
Consider Figure 5.1.Suppose the Mexican government provides a subsidy of $200 per ton to its steel producers, as indicated by the supply schedule SM (with subsidy).The overall deadweight welfare loss to Mexico equals

A) $200.
B) $400.
C) $600.
D) $800.
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28
If the home country's government grants a subsidy on a domestically produced good, domestic producers tend to

A) capture the entire subsidy in the form of higher profits.
B) increase their level of production.
C) reduce wages paid to domestic workers.
D) consider the subsidy as an increase in production cost.
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29
In certain industries, Japanese employers do not lay off workers.Therefore, they sometimes have excess supplies of goods that they cannot sell on the home market without lowering prices.To hold down losses, they sell goods in overseas markets at prices well beneath those in Japan.This practice is best referred to as

A) orderly marketing.
B) trigger pricing.
C) domestic content pricing.
D) dumping.
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30
Figure 5.1 illustrates the steel market for Mexico, assumed to be a "small" country that is unable to affect the world price. Suppose the world price of steel is given and constant at $200 per ton. Now suppose the Mexican steel industry is able to obtain trade protection.
Figure 5.1. Alternative Nontariff Trade Barriers Levied by a "Small" Country <strong>Figure 5.1 illustrates the steel market for Mexico, assumed to be a small country that is unable to affect the world price. Suppose the world price of steel is given and constant at $200 per ton. Now suppose the Mexican steel industry is able to obtain trade protection. Figure 5.1. Alternative Nontariff Trade Barriers Levied by a Small Country   Referring to Figure 5.1, suppose the Mexican government imposes an import quota equal to 2 tons of steel.If foreign exporters behave as monopoly sellers, and Mexican importers behave as competitive buyers, the overall welfare loss of the quota to Mexico equals</strong> A) $200. B) $400. C) $600. D) $800.
Referring to Figure 5.1, suppose the Mexican government imposes an import quota equal to 2 tons of steel.If foreign exporters behave as monopoly sellers, and Mexican importers behave as competitive buyers, the overall welfare loss of the quota to Mexico equals

A) $200.
B) $400.
C) $600.
D) $800.
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31
Figure 5.1 illustrates the steel market for Mexico, assumed to be a "small" country that is unable to affect the world price. Suppose the world price of steel is given and constant at $200 per ton. Now suppose the Mexican steel industry is able to obtain trade protection.
Figure 5.1. Alternative Nontariff Trade Barriers Levied by a "Small" Country <strong>Figure 5.1 illustrates the steel market for Mexico, assumed to be a small country that is unable to affect the world price. Suppose the world price of steel is given and constant at $200 per ton. Now suppose the Mexican steel industry is able to obtain trade protection. Figure 5.1. Alternative Nontariff Trade Barriers Levied by a Small Country   Referring to Figure 5.1, suppose the Mexican government imposes an import quota equal to 2 tons of steel.If the Mexican government auctions import licenses to the highest foreign bidder, the overall welfare loss of the quota to Mexico equals</strong> A) $200. B) $400. C) $600. D) $800.
Referring to Figure 5.1, suppose the Mexican government imposes an import quota equal to 2 tons of steel.If the Mexican government auctions import licenses to the highest foreign bidder, the overall welfare loss of the quota to Mexico equals

A) $200.
B) $400.
C) $600.
D) $800.
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32
If a tariff and an import quota lead to equivalent increases in the domestic price of steel, then

A) the quota results in efficiency reductions but the tariff does not.
B) the tariff results in efficiency reductions but the quota does not.
C) they have identical impacts on how much is produced and consumed.
D) they have identical impacts on how income is distributed.
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33
Figure 5.1 illustrates the steel market for Mexico, assumed to be a "small" country that is unable to affect the world price. Suppose the world price of steel is given and constant at $200 per ton. Now suppose the Mexican steel industry is able to obtain trade protection.
Figure 5.1. Alternative Nontariff Trade Barriers Levied by a "Small" Country <strong>Figure 5.1 illustrates the steel market for Mexico, assumed to be a small country that is unable to affect the world price. Suppose the world price of steel is given and constant at $200 per ton. Now suppose the Mexican steel industry is able to obtain trade protection. Figure 5.1. Alternative Nontariff Trade Barriers Levied by a Small Country   Consider Figure 5.1.Suppose the Mexican government provides a subsidy of $200 per ton to its steel producers, as indicated by the supply schedule S<sub>M (with subsidy)</sub>.As a result of the subsidy Mexican steel producers gain ____ of producer surplus.</strong> A) $200 B) $400 C) $600 D) $800
Consider Figure 5.1.Suppose the Mexican government provides a subsidy of $200 per ton to its steel producers, as indicated by the supply schedule SM (with subsidy).As a result of the subsidy Mexican steel producers gain ____ of producer surplus.

A) $200
B) $400
C) $600
D) $800
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34
Import quotas tend to lead to all of the following EXCEPT

A) domestic producers of the imported good being harmed.
B) domestic consumers of the imported good being harmed.
C) prices increasing in the importing country.
D) prices falling in the exporting country.
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35
From the perspective of the American public as a whole, export subsidies levied by overseas governments on goods sold to the United States

A) help more than they hurt.
B) hurt more than they help.
C) are equivalent to an import quota.
D) are equivalent to an export quota.
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36
To maintain that South Koreans are dumping their VCRs in the United States is to maintain that

A) Koreans are selling VCRs in the United States below their production cost.
B) Koreans are selling VCRs in the United States above their production cost.
C) the cost of manufacturing VCRs in Korea is lower in Korea than in the United States since wages are lower in Korea.
D) the cost of manufacturing VCRs in Korea is higher in Korea than in the United States since wages are higher in Korea.
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37
Figure 5.1 illustrates the steel market for Mexico, assumed to be a "small" country that is unable to affect the world price. Suppose the world price of steel is given and constant at $200 per ton. Now suppose the Mexican steel industry is able to obtain trade protection.
Figure 5.1. Alternative Nontariff Trade Barriers Levied by a "Small" Country <strong>Figure 5.1 illustrates the steel market for Mexico, assumed to be a small country that is unable to affect the world price. Suppose the world price of steel is given and constant at $200 per ton. Now suppose the Mexican steel industry is able to obtain trade protection. Figure 5.1. Alternative Nontariff Trade Barriers Levied by a Small Country   Consider Figure 5.1.With free trade, the quantity of steel imported by Mexico equals</strong> A) 2 tons. B) 4 tons. C) 6 tons. D) 8 tons.
Consider Figure 5.1.With free trade, the quantity of steel imported by Mexico equals

A) 2 tons.
B) 4 tons.
C) 6 tons.
D) 8 tons.
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38
Government subsidies may take the form of all of these EXCEPT

A) cash disbursements.
B) tax breaks.
C) bank credits.
D) insurance arrangements.
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39
Export subsidies levied by foreign governments on products in which the United States has a comparative disadvantage

A) lower the welfare of all Americans.
B) lead to increases in U.S. consumer surplus.
C) encourage U.S. production of competing goods.
D) encourage U.S. workers to demand higher wages.
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40
Figure 5.1 illustrates the steel market for Mexico, assumed to be a "small" country that is unable to affect the world price. Suppose the world price of steel is given and constant at $200 per ton. Now suppose the Mexican steel industry is able to obtain trade protection.
Figure 5.1. Alternative Nontariff Trade Barriers Levied by a "Small" Country <strong>Figure 5.1 illustrates the steel market for Mexico, assumed to be a small country that is unable to affect the world price. Suppose the world price of steel is given and constant at $200 per ton. Now suppose the Mexican steel industry is able to obtain trade protection. Figure 5.1. Alternative Nontariff Trade Barriers Levied by a Small Country   Consider Figure 5.1.Suppose the Mexican government provides a subsidy of $200 per ton to its steel producers, as indicated by the supply schedule S<sub>M (with subsidy)</sub>.The total cost of the subsidy to the Mexican government equals</strong> A) $200. B) $400. C) $600. D) $800.
Consider Figure 5.1.Suppose the Mexican government provides a subsidy of $200 per ton to its steel producers, as indicated by the supply schedule SM (with subsidy).The total cost of the subsidy to the Mexican government equals

A) $200.
B) $400.
C) $600.
D) $800.
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41
Figure 5.3. Sweden's Apple Market <strong>Figure 5.3. Sweden's Apple Market   Consider Figure 5.3.Assume that Swedish import companies behave as competitive buyers while foreign export companies behave as monopoly sellers.Compared to free trade, Sweden's import quota results in domestic welfare</strong> A) gains totaling $3.20. B) gains totaling $4.80. C) losses totaling $3.20. D) losses totaling $4.80.
Consider Figure 5.3.Assume that Swedish import companies behave as competitive buyers while foreign export companies behave as monopoly sellers.Compared to free trade, Sweden's import quota results in domestic welfare

A) gains totaling $3.20.
B) gains totaling $4.80.
C) losses totaling $3.20.
D) losses totaling $4.80.
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42
Figure 5.3. Sweden's Apple Market <strong>Figure 5.3. Sweden's Apple Market   Consider Figure 5.3.If the Swedish government auctions import licenses to the highest bidder in a competitive market, it could realize revenues of up to</strong> A) $3.20. B) $4.00. C) $4.80. D) $5.60.
Consider Figure 5.3.If the Swedish government auctions import licenses to the highest bidder in a competitive market, it could realize revenues of up to

A) $3.20.
B) $4.00.
C) $4.80.
D) $5.60.
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43
Figure 5.3. Sweden's Apple Market <strong>Figure 5.3. Sweden's Apple Market   Consider Figure 5.3.If S<sub>Sweden+Quota</sub> represents the supply schedule after a quota is levied, Sweden's imports will equal</strong> A) 6 apples. B) 8 apples. C) 10 apples. D) 12 apples.
Consider Figure 5.3.If SSweden+Quota represents the supply schedule after a quota is levied, Sweden's imports will equal

A) 6 apples.
B) 8 apples.
C) 10 apples.
D) 12 apples.
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44
Figure 5.2. International Dumping <strong>Figure 5.2. International Dumping   Consider Figure 5.2.Compared with the total revenue and total profit that ABC Inc.realizes in the absence of dumping, with dumping the firm attains a</strong> A) fall in revenue of $18; fall in profits of $15. B) fall in revenue of $18, fall in profits of $18. C) rise in revenue of $18, rise in profits of $15. D) rise in revenue of $18, rise in profits of $18.
Consider Figure 5.2.Compared with the total revenue and total profit that ABC Inc.realizes in the absence of dumping, with dumping the firm attains a

A) fall in revenue of $18; fall in profits of $15.
B) fall in revenue of $18, fall in profits of $18.
C) rise in revenue of $18, rise in profits of $15.
D) rise in revenue of $18, rise in profits of $18.
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45
Figure 5.3. Sweden's Apple Market <strong>Figure 5.3. Sweden's Apple Market   Consider Figure 5.3.In the absence of trade, Sweden's equilibrium price and quantity of apples would be</strong> A) $0.60 and 22 pounds. B) $0.60 and 14 pounds. C) $1.00 and 18 pounds. D) $1.40 and 14 pounds.
Consider Figure 5.3.In the absence of trade, Sweden's equilibrium price and quantity of apples would be

A) $0.60 and 22 pounds.
B) $0.60 and 14 pounds.
C) $1.00 and 18 pounds.
D) $1.40 and 14 pounds.
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46
Figure 5.4. Venezuelan Calculator Market <strong>Figure 5.4. Venezuelan Calculator Market   Consider Figure 5.4.The cost of the production subsidy to the Venezuelan government totals</strong> A) $32. B) $40. C) $48. D) $54.
Consider Figure 5.4.The cost of the production subsidy to the Venezuelan government totals

A) $32.
B) $40.
C) $48.
D) $54.
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47
Figure 5.3. Sweden's Apple Market <strong>Figure 5.3. Sweden's Apple Market   Consider Figure 5.3.At the free-trade price of $0.60 per pound, Sweden's consumer surplus totals ____ and producer surplus totals ____.</strong> A) $10.80, $2.40 B) $14.60, $3.90 C) $24.20, $1.80 D) $32.40, $2.30
Consider Figure 5.3.At the free-trade price of $0.60 per pound, Sweden's consumer surplus totals ____ and producer surplus totals ____.

A) $10.80, $2.40
B) $14.60, $3.90
C) $24.20, $1.80
D) $32.40, $2.30
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48
Figure 5.3. Sweden's Apple Market <strong>Figure 5.3. Sweden's Apple Market   Consider Figure 5.3.After the quota is levied, the price of apples in Sweden will equal</strong> A) $0.60 per pound. B) $1.00 per pound. C) $1.40 per pound. D) $1.80 per pound.
Consider Figure 5.3.After the quota is levied, the price of apples in Sweden will equal

A) $0.60 per pound.
B) $1.00 per pound.
C) $1.40 per pound.
D) $1.80 per pound.
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49
Figure 5.3. Sweden's Apple Market <strong>Figure 5.3. Sweden's Apple Market   Consider Figure 5.3.Suppose the rest of the world can supply apples to Sweden at a price of $0.60 per pound.With free trade, Sweden produces ____ pounds of apples and imports ____ pounds of apples.</strong> A) 10, 8 B) 10, 18 C) 6, 22 D) 6, 16
Consider Figure 5.3.Suppose the rest of the world can supply apples to Sweden at a price of $0.60 per pound.With free trade, Sweden produces ____ pounds of apples and imports ____ pounds of apples.

A) 10, 8
B) 10, 18
C) 6, 22
D) 6, 16
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50
Figure 5.3. Sweden's Apple Market <strong>Figure 5.3. Sweden's Apple Market   Consider Figure 5.3.Assume that Swedish import companies behave as monopoly buyers while foreign export companies behave as competitive sellers.Compared to free trade, Sweden's import quota results in domestic welfare</strong> A) gains totaling $1.60. B) gains totaling $3.20. C) losses totaling $1.60. D) losses totaling $3.20.
Consider Figure 5.3.Assume that Swedish import companies behave as monopoly buyers while foreign export companies behave as competitive sellers.Compared to free trade, Sweden's import quota results in domestic welfare

A) gains totaling $1.60.
B) gains totaling $3.20.
C) losses totaling $1.60.
D) losses totaling $3.20.
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51
Figure 5.1 illustrates the steel market for Mexico, assumed to be a "small" country that is unable to affect the world price. Suppose the world price of steel is given and constant at $200 per ton. Now suppose the Mexican steel industry is able to obtain trade protection.
Figure 5.1. Alternative Nontariff Trade Barriers Levied by a "Small" Country <strong>Figure 5.1 illustrates the steel market for Mexico, assumed to be a small country that is unable to affect the world price. Suppose the world price of steel is given and constant at $200 per ton. Now suppose the Mexican steel industry is able to obtain trade protection. Figure 5.1. Alternative Nontariff Trade Barriers Levied by a Small Country   Consider Figure 5.1.Suppose the rest of the world voluntarily agrees to reduce steel shipments to Mexico vis-a-vis an export quota equal to 2 tons.Assuming Mexican importers behave as competitive buyers while foreign exporters behave as monopoly sellers, the overall welfare loss of the quota to Mexico is</strong> A) $200. B) $400. C) $600. D) $800.
Consider Figure 5.1.Suppose the rest of the world voluntarily agrees to reduce steel shipments to Mexico vis-a-vis an export quota equal to 2 tons.Assuming Mexican importers behave as competitive buyers while foreign exporters behave as monopoly sellers, the overall welfare loss of the quota to Mexico is

A) $200.
B) $400.
C) $600.
D) $800.
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52
Figure 5.4. Venezuelan Calculator Market <strong>Figure 5.4. Venezuelan Calculator Market   Consider Figure 5.4.Assume the Venezuelan government grants its manufacturers a production subsidy of $4 per calculator.After the subsidy is granted, Venezuelan imports total</strong> A) 8 calculators. B) 12 calculators. C) 16 calculators. D) 20 calculators.
Consider Figure 5.4.Assume the Venezuelan government grants its manufacturers a production subsidy of $4 per calculator.After the subsidy is granted, Venezuelan imports total

A) 8 calculators.
B) 12 calculators.
C) 16 calculators.
D) 20 calculators.
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53
Figure 5.4. Venezuelan Calculator Market <strong>Figure 5.4. Venezuelan Calculator Market   Consider Figure 5.4.Suppose the rest of the world supplies calculators to Venezuela at a price of $4 each.With free trade, Venezuelan imports total</strong> A) 8 calculators. B) 16 calculators. C) 20 calculators. D) 24 calculators.
Consider Figure 5.4.Suppose the rest of the world supplies calculators to Venezuela at a price of $4 each.With free trade, Venezuelan imports total

A) 8 calculators.
B) 16 calculators.
C) 20 calculators.
D) 24 calculators.
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54
Figure 5.2. International Dumping <strong>Figure 5.2. International Dumping   Consider Figure 5.2.In the absence of international dumping, ABC Inc.maximizes profits by selling ____ calculators at a price of $____; the firm realizes profits totaling $____.</strong> A) 27, 5, 54 B) 27, 5, 36 C) 24, 4, 46 D) 24, 4, 28
Consider Figure 5.2.In the absence of international dumping, ABC Inc.maximizes profits by selling ____ calculators at a price of $____; the firm realizes profits totaling $____.

A) 27, 5, 54
B) 27, 5, 36
C) 24, 4, 46
D) 24, 4, 28
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55
Figure 5.3. Sweden's Apple Market <strong>Figure 5.3. Sweden's Apple Market   Consider Figure 5.3.The quota's revenue effect equals</strong> A) $1.60. B) $2.40. C) $3.20. D) $4.00.
Consider Figure 5.3.The quota's revenue effect equals

A) $1.60.
B) $2.40.
C) $3.20.
D) $4.00.
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56
Figure 5.3. Sweden's Apple Market <strong>Figure 5.3. Sweden's Apple Market   Consider Figure 5.3.The quota leads to a deadweight welfare loss for Sweden of an amount equaling</strong> A) $0.80. B) $1.60. C) $2.40. D) $3.20.
Consider Figure 5.3.The quota leads to a deadweight welfare loss for Sweden of an amount equaling

A) $0.80.
B) $1.60.
C) $2.40.
D) $3.20.
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57
Figure 5.1 illustrates the steel market for Mexico, assumed to be a "small" country that is unable to affect the world price. Suppose the world price of steel is given and constant at $200 per ton. Now suppose the Mexican steel industry is able to obtain trade protection.
Figure 5.1. Alternative Nontariff Trade Barriers Levied by a "Small" Country <strong>Figure 5.1 illustrates the steel market for Mexico, assumed to be a small country that is unable to affect the world price. Suppose the world price of steel is given and constant at $200 per ton. Now suppose the Mexican steel industry is able to obtain trade protection. Figure 5.1. Alternative Nontariff Trade Barriers Levied by a Small Country   Consider Figure 5.1.Suppose the rest of the world voluntarily agrees to reduce steel shipments to Mexico vis-a-vis an export quota equal to 2 tons.Assuming Mexican importers behave as monopoly buyers while foreign exporters behave as competitive sellers, the overall welfare loss of the quota to Mexico is</strong> A) $200. B) $400. C) $600. D) $800.
Consider Figure 5.1.Suppose the rest of the world voluntarily agrees to reduce steel shipments to Mexico vis-a-vis an export quota equal to 2 tons.Assuming Mexican importers behave as monopoly buyers while foreign exporters behave as competitive sellers, the overall welfare loss of the quota to Mexico is

A) $200.
B) $400.
C) $600.
D) $800.
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58
Figure 5.2. International Dumping <strong>Figure 5.2. International Dumping   Consider Figure 5.2.ABC Inc.sells 27 calculators at a price of $5 each, realizing profits totaling $54.Of this quantity, ABC Inc.sells ____ calculators in Canada and realizes revenues totaling $____; the firm sells ____ calculators in France and realizes revenues totaling $____.</strong> A) 15, 35, 9, 45 B) 15, 45, 9, 35 C) 21, 105, 6, 30 D) 21, 30, 6, 105
Consider Figure 5.2.ABC Inc.sells 27 calculators at a price of $5 each, realizing profits totaling $54.Of this quantity, ABC Inc.sells ____ calculators in Canada and realizes revenues totaling $____; the firm sells ____ calculators in France and realizes revenues totaling $____.

A) 15, 35, 9, 45
B) 15, 45, 9, 35
C) 21, 105, 6, 30
D) 21, 30, 6, 105
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59
Figure 5.2. International Dumping <strong>Figure 5.2. International Dumping   Consider Figure 5.2.With international dumping, ABC Inc.sells ____ calculators to Canadian buyers at a price of $____ and ____ calculators to French buyers at a price of $____.</strong> A) 15, 4, 12, 7 B) 15, 7, 12, 4 C) 9, 5, 15, 6 D) 9, 6, 15, 5
Consider Figure 5.2.With international dumping, ABC Inc.sells ____ calculators to Canadian buyers at a price of $____ and ____ calculators to French buyers at a price of $____.

A) 15, 4, 12, 7
B) 15, 7, 12, 4
C) 9, 5, 15, 6
D) 9, 6, 15, 5
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60
Figure 5.3. Sweden's Apple Market <strong>Figure 5.3. Sweden's Apple Market   Consider Figure 5.3.As a result of the quota, Sweden's consumer surplus</strong> A) increases by $6. B) increases by $8. C) decreases by $6. D) decreases by $8.
Consider Figure 5.3.As a result of the quota, Sweden's consumer surplus

A) increases by $6.
B) increases by $8.
C) decreases by $6.
D) decreases by $8.
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61
Under U.S.law, a(n) ___________duty is levied when the U.S.Department of Commerce determines a class or kind of foreign merchandise is being sold at less than fair value (LTFV).

A) dumping
B) antidumping
C) margin of dumping
D) below-cost sales
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62
Which is NOT a material injury caused by LTFV?

A) unemployment
B) lost sales
C) lost profit
D) general expenses
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63
When voluntary export limits are imposed on the world's chief exporter

A) the exports of the nonrestrained suppliers may be deterred.
B) a trade diversion effect may occur.
C) the exports of the non-restrained suppliers may not be deterred.
D) a trade diversion effect will not occur.
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64
Figure 5.6 Domestice Supply and demand for Wine - U.S. <strong>Figure 5.6 Domestice Supply and demand for Wine - U.S.   Consider Figure 5.6.In the global market for wine, the EU is willing to supply as much wine as the U.S.demands at $8 per bottle.What will happen to the price of a bottle of wine in the U.S.if a quota of 15 bottles of wine is imposed?</strong> A) increase to $15 B) increase to $10 C) stay the same at $8 D) decrease to $5
Consider Figure 5.6.In the global market for wine, the EU is willing to supply as much wine as the U.S.demands at $8 per bottle.What will happen to the price of a bottle of wine in the U.S.if a quota of 15 bottles of wine is imposed?

A) increase to $15
B) increase to $10
C) stay the same at $8
D) decrease to $5
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65
Figure 5.4. Venezuelan Calculator Market <strong>Figure 5.4. Venezuelan Calculator Market   Consider Figure 5.4.The increase in Venezuelan producer surplus under the production subsidy totals</strong> A) $16. B) $20. C) $24. D) $32.
Consider Figure 5.4.The increase in Venezuelan producer surplus under the production subsidy totals

A) $16.
B) $20.
C) $24.
D) $32.
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66
Assume that a U.S.importer imports furniture from China.If the Commerce Department makes a preliminary investigation and finds evidence of dumping, the U.S.importer must pay a special tariff equal to the

A) estimated dumping margin on all imports of that product.
B) estimated dumping margin on all sales of that product.
C) estimated manufacturing cost on all imports of that product.
D) estimated dumping margin on all exports of that product.
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67
Figure 5.6 Domestice Supply and demand for Wine - U.S. <strong>Figure 5.6 Domestice Supply and demand for Wine - U.S.   Consider Figure 5.6.In the global market for wine, the EU is willing to supply as much wine as the U.S.demands at $8 per bottle.If the U.S.imposes a quota of 15 bottles of wine, how much wine will U.S.consumers demand, how much wine will U.S.producers produce and how much wine will be imported?</strong> A) 30 bottles, 20 bottles, 10 bottles B) 40 bottles, 25 bottles, 15 bottles C) 30 bottles, 30 bottles, 0 bottles D) 30 bottles, 15 bottles, 15 bottles
Consider Figure 5.6.In the global market for wine, the EU is willing to supply as much wine as the U.S.demands at $8 per bottle.If the U.S.imposes a quota of 15 bottles of wine, how much wine will U.S.consumers demand, how much wine will U.S.producers produce and how much wine will be imported?

A) 30 bottles, 20 bottles, 10 bottles
B) 40 bottles, 25 bottles, 15 bottles
C) 30 bottles, 30 bottles, 0 bottles
D) 30 bottles, 15 bottles, 15 bottles
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68
A home appliance manufacturer observes the following and determines that his competitors are pricing their imported goods below-cost sale.Which point would have helped him come to this conclusion?

A) The amount of general expenses was 12 percent of the cost of manufacturing.
B) The cost of packaging the merchandise for shipment was included.
C) The cost of product in the U.S. is below that in the home market.
D) The amount of profit was equal to 9 percent of the manufacturing cost plus general expenses.
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69
In recent years, the average antidumping duty imposed by the United States has been about

A) 70 percent.
B) 50 percent.
C) 45 percent.
D) >100 percent.
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70
The margin of dumping is calculated as

A) difference between the local market value and the U.S. price.
B) difference between the foreign market value and the U.S. price.
C) difference between the U.S. market value and the foreign price.
D) difference between the foreign market value and the foreign price.
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71
Assume that the Commerce Department makes a preliminary investigation on imports of furniture by a company and finds evidence of dumping and collects an estimated dumping margin on all imports of that product.On further investigation it is determined that dumping has NOT happened.Then, the special tariff collected is

A) replaced with a permanent tariff, collected from the importer.
B) returned partially to the importer.
C) retained fully by the Commerce Department.
D) rebated to the importer.
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72
Figure 5.6 Domestice Supply and demand for Wine - U.S. <strong>Figure 5.6 Domestice Supply and demand for Wine - U.S.   Consider Figure 5.6.In the global market for wine, the EU is willing to supply as much wine as the U.S.demands at $8 per bottle.If the U.S.imposes a quota of 15 bottles of wine what will happen to consumer surplus?</strong> A) decreases by $210 B) decreases by $245 C) stays the same D) increases by $70
Consider Figure 5.6.In the global market for wine, the EU is willing to supply as much wine as the U.S.demands at $8 per bottle.If the U.S.imposes a quota of 15 bottles of wine what will happen to consumer surplus?

A) decreases by $210
B) decreases by $245
C) stays the same
D) increases by $70
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Unlock Deck
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73
Why do you think Whirlpool had to file multiple lawsuits before it won import protection?

A) due to the tough import competition it faced from Samsung and LG.
B) due to the country-hopping technique that Samsung and LG indulged in
C) due to president Donald Trump's "America First" slogan
D) because Samsung and LG practiced unlawful pricing of washing machines imported from South Korea and Mexico
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74
Figure 5.6 Domestice Supply and demand for Wine - U.S. <strong>Figure 5.6 Domestice Supply and demand for Wine - U.S.   Consider Figure 5.6.In the global market for wine, the EU is willing to supply as much wine as the U.S.demands at $8 per bottle.If the U.S.imposes a quota of 15 bottles of wine, how much revenue will the U.S.government collect?</strong> A) 0 B) $35 C) $70 D) $105
Consider Figure 5.6.In the global market for wine, the EU is willing to supply as much wine as the U.S.demands at $8 per bottle.If the U.S.imposes a quota of 15 bottles of wine, how much revenue will the U.S.government collect?

A) 0
B) $35
C) $70
D) $105
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75
Figure 5.6 Domestice Supply and demand for Wine - U.S. <strong>Figure 5.6 Domestice Supply and demand for Wine - U.S.   Consider Figure 5.6.In the global market for wine, the EU is willing to supply as much wine as the U.S.demands at $8 per bottle.How much will the U.S.produce and import in these circumstances?</strong> A) 5 bottles, 40 bottles B) 40 bottles, 0 bottles C) 5 bottles, 35 bottles D) 5 bottles, 0 bottles
Consider Figure 5.6.In the global market for wine, the EU is willing to supply as much wine as the U.S.demands at $8 per bottle.How much will the U.S.produce and import in these circumstances?

A) 5 bottles, 40 bottles
B) 40 bottles, 0 bottles
C) 5 bottles, 35 bottles
D) 5 bottles, 0 bottles
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76
A voluntary export agreement

A) typically applies only to the world's most important exporting nation(s).
B) typically applies only to the world's least important exporting nation (s).
C) is always more restrictive on trade than a tariff or import quota.
D) allows producers with superior products to participate in market.
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77
Concerning international dumping, many economists argue that "fair value" should be based on

A) average variable cost.
B) average fixed cost.
C) marginal cost.
D) total cost.
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78
Figure 5.4. Venezuelan Calculator Market <strong>Figure 5.4. Venezuelan Calculator Market   Consider Figure 5.4.The production subsidy results in an overall welfare loss for Venezuela totaling</strong> A) $8. B) $12. C) $16. D) $20.
Consider Figure 5.4.The production subsidy results in an overall welfare loss for Venezuela totaling

A) $8.
B) $12.
C) $16.
D) $20.
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79
Assume that the manufacturing cost of a company is $50,0000 and the general expenses is $50,000.Then, the amount of profit must be equal to at least _____ for the cost-based definition criterion of foreign market value to be met.

A) $44,000
B) $6,500
C) $56,000
D) $49,000
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80
Subsidies to domestic firms may lead to

A) an increase in prices.
B) higher volume of exports.
C) higher volume of imports.
D) increase in welfare of the trading partner.
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Unlock Deck
Unlock for access to all 181 flashcards in this deck.