Deck 4: The Constitution As the Foundation of the Legal Environment

Question 1

Federal law requires most interstate truckers to obtain a permit that reflects compliance with certain federal requirements. The 1965 version of the law authorized states to require proof that a truck operator had such a permit. By 1991, 39 states had demanded such proof, requiring a $10 per truck registration fee and giving each trucker a stamp to affix to a multistate "bingo card" carried in the vehicle. Finding this scheme inefficient and burdensome, Congress created the current Single State Registration System (SSRS), which allows a trucking company to fill out one set of forms in one state, thereby registering in every participating state through which its trucks travel. A subsection of Michigan's Motor Carrier Act imposes on truck companies operating in interstate commerce an annual fee of $100 for each self-propelled motor vehicle operated by or on behalf of the motor carrier. The American Truckers Association (ATA) and others challenged the $100 fee as preempted by the extensive federal regulation of interstate trucking and trucking companies. The ATA and others appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. What should the U.S. Supreme Court do? Be sure to discuss what portion of the Constitution applies to this issue. [ American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Michigan Public Service Com ' n, 545 U.S. 429]

Answer 1

Refer to the case American Trucking Associations (ATA) v Michigan Public Service Commission (2005) (549 US 429)
Facts:
1) Congress made a Single State Registration System (SSRS) allowing for vehicle and license registration in one state to apply to all states
2) Michigan included a provision in its Motor Carrier Act which imposed a $100 flat-fee on every truck used in intrastate commercial operations: "that is, on trucks that undertake point-to-point hauls between Michigan cities."
3) The ATA argued that this violated the commerce clause , that is only US Congress have the power to regulate interstate commerce. ATA claimed burdens interstate commerce as it also charges trucks in both engaged in interstate and intrastate operations, and it is pre-empted by Congress' regulation of vehicles (fact 1 above). Specifically this is an argument that it violated dormant commerce clause , an implication that states can't pass laws to bar interstate commerce.
4) The Michigan district court and appeal court upheld the provision, arguing that the fee is imposed on all trucks engaged in intrastate travel, and that any effect on interstate commerce is speculation. ATA petitioned to the Supreme Court of the US
The Supreme Court affirmed. The provision doesn't violate commerce clause. The court found that it was within the State power to charge the fees and it was customary practice, hence there's no preemption by federal statute.
The court stated its view that violation of the dormant commerce clause is clear if there are fees or taxes imposed that favors in-state companies over out-of-state companies. The ATA argued that this discourages "topping-off," trucks making a delivery interstate but also picking up and dropping off delivers while in Michigan, hence a higher fee on out-of-state companies that tops off. The court found this argument unpersuasive as it is a small flat rate fee and there's no study that shows a higher fee will significantly impact interstate commerce.

Question 2

C. Penney, a retail merchandiser, has its principal place of business in Plano, Texas. It operates retail stores in all 50 states, including 10 stores in Massachusetts, and a direct mail catalog business. The catalogs illustrated merchandise available for purchase by mail order. The planning, artwork, design, and layout for these catalogs were completed and paid for outside of Massachusetts, primarily in Texas, and Penney contracted with independent printing companies located outside Massachusetts to produce the catalogs. The three major catalogs were generally printed in Indiana, while the specialty catalogs were printed in South Carolina and Wisconsin. Penney supplied the printers with paper, shipping wrappers, and address labels for the catalogs; the printers supplied the ink, binding materials, and labor. None of these materials was purchased in Massachusetts. Printed catalogs, with address labels and postage affixed, were transported by a common carrier from the printer to a U.S. Postal Service office located outside Massachusetts, where they were sent to Massachusetts addressees via third- or fourth-class mail. Any undeliverable catalogs were returned to Penney's distribution center in Connecticut.
Purchases of catalog merchandise were made by telephoning or returning an order form to Penney at a location outside Massachusetts, and the merchandise was shipped to customers from a Connecticut distribution center. The Massachusetts Department of Revenue audited Penney in 1995 and assessed a use tax, penalty, and interest on the catalogs that had been shipped into Massachusetts. The position of the department was that there was a tax due of $314,674.62 on the catalogs that were used by Penney's Massachusetts customers. Penney said such a tax was unconstitutional in that it had no control or contact with the catalogs in the state. Can the state impose the tax? Why or why not? [ Commissioner of Revenue v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 730 N.E.2d 266 (Mass)]

Answer 2

Case facts:
1) JC Penney (JCP) is a national retail store, incorporated in Delaware, which also operates mail catalog orders
2) The mail catalogs included customers from MSS. However, all of the mailing, printing, and ordering process were done out of Mass, e.g. catalogs were sent from a location in another state, and orders were made by return mail or phone calls to location out of Mass.
3) The State of Mass ordered JCP to pay a use-tax for mailing its catalogs to state residents. JCP refused as none of the mail catalog ordering process involved any location in the State. The tax board abated the use-tax, the State appealed
The Supreme Court of MSS court reversed the decision. The State can impose the use-tax. It didn't matter if none of the mail ordering process involved materials as long as the purpose was to sell to customers in the state Mass has the right to enact the use-tax. Moreover, the Court argued that if JCP were allowed not to pay a use-tax this puts in-state mail order businesses at a disadvantage because they do business in Mass and also pays the use tax.
Hence, the term "use" doesn't need to mean use of resources in the state. On the other hand, the court had determined that JCP intended the catalogs to be distributed within the state to persons living with in the commonwealth. Hence the state can impose the tax.

Question 3

Alfonso Lopez, Jr., a 12th-grade student at Edison High School in San Antonio, Texas, went to school carrying a concealed.38-caliber handgun and five bullets. School officials, acting on an anonymous tip, confronted Lopez. Lopez admitted that he had the gun. He was arrested and charged with violation of federal law, the Gun- Free School Zones Act of 1990. Lopez moved to dismiss his indictment on the grounds that the provision of the Gun-Free School Zones Act with which he was charged was unconstitutional in that it was beyond the power of Congress to legislate controls over public schools. The district court found the statute to be a constitutional exercise of congressional authority.
Lopez was found guilty and sentenced to two years in prison. He appealed and challenged his conviction on the basis of the commerce clause. The Court of Appeals agreed with Lopez, found the Gun-Free School Zones Act an unconstitutional exercise of congressional authority, and reversed the conviction. The U.S. Attorney appealed. Who should win at the U.S. Supreme Court and why? [ United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549]

Answer 3

The commerce clause gives the federal government to regulate the laws regarding the interstate commerce, that is trade among the states, trade with other countries and trade with Indian tribes.
Facts:
1) Congress enacted the Guns Free School Zone Act (GFSZA) of 1990 to ban guns in school
2) A high school student L was caught with a gun in school and was charged violating the act
3) The district court upheld the charge. The court of appeals reversed the charge claiming that GFSZA was an unconstitutional violation of the commerce clause, US attorney appealed to the Supreme Court
The U.S supreme court has put some limitations on what the congress can regulate under the commerce clause. Earlier if the interstate commerce is affected slightest then it gives federal government authority to regulate it. However, the supreme court ruled that underlying nature of the activity itself has to be economic and does not necessarily have economic impacts for federal government to regulate it.
Under the commerce clause the congress can regulate the following areas:
• Any activity which have huge effect on trade between states.
• The channels through which interstate trade is conducted
• The means to achieve the interstate commerce
If the matter is taken to U.S supreme court, L would win the case because he would be able to prove that carrying the gun into gun free zone is not an economic activity and does not affect the interstate commerce. Even though the schools with their huge economic power substantially affects the interstate commerce, the act was done by an individual not by the school. The GFSZA act of 1990 is a criminal statute which by its very nature have nothing to do with economic activity. Thus, congress do not have authority under commerce clause to regulate the GFSZA act of 1990.

Question 4

University of Wisconsin requires all of its students to pay, as part of their tuition, a student activity fee. Those fees are used to support campus clubs and activities. Some students who objected to the philosophies and activities of some of the student clubs filed suit to have the fees halted. What constitutional basis do you think they could use for the suit? [ Board of Regents of Wisconsin System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217]

Question 5

Crafts' home was supplied with gas by the city gas company. Because of some misunderstanding, the gas company believed that the Crafts were delinquent in paying their gas bill. The gas company had an informal complaint procedure for discussing such matters, but the Crafts had never been informed that such a procedure was available. The gas company notified the Crafts that they were delinquent and that the company was shutting off the gas. The Crafts brought an action to enjoin the gas company from doing so on the theory that a termination without any hearing was a denial of due process. The lower courts held that the interest of the Crafts in receiving gas was not a property interest protected by the due process clause and that the procedures the gas company followed satisfied the requirements of due process. The Crafts appealed. Were they correct in contending that they had been denied due process of law? Why or why not? [ Memphis Light, Gas and Water Division v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1]

Question 6

2002, the Williamson family, riding in their 1993 Mazda minivan, was struck head-on by another vehicle. Thanh Williamson was sitting in a rear aisle seat, wearing a lap belt; she died in the accident. Delbert and Alexa Williamson were wearing lap-and-shoulder belts; they survived. Thanh's estate brought suit in a California state court to recover from Mazda for her wrongful death. The basis of the suit was that Mazda should have installed lap-and-shoulder belts on all seats, including the rear aisle seats, and that Thanh died because Mazda equipped her seat with only a lap belt instead. Federal safety requirements do not require lap-and-shoulder belts except for seats located next to doors and windows. Middle seats (aisle) can have a lap belt only. Mazda asked for a dismissal on the grounds that allowing Thanh's estate to recover would contradict federal law and that federal law preempts state tort laws on product liability. The trial court dismissed the suit as preempted by federal law, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari. What should the court decide and why? [ Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc. 131 S.Ct. 1131]

Question 7

Montana imposed a severance tax on every ton of coal mined within the state. The tax varied depending on the value of the coal and the cost of production. It could be as high as 30 percent of the price at which the coal was sold. Montana mine operators and some out-of-state customers claimed that this tax was unconstitutional as an improper burden on interstate commerce. Decide. [ Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609]

Question 8

Ollie's Barbecue is a family-owned restaurant in Birmingham, Alabama, specializing in barbecued meats and homemade pies, with a seating capacity of 220 customers. It is located on a state highway 11 blocks from an interstate highway and a somewhat greater distance from railroad and bus stations. The restaurant caters to a family and white-collar trade, with a take-out service for "Negroes." (Note: This term is used by the Court in its opinion in the case.) In the 12 months preceding the passage of the Civil Rights Act, the restaurant purchased locally approximately $150,000 worth of food, $69,683 or 46 percent of which was meat that it bought from a local supplier who had procured it from outside the state. Ollie's has refused to serve Negroes in its dining accommodations since opening in 1927, and since July 2, 1964, it has been operating in violation of the Civil Rights Act. A lower court concluded that if it were required to serve Negroes, it would lose a substantial amount of business. The lower court found that the Civil Rights Act did not apply because Ollie's was not involved in "interstate commerce." Will the commerce clause permit application of the Civil Rights Act to Ollie's? [ Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294]

Question 9

Ellis was employed by the city of Lakewood. By the terms of his contract, he could be discharged only for cause. After working for six years, he was told that he was going to be discharged because of his inability to generate safety and self-insurance programs, because of his failure to win the confidence of employees, and because of his poor attendance. He was not informed of the facts in support of these conclusions and was given the option to resign. He claimed that he was entitled to a hearing. Is he entitled to one? Why or why not? [ Ellis v. City of Lakewood, 789 P.2d 449 (Colo. App.)]

Question 10

Federal Food Stamp Act provided for the distribution of food stamps to needy households. In 1971, section 3(e) of the statute was amended to define households as limited to groups whose members were all related to each other. This was done because of congressional dislike for the lifestyles of unrelated hippies who were living together in hippie communes. Moreno and others applied for food stamps but were refused them because the relationship requirement was not satisfied. An action was brought to have the relationship requirement declared unconstitutional. Is it constitutional? Discuss why or why not. [ USDA v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528]

Question 11

Hampshire adopted a tax law that in effect taxed the income of nonresidents working in New Hampshire only. Austin, a nonresident who worked in New Hampshire, claimed that the tax law was invalid. Was he correct? Explain. [ Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656]

Question 12

California passed a law that prohibited the sale or rental of "violent video games." The act defined violent video games as games "in which the range of options available to a player includes killing, maiming, dismembering, or sexually assaulting an image of a human being, if those acts are depicted" in a manner that "[a] reasonable person, considering the game as a whole, would find appeals to a deviant or morbid interest of minors." The association of video game manufacturers and developers brought suit, challenging the California statute as an unconstitutional violation of their First Amendment right and a violation of their due process rights because it is so vague. What should the U.S. Supreme Court hold on the constitutionality of the statute and why? [ Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass ' n, 131 S.Ct. 2729]