Deck 57: Judith Jarvis Thomson

Question 1

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley
The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track.
Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible.
-Explain the trolley problem. Describe the two cases that generate the problem, and the verdicts people usually give to these cases. As it has traditionally been conceived, what would an adequate solution to the trolley problem consist of? Do you think such a solution is possible? Why or why not?

Answer 1

No Answer

Question 2

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley
The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track.
Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible.
-State the two principles that Foot proposed in response to the trolley problem. Do you think these principles are correct? If so, what argument can be given in their defense? If not, can you think of a counterexample to either principle?

Answer 2

No Answer

Question 3

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley
The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track.
Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible.
-What widespread intuition regarding the trolley problem does Thomson regard as mistaken? What is her explanation of why so many people have this intuition? Do you find her explanation convincing? Why or why not?

Answer 3

No Answer

Question 4

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley
The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track.
Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible.
-Thomson claims that she now accepts Foot's two principles. Does this imply that Thomson now rejects her view in "A Defense of Abortion"? If the fetus is a person, does one kill a person - i.e. become the agent of harm -when one has an abortion? Defend your answer.

Question 5

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley
The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track.
Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible.
-What two cases comprise the "trolley problem"? What verdicts do people typically give regarding these cases? Do you agree with these verdicts? Why or why not?

Question 6

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley
The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track.
Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible.
-What two principles did Foot propose in response to the trolley problem? What counterintuitive consequence of these principles does Thomson point out? Do you find the principles plausible? Why or why not?

Question 7

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley
The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track.
Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible.
-What is Thomson's solution to the trolley problem? What is her argument for this solution? Do you think her argument is sound? Defend your answer.

Question 8

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley
The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track.
Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible.
-In Foot's case of the Judge's Two Options, most people say that:

A) the judge is permitted to let the rioters kill the five hostages.
B) the judge is permitted, but not required, to frame an innocent person to save the hostages.
C) the judges is required to frame an innocent person to save the hostages.
D) neither of the options is morally permissible.

Question 9

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley
The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track.
Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible.
-According to Thomson, most people say it is permissible to turn the trolley so that it kills fewer people:

A) when one is the driver.
B) when one is a bystander.
C) both a and b.
D) neither a nor b.

Question 10

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley
The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track.
Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible.
-Thomson concludes that it is permissible to turn the trolley so that it kills fewer people:

A) when one is the driver.
B) when one is a bystander.
C) both a and b.
D) neither a nor b.

Question 11

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley
The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track.
Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible.
-According to Foot, if one is faced with a choice between letting five die or killing one:

A) one must let the five die.
B) one must kill the one.
C) one is permitted to take either action.
D) there is no permissible action available to the agent.

Question 12

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley
The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track.
Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible.
-Foot suggested that the difference in our verdicts about the Judge's Two Options case and the Driver's Two Options case can be explained by appeal to what Thomson calls:

A) the Letting Five Die Vs. Killing One Principle.
B) the Killing Five Vs. Killing One Principle.
C) both a and b.
D) neither a nor b..

Question 13

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley
The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track.
Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible.
-Foot claimed that negative duties:

A) are the only kinds of duties that we have.
B) are less weighty than positive duties.
C) are exactly as weighty as positive duties.
D) are weightier than positive duties.

Question 14

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley
The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track.
Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible.
-Thomson claims that in the case of the fat man:

A) we are required to let five people die.
B) we are required to let one person die.
C) we are required to kill one person.
D) we are required to kill five people.

Question 15

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley
The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track.
Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible.
-In Bystander's Three Options, Thomson modifies the case of the trolley by adding the option of:

A) the bystander pushing a fat man onto the tracks.
B) the bystander killing one other innocent bystander.
C) the bystander killing two other innocent bystanders.
D) the bystander killing himself.

Question 16

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley
The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track.
Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible.
-Which of the following is not one of Bystander's Three Options:

A) do nothing, letting five die.
B) throw the switch to the right, killing one.
C) throw the switch to the left, killing himself.
D) throw the fat man on the track, killing him but stopping the trolley.

Question 17

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley
The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track.
Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible.
-In the case of Bystander's Three Options, Thomson claims that killing the one is akin:

A) to refusing to give money to Oxfam when it could save five lives.
B) to giving money to Oxfam and then stealing it back.
C) to stealing money from Oxfam.
D) to stealing money from someone else to make a donation to Oxfam.

Question 18

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley
The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track.
Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible.
-Thomson claims that the willingness to give up one's life simply to save five strangers is:

A) morally required.
B) morally very good, but not required.
C) neither morally good nor morally bad.
D) a sign of a serious moral defect in a person.

Question 19

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley
The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track.
Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible.
-Thomson believes that if one is given the choice between killing five people, killing one other person, or killing oneself:

A) one must kill the five.
B) one must kill the other person.
C) one must kill oneself.
D) one may permissibly choose any of the three options.

Question 20

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley
The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track.
Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible.
-Thomson claims that in the case of the runaway trolley, the driver __________, and a bystander __________.

A) may permissibly do nothing; may permissibly do nothing
B) may permissibly do nothing; morally ought to do something
C) morally ought to do something; may permissibly do nothing
D) morally ought to do something; morally ought to do something

Question 21

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley
The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track.
Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible.
-According to Thomson's Third Principle:

A) A must kill B to save five if he cannot kill himself to save the five.
B) A must not kill B to save five if he can kill himself to save the five.
C) A must not kill B to save five if he can let the five kill him.
D) A must kill B to save five if he can do so painlessly.

Question 22

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley
The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track.
Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible.
-Thomson concludes that Foot's two principles are:

A) correct.
B) in need of revision, but mostly correct.
C) consistent, but completely wrong.
D) inconsistent.

Question 23

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley
The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track.
Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible.
-According to Foot's two principles, it is never permissible to kill an innocent person.

Question 24

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley
The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track.
Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible.
-Thomson endorses the view that our negative duties are weightier than our positive duties.

Question 25

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley
The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track.
Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible.
-Thomson accepts Foot's second principle but rejects Foot's first principle.

Question 26

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley
The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track.
Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible.
-Thomson argues that one may not kill a person to save five if one can instead kill oneself to save the five.

Question 27

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley
The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track.
Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible.
-According to Thomson, one may let five die if the only permissible means of saving them is killing oneself.

Question 28

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley
The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track.
Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible.
-Thomson claims that it is permissible for a bystander to turn a runaway trolley so that it kills one innocent person instead of five.

Question 29

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley
The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track.
Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible.
-According to Thomson's Fourth Principle, A may let five die if the only permissible means he has of saving them is killing himself

Question 30

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley
The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track.
Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible.
-According to Thomson, we should not be troubled that so many people have tried to solve the trolley problem for so many years and come up wanting.

Question 31

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley
The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track.
Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible.
-Thomson claims that if a trolley driver refuses to steer the runaway trolley onto a side track, and because of this the trolley runs over five people, the driver merely lets the five die.

Question 32

Judith Jarvis Thomson: Turning the Trolley
The "trolley problem" arises when we attempt to reconcile our intuitive moral judgments concerning two imaginary cases. On the one hand, it seems permissible for a bystander to pull a switch, turning a runaway trolley off of a track on which it will kill five innocent people, and onto a track on which it will kill one innocent person. On the other hand, it seems morally wrong for the bystander to push a fat man into the path of an oncoming trolley to stop the trolley and prevent it from killing five innocent people. These two verdicts seem puzzling because in each case the agent has the option of choosing the death of one person over the death of five, yet doing so seems permissible in the first case but not the second. Philippa Foot proposed two principles to deal with cases of this sort. The first principle holds that A must let five die if saving them requires killing B, and the second holds that A must not kill five if he can instead kill one. Foot's first principle is widely regarded as counterintuitive, because it implies that it would be wrong for the bystander to turn the trolley onto the less-populated track.
Thomson argues that Foot's two principles are in fact correct, and that it is impermissible to turn the trolley in the first case. She argues for this position by presenting a variation on the first case. Suppose that the bystander has three options: He can let the five die, turn the trolley so that it kills one other person, or turn the trolley in a different direction so that it will run over him. Thomson claims that the bystander may not permissibly turn the trolley onto the other innocent person; to do so would be to require a third party to bear the cost of his good deed. Thomson then argues that the same prohibition holds even when there is no option for the bystander to turn the trolley in his own direction. Thomson therefore concludes that turning the trolley is impermissible.
-Thomson concludes that the trolley problem is in fact a nonproblem.