Deck 13: The Political Psychology of International Security and Conflict

Question 1

Thucydides suggested that the main spark igniting the bloody conflict between Sparta and Athens was:

A)competition
B)fear of one another
C)the need for aggression
D)a long history of hatred for one another

Answer 1

B

Question 2

The idea that political leaders will take greater risks, and will be more likely to engage in conflict, the more they do not have to answer to a higher power (i.e., a ruling coalition, a voting public, etc.) is called:

A)groupthink
B)risky shift
C)illusion of invlulnerability
D)accountability

Answer 2

D

Question 3

Which of the following are possible causes of war?

A)biology
B)all of the answers are correct
C)social learning
D)misperception

Answer 3

B

Question 4

One cause of the security dilemma is

A)the difficulty of distinguishing between offensive and defensive weapons
B)certainty about the intentions of others
C)economic constraints
D)none of the answers are correct

Question 5

Malignanty (spiral) processes of hostile interaction are characterized by

A)summit meetings
B)Arms control agreements
C)self-fulfilling prophecies
D)diplomatic negotiations

Question 6

Saddam Hussein's image of the West before his invasion of Kuwait was

A)imperalist
B)enemy
C)rogue
D)degenerate

Question 7

In the Protracted Crisis Approach, crises are seen as

A)situations in which deterrence has already failed
B)situations in which deterrence is not operateive
C)situations in which there is a single act of deterrence which either works or fails
D)separate and distincy deterrence and compellence exchanges

Question 8

The deterrence problem between the Superpowers during the Cold War is often represented trhough the game of

A)prisonders dilemma
B)chicken
C)defensive avoidance
D)nuclear annihilation

Question 9

Analogical reasoning is used to

A)frame policy problems
B)decide which symbols to manipulate
C)plant information in the pres
D)none of the answers are correct

Question 10

prospect theory attempts to predict

A)when people will engage in groupthink
B)how people frame policy problems
C)when people will be risk averse or risk seeking
D)why leaders engage in containment

Question 11

Which of the following is not a characteristic of groupthink?

A)active use of stereotypes
B)careful assessment of all available information
C)illusion of unanimity
D)rationalization

Question 12

The Guns of August Analogy was used by

A)John F. Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis
B)Lyndon Johnson during Vietnam
C)Harry Truman during Korea
D)Neville Chamberlain before WWII

Question 13

Saddam Hussein believed he could create a _____ that would defeat American resolve.

A)guerrilla war
B)nuclear standoff
C)war of attrition
D)conventional war

Question 14

The Prisoner's Dilemma is most applicable to

A)all of the answers are correct
B)deterrence
C)containment
D)spiral conflicts

Question 15

Which example of analogical reasoning by policy makers involves the idea that events during a crisis (e.g., misperception, miscommunication, etc.) can cause a war to break out that was not desired or intended by any of the parties?

A)The Potter Shop analogy
B)The Vietnam analogy
C)The Munich analogy
D)The Guns of August analogy

Question 16

In the game of Prisoner's Dilemma, the 'rational' solution is:

A)negotiate for better terms
B)Confess every time
C)keep mum
D)Ask for a plea bargain

Question 17

One notable psychological factor that contributed to the spped with which World War I escalated was:

A)the need for authority
B)misperception by leaders
C)fear of technology advancement
D)a strong group identity

Question 18

A(n) _______ occurs when leaders take action they perceive to be ""defensive"" ones in response to a perceived threat in international security.

A)Security dilemma
B)International security strategy
C)military offensive
D)security strategy

Question 19

One issue that policy makers fail to consider when they engage in defensive military buildups in

A)the economic consequences of enacting an enlarged military
B)how those actions are likely to be perceived by neighboring states
C)the cost of the military bildup
D)thetechnological advances neede dto enhance defense

Question 20

During the Cold War, U.S. policy makers made a(n) ______________ when explain the Soviet Union's military buildup and forward deployment of forces in Eastern Europe as being due to the dispositional qualities of Soviet leaders and not to situational factors.

A)actor-observer error
B)security dilemma error
C)Fundamental attribution error
D)false consensus error

Question 21

One of the most importatn elements of deterrence is

A)philosophical
B)structural
C)psychological
D)political

Question 22

With regard to the effectivenss of deterrence, most scholars

A)agree that deterrence is effective if the motivations of the states is known
B)dispute whether deterrence is generally effective or not
C)agree that deterrence is generally effective
D)disagree on how to measure its effectiveness

Question 23

One reason that Saddam Hussein was not effective in the Gulf War was:

A)his misperception of Bush's motivation
B)a miscalculation of this military acumen
C)an error in framing the problem
D)his belief that the US military was inept

Question 24

The Vietnam Analogy refers to:

A)an error in framing the problem
B)a miscalculaiton of his military acumen
C)his misperception of Bush's motivation
D)his belief that the US military was inept

Question 25

Political leaders take greater risks and are more likely to engage in conflict when they lack _____

A)deterrence ability
B)experience in military settings
C)risky shift
D)accountability

Question 26

The attribution error that reflected the way US policy makers perceived the actions and motivations of Soviet leaders during the Cold War was called:

A)perceptual reality
B)inherent bad faith
C)security dilemmaq
D)faithless realism

Question 27

All of the following statements about deterrence are true EXCEPT:

A)The credibility (or effectiveness) of deterrent threats will hinge upon the perceptions of the target actor (i.e., do they believe you would take the threatened actions; do they accurate perceive that you have the capability to carry out your threatened action, etc.)
B)Deterrence is best understood as a rational calculation based upon the objective power capabilities of each side (e.g., how big is their military, how many missiles do they have, etc.)
C)Deterrence is best understood as a psychological relationship between those policy makers issuing deterrent threats and the recipients of those threats.
D)Deterrence is the threat by one political actor to take actions in response to another actor's potential actions, which would make the costs (or losses) incurred far outweigh any possible benefits (or gains) obtained by the aggressor.

Question 28

The game that was often used to represent the nature of the deterrence problem facing the superpowers during the Cold War which involved two drivers hurtling towards each other on a highway attempting to get their opponent to 'swerve' out of the way of a head-on collision first was called:

A)bolstering
B)prisonders dilemma
C)defensive avoidance
D)chicken

Question 29

What 'threat' is intended to make an 'irrational' act appear plausible?

A)the threat that leaves something to chance
B)prisoner's dilemma
C)security dilemmaq
D)chicken

Question 30

Cognitive rigidity

A)can lead policy makers to employ the Vietnam analogy
B)can lead policy makers to respond to positive signals from adversaries
C)can lead policy makers to ignore neutral or friendly behavior by adversaries
D)can lead policy makers to surrender in war