Deck 10: Cooperation

Question 1

The required relationship among payoffs in the prisoner's dilemma game, where S = sucker's payoff, R = reward for mutual cooperation, P = punishment for mutual defection, and T = temptation to cheat, is:

A) S > R > P > T.
B) T > R > P > S.
C) R > P > T > S.
D) T > P > R > S.
E) P > S > T > P.

Answer 1

T > R > P > S.

Question 2

The four paths to the evolution and maintenance of cooperation in animals are:

A) kin selection, group selection, reciprocity, and byproduct mutualism.
B) group selection, trait-group selection, kin selection, and reproductive skew.
C) byproduct mutualism, tit-for-tat, prisoner's dilemma, and heritability.
D) group selection, ecological constraints theory, tit-for-tat, and sensory exploitation.
E) kin selection, truncation selection, natural selection, and within-group selection.

Answer 2

kin selection, group selection, reciprocity, and byproduct mutualism.

Question 3

Which of the following is NOT a characteristic of the tit-for-tat rule?

A) Players utilize conditionally cooperative strategies.
B) Players using the tit-for-tat strategy never defect first.
C) Players interact repeatedly.
D) Players using the tit-for-tat strategy remember three moves back.
E) Players using the tit-for-tat strategy copy their partners' previous move.

Answer 3

Players using the tit-for-tat strategy remember three moves back.

Question 4

Studies conducted by Naomi Pierce and her colleagues on the relationship between the imperial blue butterfly (Jalmenus evagorus) and the ant (Iridomyrmex anceps) demonstrated:

A) a mutualistic relationship between butterfly pupae/larvae and the ants.
B) that the mutualism provided significant survival benefits to the butterflies and substantial nutritive benefits to the ants.
C) that the butterflies incur substantial costs by producing sugary solutions for the ants.
D) that ants and butterfly pupae/larvae communicate via vibrational cues.
E) all of the above.

Question 5

Byproduct mutualism (BM) differs from reciprocity (REC) in which of the following ways?

A) Scorekeeping is not required in BM or REC, but there is a temptation to cheat in REC.
B) In REC, but not BM, there is no temptation to cheat, nor do individuals have to keep track of their partner's behavior.
C) In BM, but not REC, there is no temptation to cheat, nor do individuals have to keep track of their partner's behavior.
D) There is no temptation to cheat in BM or REC, but scorekeeping is required in REC.
E) There is no temptation to cheat in BM or REC, but scorekeeping is required in BM.

Question 6

Which of the following statements about group selection is FALSE?

A) Variation in the proportion of cooperators and selfish phenotypes must exist among groups.
B) A key aspect of group selection models is that natural selection operates both within and between groups.
C) Between-group selection favors cooperation in kin groups but favors selfish phenotypes in nonkin groups.
D) Between-group selection favors cooperation if groups with more cooperators outreproduce groups with fewer cooperators.
E) Within-group selection always favors selfish phenotypes because they receive benefits without paying the costs of altruism.

Question 7

What is the "dilemma" in the prisoner's dilemma game?

A) Individuals cannot choose the proper strategy because the payoffs constantly change.
B) All strategies provide equal payoffs regardless of what one's partner does.
C) Cooperation can never evolve despite the fact that individuals always do best when cooperating.
D) The payoff for cooperating is substantially higher than the payoff for cheating unless both individuals in a pair opt to cheat.
E) It pays each individual to cheat every time, but mutual defection is more costly than mutual cooperation.

Question 8

Which of the following statements does NOT apply to the communal web building systems of spiders?

A) Cooperative hunting is performed on the communal webs.
B) Individuals occupying a web will cooperate to care for the young born on the web.
C) Sociality evolved just once in these spiders.
D) The vast majority of communal web-building spiders have gone extinct.
E) Inbreeding is one of the major costs to communal web building.

Question 9

When coalitions exist for long periods of time, they are referred to as:

A) alliances.
B) colonies.
C) herds.
D) mutualisms.
E) societies.

Question 10

Phylogenetic analyses allow us to examine whether cooperative behavior:

A) is under the control of genes that follow Mendel's law of segregation.
B) is a fixed trait that can no longer be subject to natural selection.
C) will evolve in the future due to each species inhabiting similar environments.
D) can be explained by common ancestry rather than independent selection regimes.
E) can be subject to rigorous mathematical treatments.

Question 11

Compare and contrast the four paths to cooperation-kinship, reciprocity, byproduct mutualism, and group selection-in terms of the incentive to cheat and how this incentive influences the dynamics of the cooperative interactions.

Question 12

Obtain a copy of Nowak and Sigmund's (1993) paper, "A Strategy of Win Stay, Lose Shift That Outperforms Tit-For-Tat in the Prisoner's-Dilemma Game" in Nature (vol. 364, pp. 56-58). Describe how their strategy-dubbed Pavlov-differs from the tit-for-tat strategy that was introduced in this chapter. What are the defining features of the Pavlov strategy that allow it to outcompete tit-for-tat?

Question 13

In the discussion of cooperation via group selection, you learned that grouplevel benefits could be realized only under circumstances where there is variation in the frequency of cooperators among groups. Why must this be so? Could evolutionary forces act at the group level without such variation? Why do you suspect that group selection-based arguments have been met with such opposition? Read Wilson and Wilson's (2007) paper, "Rethinking the Theoretical Foundation of Sociobiology" (Quarterly Review of Biology, vol. 82, pp. 327-348). What is the theoretical and empirical evidence for group selection as a major evolutionary force? Describe how you might apply Wilson and Wilson's multilevel selection theory to issues such as cooperation.

Question 14

Why are phylogenetic analyses important for understanding the evolution of cooperative behavior-or any other behavior-in animals? What insights might we gain from conducting phylogenetic analyses in concert with empirical research in behavioral ecology?

Question 15

In this chapter, you encountered some stimulating examples of coalition and alliance formation in baboons and dolphins. Oftentimes, coalition formation involves one animal intervening in aggressive disputes between others. Under what circumstances would it be beneficial for a dominant animal to intervene in fights between other group members? Can you think of any circumstances in which it benefits subordinate animals to intervene?

Question 16

Read the paper by McNally and Jackson (2013) entitled "Cooperation Creates Selection for Tactical Deception" (Proceedings of the Royal Society of London Series B, vol. 280: 20130699). Describe the basics of the authors' game theoretic model, including the predictions stemming from their model. How did the authors test these predictions using a collection of primate data? What did they find?