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Intermediate Microeconomics and Its Application 11th Edition by Walter Nicholson,Christopher Snyder
Edition 11ISBN: 978-0324599107Intermediate Microeconomics and Its Application 11th Edition by Walter Nicholson,Christopher Snyder
Edition 11ISBN: 978-0324599107 Exercise 3
Return to the game given by the payoff matrix in Problem
a. Write down the extensive form for the simultaneous-move game.
b. Suppose the game is now sequential move, with A moving first and then B. Write down the extensive form for this sequential-move game.
c. Write down the normal form for the sequential-move game. Find all the Nash equilibria. Which Nash equilibrium is subgame-perfect?
Consider a simultaneous game in which player A chooses one of two actions (Up or Down), and B chooses one of two actions (Left or Right). The game has the following payoff matrix, where the first payoff in each entry is for A and the second for B.
a. Find the Nash equilibrium or equilibria.
b. Which player, if any, has a dominant strategy?
a. Write down the extensive form for the simultaneous-move game.
b. Suppose the game is now sequential move, with A moving first and then B. Write down the extensive form for this sequential-move game.
c. Write down the normal form for the sequential-move game. Find all the Nash equilibria. Which Nash equilibrium is subgame-perfect?
Consider a simultaneous game in which player A chooses one of two actions (Up or Down), and B chooses one of two actions (Left or Right). The game has the following payoff matrix, where the first payoff in each entry is for A and the second for B.
a. Find the Nash equilibrium or equilibria.
b. Which player, if any, has a dominant strategy?
Explanation
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The payoff matrix is a table that shows ...
Intermediate Microeconomics and Its Application 11th Edition by Walter Nicholson,Christopher Snyder
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