Deck 11: The Rationality of Moral Action Philippa Foot

Question 1

Foot argues that moral judgments are made on the basis of

A) attitude.
B) reason.
C) the heart's desire.
D) self-preservation.

Answer 1

B

Question 2

How does Foot characterize "moral virtue"?

A) If one possesses moral virtue, one's actions are good.
B) If one possesses moral virtue, one always keeps one's contracts.
C) If one possesses moral virtue, one does not kill innocents.
D) All of the above

Answer 2

A

Question 3

To possess a given virtue is to

A) always act on the appropriate principle.
B) always succeed in achieving one's ends in a given domain.
C) recognize certain considerations as powerful reasons for acting.
D) know what one must do avoid pain.

Answer 3

C

Question 4

Foot claims that moral goodness is

A) synonymous with practical rationality.
B) closely related to practical rationality.
C) synonymous with happiness.
D) closely related to happiness.

Question 5

A noncognivitist claims that one's reasons are dependent on one's

A) feelings.
B) desires.
C) passions.
D) All of the above

Question 6

Recognition of a reason for action is

A) based on facts and concepts.
B) based on prior attitudes and feelings.
C) inexplicable.
D) explained by science.

Question 7

Foot and noncognitivists disagree primarily on

A) the meaning of moral virtue.
B) the possibility of moral virtue.
C) whether having a reason to act depends ultimately on feelings.
D) whether having moral virtue depends ultimately on luck.

Question 8

By Foot's lights, a person's reasons or goals for action arise from

A) a combination of social pressures and genetically inherited tendencies.
B) her understanding of relevant facts and concepts.
C) whatever personal desire happens to be strongest.
D) an exercise of willpower.

Question 9

Foot argues that moral argument is ultimately based on

A) historical factors such as race, gender, or religious identity.
B) "conative" facts about human psychology.
C) appeals to sentiment.
D) objective facts about human nature.

Question 10

Foot claims that that human sight, hearing, memory and other capacities

A) are radically different from the human will.
B) can be factually evaluated.
C) can be objectively evaluated.
D) both b and c

Question 11

Foot claims that moral judgments have an essential conative element.

Question 12

On Foot's view, having a moral virtue, like courage, requires having the right emotional response to a situation.

Question 13

Practical rationality is closely related to moral goodness.

Question 14

Foot denies that moral action is rational action.

Question 15

Foot would agree that only powerful feelings can motivate one to overcome addiction.

Question 16

Foot argues that a moral person is a person who recognizes the right reasons for action.

Question 17

Foot claims that the fact that people take care of their own futures requires an explanation.

Question 18

Foot argues that practical rationality is about recognizing the right reasons and properly communicating them to others.

Question 19

To be virtuous, one must recognize a particular consideration as a reason for action and act on that reason.

Question 20

Foot insists that the fact of an agent's having reason to do something is itself dependent on his or her feelings, passions, or desires.

Question 21

Foot notes that "there are objective, factual evaluations of such things as human sight, hearing, memory, and concentration, based on the life form of our own species." How does this claim feature in her argument? Why, if one accepts this claim, should human will be evaluated on the basis of facts about the nature of human beings?

Question 22

What is Foot's argument for the conclusion that moral action is rational action? What is the strongest objection to that argument? Is Foot's view ultimately convincing?

Question 23

Foot claims that moral goodness is closely related to practical rationality. What argument does she supply for this claim?

Question 24

Foot anticipates an objection to her view: Some will insist that the fact of an agent's having reason to do something is itself dependent on his or her feelings, passions, or desires. This, it is claimed, implies that moral judgments involve a conative element. How does Foot respond to this objection? Is her response compelling? Can you devise a stronger reply?