Deck 4: Mind and Body

Question 1

The view that we consist of two distinct substances (body and mind) and that these two interact is known as

A) functionalism.
B) identity theory.
C) substance dualism.
D) materialism.

Answer 1

C

Question 2

Descartes believed that interaction between body and mind took place in

A) ectoplasm.
B) the brainstem.
C) the pineal gland.
D) the nervous system.

Answer 2

C

Question 3

The idea that mental states are dispositions to behave in particular ways in certain circumstances is known as

A) logical nominalism.
B) logical behaviorism.
C) methodological behaviorism.
D) eliminative materialism.

Answer 3

B

Question 4

Logical behaviorism is at odds with our commonsense intuition that mental states

A) do not exist.
B) never cause behavior.
C) exist.
D) cause behavior.

Question 5

The theory that says mental states are nothing but brain states is known as

A) brain theory.
B) epiphenomenalism.
C) logical behaviorism.
D) identity theory.

Question 6

Functionalism asserts that

A) the mind is the function that the brain performs.
B) the mind's function is to think.
C) the mind does not exist.
D) the mind functions only when healthy.

Question 7

According to Epiphenomenalism,

A) the mind is not real.
B) the mind is an immaterial substance.
C) mental properties do not cause anything.
D) mental properties can be multiply realized.

Question 8

Property dualism is the view that

A) the mind has no mental properties.
B) mental properties are identical to physical properties.
C) mental properties are reducible to physical properties.
D) mental properties arise from, but are neither identical nor reducible to, physical properties.

Question 9

Descartes says that the chief characteristic of physical things is that

A) they cannot be measured.
B) science can study them.
C) they do not have extension.
D) they have extension.

Question 10

When Descartes reasons that it is conceivable that he could exist without his body and that whatever is conceivable is logically possible, he is offering a _______ argument.

A) possibility
B) conceivability
C) divisibility
D) probability

Question 11

The contention that bodies and minds must be different things because bodies can be divided into parts but minds cannot is known as a _______ argument.

A) divisibility
B) unitary
C) conceivability
D) divisive

Question 12

The existence of a form of mental illness known as multiple personality disorder seems to suggest that

A) the existence of the mind is a delusion.
B) the mind is indivisible.
C) the mind is divisible.
D) mental illness is incurable.

Question 13

The biblical account of the soul is at odds with

A) a unitary concept of the soul.
B) the identity theory.
C) soul-body dualism.
D) the idea of a monistic soul.

Question 14

Regarding mind and body, most contemporary philosophers are

A) logical behaviorists.
B) substance dualists.
C) eliminative materialists.
D) materialists.

Question 15

Substance dualism is said to violate the scientific principle of

A) dualistic action.
B) behaviorism.
C) action at a distance.
D) the causal closure of the physical.

Question 16

According to Descartes, the mind, or soul, is

A) a thinking and extended thing.
B) an unthinking and unextended thing.
C) identical to the body.
D) a thinking and unextended thing.

Question 17

Descartes says that the mind is distinct from the body and

A) cannot exist without it.
B) is unknowable.
C) is dependent on material substance.
D) can exist without the body.

Question 18

Descartes asserts that he knows that he is a substance the whole essence of which is to

A) breathe.
B) be extended in space.
C) think.
D) require a body.

Question 19

Cartesian dualism posits

A) a soul and a spirit.
B) a body and a mind.
C) two minds.
D) a body and a brain.

Question 20

If mental states are multiply realizable, that presents a problem for

A) the identity theory of mind.
B) the functionalist theory of mind.
C) the property dualist theory of mind.
D) the substance dualist theory of mind.

Question 21

According to Searle, the appropriately programmed computer

A) has cognitive states.
B) can achieve strong AI.
C) explains human cognition.
D) cannot have cognitive states.

Question 22

Searle argues that the Chinese room thought experiment shows that

A) the claims of strong AI are not plausible.
B) the claims of strong AI are plausible.
C) computers can understand stories.
D) computers can understand Chinese.

Question 23

Searle believes that understanding Chinese (or any other language) is

A) merely a matter of symbol manipulation.
B) a matter of inputs and outputs.
C) not merely a matter of symbol manipulation.
D) computation.

Question 24

Searle asserts that no computer program by itself, however sophisticated, is sufficient for

A) computation.
B) symbol manipulation.
C) syntax.
D) intentionality.

Question 25

According to Nagel, an organism has conscious mental states if and only if

A) it has human-like physical attributes.
B) there is something that it is like to be that organism.
C) the mental states are reducible to functional states.
D) the mental states play the right causal role.

Question 26

Nagel believes that the essence of the belief that bats have experience is that

A) they have brains.
B) bat experiences are like human experiences.
C) we know what it is like to be a bat.
D) there is something that it is like to be a bat.

Question 27

According to Fodor, in the functionalist view the psychology of a system depends not on the stuff it is made of but on

A) what psychologists say about the stuff.
B) how the stuff relates to modern physics.
C) what kind of stuff it is.
D) how the stuff is put together.

Question 28

According to Smart, the report of an "after-image" or "ache" is a report of

A) sensations.
B) a brain process.
C) conscious experience.
D) a mental process.

Question 29

Chalmers's zombie twin is identical to him

A) psychically.
B) functionally and psychologically.
C) functionally, but not psychologically.
D) psychologically only.

Question 30

Chalmers argues that his zombie is

A) not conceivable.
B) impossible.
C) actual.
D) conceivable.

Question 31

According to Block, functionalism is

A) implausible.
B) plausible.
C) proven empirically.
D) proven logically.

Question 32

Block's Chinese brain argument is meant to show that functionalism

A) needs further development.
B) is false.
C) is too complex.
D) is too simple.

Question 33

According to Block, the Chinese brain system has

A) minimal awareness.
B) no mental states.
C) minimal consciousness.
D) mental states.

Question 34

Block's Chinese brain thought experiment is an example of a(n) _______ argument.

A) full qualia
B) inverted spectrum
C) absent qualia
D) absent spectrum

Question 35

The fact that your being thirsty seems to cause you to reach for a glass of water presents a problem for

A) functionalism.
B) substance dualism.
C) epiphenomenalism.
D) property dualism.

Question 36

Descartes is convinced that corporeal things exist and that he has a body.

Question 37

Cartesian dualism says that the mind is identical with the body.

Question 38

Descartes thinks that something that is conceivable is logically possible, and something that is inconceivable is logically impossible.

Question 39

Descartes believes that consciousness must reside in the heart.

Question 40

Searle believes in the possibility of strong AI.

Question 41

Nagel declares that the objective perspective is the true perspective.

Question 42

Searle believes that knowledge of what it is like to be a bat can be acquired through scientific investigation.

Question 43

Nagel's argument suggests that mental states can be identical with brain states.

Question 44

Traditional philosophies of mind can be divided into dualist theories and materialist theories.

Question 45

Fodor thinks that functionalism is a reductionist thesis.

Question 46

The biggest challenge for property dualism is to explain the relationship between the mental and the physical?

Question 47

Qualitative content is a problem for functionalism.

Question 48

Functionalism posits the existence of an immaterial substance.

Question 49

Chalmers' arguments lead us inevitably to Cartesian dualism.

Question 50

Chalmers' theory is compatible with all the results of contemporary science.

Question 51

Chalmers can accept a naturalistic understanding of the world and still reject materialism.

Question 52

Smart denies that to say "I have a yellowish orange after-image" is to report something irreducibly psychical.

Question 53

On Smart's view, there are sensations.

Question 54

Smart argues that since an after-image is not in physical space, and a brain process is, the after-image must not be a brain process.

Question 55

Smart thinks that the possibility of zombies shows that they actually exist or will exist.

Question 56

Chalmers's zombie is like the zombies found in Hollywood movies.

Question 57

Block says that what makes the Chinese brain a counterexample to functionalism is that there is prima facie doubt whether it has any mental states.

Question 58

Block says that the Chinese brain has a functional organization that brings a mind into existence.

Question 59

The Turing test had a powerful influence on the field of AI.

Question 60

People only use terms syntactically while computers only use terms semantically.

Question 61

Some AI experts believe that in the future, intelligent robots may acquire moral and legal rights.

Question 62

With Descartes's view, can we ever know that other minds exist? Why or why not?

Question 63

What point is Nagel trying to make with the bat example? How does the nature of subjective experience count against reductive theories of mind?

Question 64

What reasons does Fodor give for preferring functionalism over competing theories? Why does Fodor prefer functionalism over the identity theory?

Question 65

Why does Searle say that strong AI is false?

Question 66

What is the Chinese nation argument? Are you persuaded by it? Why or why not? What are some of the objections to the Chinese nation scenario that Block considers? Do any of these convince you that the Chinese nation argument is mistaken?

Question 67

What is the Chinese room thought experiment? What does it purport to show about strong AI?

Question 68

How does Descartes use the notion of divisibility to argue that the mind exists independently from the body? Assess the argument.

Question 69

What is the identity theory? Is it an adequate solution to the mind-body problem? Why or why not?

Question 70

What is substance dualism? Why do many philosophers think it is an inadequate theory of mind? Do you agree with them? Why or why not?

Question 71

What is property dualism? How does it differ substance dualism? Which kind of dualism do you think is more plausible? Explain.

Question 72

What is the Turing test? Do you believe that the Turing test is an adequate test for intelligence? Why or why not?

Question 73

If substance dualism is false, does that eliminate the possibility of an afterlife? Are the other theories of mind compatible with our continued existence after our death? Why or why not?