Deck 20: The Problem of Moral Hazard
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Deck 20: The Problem of Moral Hazard
1
Progressive Insurance's 'Tripsense' monitors driving patterns of the people who purchase the related insurance policy.This lowers insurance costs because
A)only less reckless drivers will accept the device
B)only more reckless drivers will accept the device
C)drivers will believe they can now drive more recklessly
D)it does not affect care in driving
A)only less reckless drivers will accept the device
B)only more reckless drivers will accept the device
C)drivers will believe they can now drive more recklessly
D)it does not affect care in driving
A
2
An example of moral hazard is
A)people drive as carefully in icy conditions with antilock brakes as without
B)people drive as safely with more airbags as without
C)football players 'spear' with their heads when tackling more often with safer helmets
D)people read the medicine warnings as carefully when self-medicating versus with a doctor's prescription
A)people drive as carefully in icy conditions with antilock brakes as without
B)people drive as safely with more airbags as without
C)football players 'spear' with their heads when tackling more often with safer helmets
D)people read the medicine warnings as carefully when self-medicating versus with a doctor's prescription
C
3
The difference between moral hazard and adverse selection is
A)moral hazard has to do with unobservable characteristics of individuals
B)moral hazard has to do with unobservable actions of individuals
C)adverse selection is when individuals change their behaviors because of a contract
D)adverse selection is when you choose the wrong answer on a test
A)moral hazard has to do with unobservable characteristics of individuals
B)moral hazard has to do with unobservable actions of individuals
C)adverse selection is when individuals change their behaviors because of a contract
D)adverse selection is when you choose the wrong answer on a test
B
4
An example of moral hazard is
A)A taxi driver paid per mile taking a longer route than necessary
B)a piece-rate garment worker shirking more than a per jour worker
C)an hourly salesman working harder than a commission salesman
D)an author on contract going to as many book signings as one with a percentage royalty rate
A)A taxi driver paid per mile taking a longer route than necessary
B)a piece-rate garment worker shirking more than a per jour worker
C)an hourly salesman working harder than a commission salesman
D)an author on contract going to as many book signings as one with a percentage royalty rate
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5
An example of moral hazard is
A)A taxi driver paid per mile taking the shortest route
B)a piece-rate garment worker shirking less than a per jour worker
C)an hourly salesman working harder than a commission salesman
D)an author on contract going to as many book signings as one with a percentage royalty rate
A)A taxi driver paid per mile taking the shortest route
B)a piece-rate garment worker shirking less than a per jour worker
C)an hourly salesman working harder than a commission salesman
D)an author on contract going to as many book signings as one with a percentage royalty rate
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6
An example of moral hazard is
A)A taxi driver paid per mile taking the shortest route
B)a piece-rate garment worker shirking more than a per jour worker
C)an hourly salesman working less hard than a commission salesman
D)an author on contract going to as many book signings as one with a percentage royalty rate
A)A taxi driver paid per mile taking the shortest route
B)a piece-rate garment worker shirking more than a per jour worker
C)an hourly salesman working less hard than a commission salesman
D)an author on contract going to as many book signings as one with a percentage royalty rate
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7
An example of moral hazard is
A)workers working diligently even though the boss is not looking
B)health care insured forgoing their diet and exercise
C)drivers of safer cars turning their phones off before driving
D)borrowers investing their loan proceeds exactly as the bank requires
A)workers working diligently even though the boss is not looking
B)health care insured forgoing their diet and exercise
C)drivers of safer cars turning their phones off before driving
D)borrowers investing their loan proceeds exactly as the bank requires
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8
An example of moral hazard is
A)workers shirking when the boss is not looking
B)health care insured dieting and exercising
C)drivers of safer cars turning their phones off before driving
D)borrowers investing their loan proceeds exactly as the bank requires
A)workers shirking when the boss is not looking
B)health care insured dieting and exercising
C)drivers of safer cars turning their phones off before driving
D)borrowers investing their loan proceeds exactly as the bank requires
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9
An example of moral hazard is
A)people drive less carefully in icy conditions with antilock brakes as without
B)people drive as safely with more airbags as without
C)football players avoid 'spearing' with their heads even with safer helmets
D)people read the medicine warnings as carefully when self-medicating versus with a doctor's prescription
A)people drive less carefully in icy conditions with antilock brakes as without
B)people drive as safely with more airbags as without
C)football players avoid 'spearing' with their heads even with safer helmets
D)people read the medicine warnings as carefully when self-medicating versus with a doctor's prescription
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10
An example of moral hazard is
A)A taxi driver paid per mile taking the shortest route
B)a piece-rate garment worker shirking more than a per jour worker
C)an hourly salesman working harder than a commission salesman
D)an author on contract going to fewer book signings as one with a percentage royalty rate
A)A taxi driver paid per mile taking the shortest route
B)a piece-rate garment worker shirking more than a per jour worker
C)an hourly salesman working harder than a commission salesman
D)an author on contract going to fewer book signings as one with a percentage royalty rate
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11
US law was recently changed so that some airplane manufacturers are immune from liability from accidents involving their decades old aircraft.As a result
A)accident rates fell due to less adverse selection
B)accident rates fell due to less moral hazard
C)accident rates rose due to less adverse selection
D)accident rates rose due to less moral hazard
A)accident rates fell due to less adverse selection
B)accident rates fell due to less moral hazard
C)accident rates rose due to less adverse selection
D)accident rates rose due to less moral hazard
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12
You offer an extended warranty for your product that is purchased by a few customers.If the product typically fails 2% of the time,the claim rate will exceed 2% of warranty purchasers because
A)adverse selection will lead those who are more reckless to purchase the warranty
B)moral hazard will lead those who purchase to be more reckless
C)you systematically underestimate product failure rates
D)a)and b)
A)adverse selection will lead those who are more reckless to purchase the warranty
B)moral hazard will lead those who purchase to be more reckless
C)you systematically underestimate product failure rates
D)a)and b)
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13
An example of moral hazard is
A)workers working diligently even though the boss is not looking
B)health care insured dieting and exercising
C)drivers of safer cars texting on their phones while driving
D)borrowers investing their loan proceeds exactly as the bank requires
A)workers working diligently even though the boss is not looking
B)health care insured dieting and exercising
C)drivers of safer cars texting on their phones while driving
D)borrowers investing their loan proceeds exactly as the bank requires
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14
An example of moral hazard is
A)workers working diligently even though the boss is not looking
B)health care insured dieting and exercising
C)drivers of safer cars turning their phones off before driving
D)borrowers investing their loan proceeds differently than the bank requires
A)workers working diligently even though the boss is not looking
B)health care insured dieting and exercising
C)drivers of safer cars turning their phones off before driving
D)borrowers investing their loan proceeds differently than the bank requires
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15
Progressive Insurance's 'Tripsense' monitors driving patterns of the people who purchase the related insurance policy.This lowers insurance costs because
A)only more reckless drivers will accept the device
B)drivers will want to drive more carefully now
C)drivers will believe they can now drive more recklessly
D)it does not affect care in driving
A)only more reckless drivers will accept the device
B)drivers will want to drive more carefully now
C)drivers will believe they can now drive more recklessly
D)it does not affect care in driving
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16
Because employer-provided health insurance was too expensive,a major employer decided to self-insure and simply pay for medical bills itself rather than a premium to an insurance company.As a result
A)they are more likely to institute a wellness program for employees
B)they are less likely to institute a wellness program for employees
C)they are indifferent with regards wellness programs
D)they will regret this decision
A)they are more likely to institute a wellness program for employees
B)they are less likely to institute a wellness program for employees
C)they are indifferent with regards wellness programs
D)they will regret this decision
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17
A difference between moral hazard and adverse selection is that
A)moral hazard deals with pre-contractually determined public information
B)moral hazard deals with post-contractually determined private information
C)adverse selection deals with pre-contractually determined private information
D)adverse selection deals with post-contractually determined public information
A)moral hazard deals with pre-contractually determined public information
B)moral hazard deals with post-contractually determined private information
C)adverse selection deals with pre-contractually determined private information
D)adverse selection deals with post-contractually determined public information
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18
An example of moral hazard is
A)people drive as carefully in icy conditions with antilock brakes as without
B)people drive as safely with more airbags as without
C)football players avoid 'spearing' with their heads even with safer helmets
D)people fail to read the medicine warnings more often when self-medicating versus with a doctor's prescription
A)people drive as carefully in icy conditions with antilock brakes as without
B)people drive as safely with more airbags as without
C)football players avoid 'spearing' with their heads even with safer helmets
D)people fail to read the medicine warnings more often when self-medicating versus with a doctor's prescription
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19
You offer an extended warranty for your product that is purchased by a few customers.If the product typically fails 2% of the time,
A)you should price the warranty at less than 2% of the product price
B)you should price the warranty at exactly 2% of the product price
C)you should price the warranty at more than 2% of the product price
D)Cannot tell from this information
A)you should price the warranty at less than 2% of the product price
B)you should price the warranty at exactly 2% of the product price
C)you should price the warranty at more than 2% of the product price
D)Cannot tell from this information
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20
An example of moral hazard is
A)people drive as carefully in icy conditions with antilock brakes as without
B)people drive less safely with more airbags as without
C)football players avoid 'spearing' with their heads even with safer helmets
D)people read the medicine warnings as carefully when self-medicating versus with a doctor's prescription
A)people drive as carefully in icy conditions with antilock brakes as without
B)people drive less safely with more airbags as without
C)football players avoid 'spearing' with their heads even with safer helmets
D)people read the medicine warnings as carefully when self-medicating versus with a doctor's prescription
Unlock Deck
Unlock for access to all 35 flashcards in this deck.
Unlock Deck
k this deck
21
To keep employees from shirking,you can invest in greater monitoring
A)even though monitoring is expensive
B)especially when monitoring is efficient
C)when employees respond well to incentive contracts
D)when incentives solve both moral hazard and adverse selection problems with employees
A)even though monitoring is expensive
B)especially when monitoring is efficient
C)when employees respond well to incentive contracts
D)when incentives solve both moral hazard and adverse selection problems with employees
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Unlock for access to all 35 flashcards in this deck.
Unlock Deck
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22
Which is NOT an example of signaling high quality in a social setting
A)wearing a business suit on a job interview
B)scrimping on the tip for the waiter after a dinner date
C)offering an expensive engagement ring to your bride
D)Visiting the beauty salon before a big date
A)wearing a business suit on a job interview
B)scrimping on the tip for the waiter after a dinner date
C)offering an expensive engagement ring to your bride
D)Visiting the beauty salon before a big date
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23
Which is NOT an example of signaling high quality in a social setting
A)wearing a business suit on a job interview
B)leaving a big tip for the waiter after a dinner date
C)offering an expensive engagement ring to your bride
D)Doing messy chores before a big date
A)wearing a business suit on a job interview
B)leaving a big tip for the waiter after a dinner date
C)offering an expensive engagement ring to your bride
D)Doing messy chores before a big date
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24
Which is NOT an example of signaling high quality in a social setting
A)wearing a business suit on a job interview
B)leaving a big tip for the waiter after a dinner date
C)offering a cheap engagement ring to your bride
D)Visiting the beauty salon before a big date
A)wearing a business suit on a job interview
B)leaving a big tip for the waiter after a dinner date
C)offering a cheap engagement ring to your bride
D)Visiting the beauty salon before a big date
Unlock Deck
Unlock for access to all 35 flashcards in this deck.
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k this deck
25
Which is NOT an example of moral hazard
A)people eat more at all-you-can-eat buffets
B)loggers select the most profitable trees to harvest even when they are not paying per tree felled
C)Drivers of heavier,safer cares are more likely to run stop signs
D)workers on commission work harder than those paid an hourly wage
A)people eat more at all-you-can-eat buffets
B)loggers select the most profitable trees to harvest even when they are not paying per tree felled
C)Drivers of heavier,safer cares are more likely to run stop signs
D)workers on commission work harder than those paid an hourly wage
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26
Which is NOT an example of moral hazard
A)people eat less at all-you-can-eat buffets
B)loggers clear-cut a tract of land rather than when paying per tree felled
C)Drivers of heavier,safer cares are more likely to run stop signs
D)workers on commission work harder than those paid an hourly wage
A)people eat less at all-you-can-eat buffets
B)loggers clear-cut a tract of land rather than when paying per tree felled
C)Drivers of heavier,safer cares are more likely to run stop signs
D)workers on commission work harder than those paid an hourly wage
Unlock Deck
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27
The following is NOT an example of a potential monitoring solution to moral hazard
A)blocking social network sites on company computers
B)closed circuit TVs throughout a warehouse
C)GPS tracking devices in repair trucks
D)requiring physicians to be 'board certified'
A)blocking social network sites on company computers
B)closed circuit TVs throughout a warehouse
C)GPS tracking devices in repair trucks
D)requiring physicians to be 'board certified'
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28
The following is NOT an example of a potential monitoring solution to moral hazard
A)blocking social network sites on company computers
B)termination for failing to show up to work during the probationary period
C)GPS tracking devices in repair trucks
D)listening in on call center conversations
A)blocking social network sites on company computers
B)termination for failing to show up to work during the probationary period
C)GPS tracking devices in repair trucks
D)listening in on call center conversations
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Unlock Deck
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29
The following is NOT an example of a potential monitoring solution to moral hazard
A)a pre-hire typing test for clerical employees
B)closed circuit TVs throughout a warehouse
C)GPS tracking devices in repair trucks
D)listening in on call center conversations
A)a pre-hire typing test for clerical employees
B)closed circuit TVs throughout a warehouse
C)GPS tracking devices in repair trucks
D)listening in on call center conversations
Unlock Deck
Unlock for access to all 35 flashcards in this deck.
Unlock Deck
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30
The following is NOT an example of a potential monitoring solution to moral hazard
A)blocking social network sites on company computers
B)closed circuit TVs throughout a warehouse
C)requiring a kitchen remodeling contractor to be 'bonded'
D)listening in on call center conversations
A)blocking social network sites on company computers
B)closed circuit TVs throughout a warehouse
C)requiring a kitchen remodeling contractor to be 'bonded'
D)listening in on call center conversations
Unlock Deck
Unlock for access to all 35 flashcards in this deck.
Unlock Deck
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31
To keep employees from shirking,you can invest in greater monitoring
A)because monitoring is inexpensive
B)especially when monitoring is not very efficient
C)when employees respond well to incentive contracts
D)when incentives solve both moral hazard and adverse selection problems with employees
A)because monitoring is inexpensive
B)especially when monitoring is not very efficient
C)when employees respond well to incentive contracts
D)when incentives solve both moral hazard and adverse selection problems with employees
Unlock Deck
Unlock for access to all 35 flashcards in this deck.
Unlock Deck
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32
Which is NOT an example of moral hazard
A)people eat more at all-you-can-eat buffets
B)loggers clear-cut a tract of land rather than when paying per tree felled
C)Drivers of heavier,safer cares are more likely to run stop signs
D)workers paid an hourly wage work harder than those on commission
A)people eat more at all-you-can-eat buffets
B)loggers clear-cut a tract of land rather than when paying per tree felled
C)Drivers of heavier,safer cares are more likely to run stop signs
D)workers paid an hourly wage work harder than those on commission
Unlock Deck
Unlock for access to all 35 flashcards in this deck.
Unlock Deck
k this deck
33
Which is NOT an example of moral hazard
A)people eat more at all-you-can-eat buffets
B)loggers clear-cut a tract of land rather than when paying per tree felled
C)Drivers of heavier,safer cares are less likely to run stop signs
D)workers on commission work harder than those paid an hourly wage
A)people eat more at all-you-can-eat buffets
B)loggers clear-cut a tract of land rather than when paying per tree felled
C)Drivers of heavier,safer cares are less likely to run stop signs
D)workers on commission work harder than those paid an hourly wage
Unlock Deck
Unlock for access to all 35 flashcards in this deck.
Unlock Deck
k this deck
34
To keep employees from shirking,you can invest in greater monitoring
A)even though monitoring is expensive
B)especially when monitoring is not very efficient
C)when employees respond well to incentive contracts
D)when incentives fail to solve either moral hazard and adverse selection problems with employees
A)even though monitoring is expensive
B)especially when monitoring is not very efficient
C)when employees respond well to incentive contracts
D)when incentives fail to solve either moral hazard and adverse selection problems with employees
Unlock Deck
Unlock for access to all 35 flashcards in this deck.
Unlock Deck
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35
To keep employees from shirking,you can invest in greater monitoring
A)even though monitoring is expensive
B)especially when monitoring is not very efficient
C)when employees fail to respond to incentive contracts
D)when incentives solve both moral hazard and adverse selection problems with employees
A)even though monitoring is expensive
B)especially when monitoring is not very efficient
C)when employees fail to respond to incentive contracts
D)when incentives solve both moral hazard and adverse selection problems with employees
Unlock Deck
Unlock for access to all 35 flashcards in this deck.
Unlock Deck
k this deck