Business Law 13th Edition by Frank Cross, Kenneth Clarkson, Roger LeRoy Miller

Exercise 17

In the language of the court
fla um, Circuit Judge.
* * * * Indiana Code Section 35-42-4-12 prohibits certain sex offenders from "knowingly or intentionally using: a social networking Web site" or "an instant messaging or chat room program"
a. The names John Doe and Jane Doe are used as placeholders in litigation to represent a party whose true identity is either unknown or being withheld for some reason.
that "the offender knows allows a person who is less than eighteen (18) years of age to access or use the Web site or program." The law applies broadly to all individuals required to register as sex offenders. * * * * This case presents a single legal question * * *. The statute clearly implicates Doe's First Amendment rights * * *. It not only precludes [prohibits] expression through the medium of social media, it also limits his right to receive information and ideas. The Indiana law, however, is content neutral because it restricts speech without reference to the expression's content. As such, it may impose reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions. To do so, the law * * * must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest. The state initially asserts an interest in "protecting public safety, and specifically in protecting minors from harmful online communications." Indiana is certainly justified in shielding its children from improper sexual communication.
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* * * The state agrees there is nothing dangerous about Doe's use of social media as long as he does not improperly communicate with minors. Further, there is no disagreement that illicit communication comprises a minuscule subset of the universe of social network activity. As such, the Indiana law targets substantially more activity than the evil it seeks to redress. * * * Indiana has other methods to combat unwanted and inappropriate communication between minors and sex offenders. For instance, [under Indiana Code Section 35-42-4-6] it is a felony in Indiana for persons over twenty-one to "solicit" children under sixteen "to engage in: (1) sexual intercourse; (2) deviate sexual conduct; or (3) any fondling intended to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the older person." A separate statute goes further. [Indiana Code Section 35-42-4-13] punishes mere "inappropriate communication with a child" and communication "with the intent to gratify the sexual desires of the person or the individual." Significantly, both statutes have enhanced penalties for using a computer network and better advance Indiana's interest in preventing harmful interaction with children (by going beyond social networks). They also accomplish that end more narrowly (by refusing to burden benign Internet activity). That is, they are neither over nor under-inclusive like the statute at issue here. [Emphasis added.]
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For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district court's decision, and REMAND with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Doe and issue the injunction.
Decision and remedy The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the lower court's judgment in the defendant's favor and remanded the case for the entry of a judgment for Doe. A law that concerns rights under the First Amendment must be narrowly tailored to accomplish its objective. The blanket ban on social media in this case did not pass this test.
The legal environment dimension What is an injunction? What did the plaintiff in this case hope to gain by seeking an injunction?
The social dimension Could a state effectively enforce a law that banned all communication between minors and sex offenders through social media sites? Why or why not?