Consider a Cournot duopoly with the following inverse demand function: P = 100 - 2Q1 - 2Q2.The firms' marginal cost are identical and given by MCi(Qi) = 2Qi.Based on this information firm 1 and 2's marginal revenue functions are

A) MR1(Q1,Q2) = 100 - 2Q1 - Q2 and MR2(Q1,Q2) = 100 - Q1 - 2Q2. B) MR1(Q1,Q2) = 100 - 4Q1 - 2Q2 and MR2(Q1,Q2) = 100 - 2Q1 - 4Q2. C) MR1(Q1,Q2) = 100 - 2Q1 - 4Q2 and MR2(Q1,Q2) = 100 - 4Q1 - 2Q2. D) MR1(Q1,Q2) = 24.5 - 0.5Q2 and MR2(Q1,Q2) = 24.5 - 0.5Q1. A) MR1(Q1,Q2) = 100 - 2Q1 - Q2 and MR2(Q1,Q2) = 100 - Q1 - 2Q2. B) MR1(Q1,Q2) = 100 - 4Q1 - 2Q2 and MR2(Q1,Q2) = 100 - 2Q1 - 4Q2. C) MR1(Q1,Q2) = 100 - 2Q1 - 4Q2 and MR2(Q1,Q2) = 100 - 4Q1 - 2Q2. D) MR1(Q1,Q2) = 24.5 - 0.5Q2 and MR2(Q1,Q2) = 24.5 - 0.5Q1.

Consider a Cournot duopoly with the following inverse demand function: P = 100 - 2Q1 - 2Q2.The firms' marginal cost are identical and given by MCi(Qi) = 2Qi.Based on this information consumer surplus in this market is

A) $16.33. B) $32.67. C) $1,067.11. D) $2,134.22. A) $16.33. B) $32.67. C) $1,067.11. D) $2,134.22.

Consider a Cournot duopoly with the following inverse demand function: P = 100 - 2Q1 - 2Q2.The firms' marginal cost are identical and given by MCi(Qi) = 2Qi.Based on this information firm 1 and 2's reaction functions are

A) r1(Q2) = 24.5 - 0.5Q1 and r2(Q1) = 24.5 - 0.5Q2. B) r1(Q2) = 24.5 - 0.5Q2 and r1(Q2) = 24.5 - 0.5Q1. C) Q1 = 49 - 0.5Q2 and Q2 = 49 - 0.5Q1. D) Q1 = 49 - 0.25Q2 and Q2 = 49 - 0.25Q1. A) r1(Q2) = 24.5 - 0.5Q1 and r2(Q1) = 24.5 - 0.5Q2. B) r1(Q2) = 24.5 - 0.5Q2 and r1(Q2) = 24.5 - 0.5Q1. C) Q1 = 49 - 0.5Q2 and Q2 = 49 - 0.5Q1. D) Q1 = 49 - 0.25Q2 and Q2 = 49 - 0.25Q1.

Exam 9: Basic Oligopoly Models

Consider a Cournot duopoly with the following inverse demand function: P = 100 - 2Q₁ - 2Q₂.The firms' marginal cost are identical and given by MC_i(Q_i) = 2Q_i.Based on this information firm 1 and 2's marginal revenue functions are

(Multiple Choice)

4.8/5

(42)

Question 81

Which of the following is true?

(Multiple Choice)

4.8/5

(32)

Question 82

Both firms in a Cournot duopoly would experience lower profits if

(Multiple Choice)

4.9/5

(43)

Question 83

Which of the following is true of a perfectly contestable market?

(Multiple Choice)

4.8/5

(36)

Question 84

The market demand in a Bertrand duopoly is P = 10 - 3Q, and the marginal costs are $1.Fixed costs are zero for both firms.Based on this information we can conclude that

(Multiple Choice)

4.9/5

(36)

Question 85

Two identical firms compete as a Cournot duopoly.The demand they face is P = 100 - 2Q.The cost function for each firm is C(Q) = 4Q.In equilibrium, the deadweight loss is:

(Multiple Choice)

4.7/5

(41)

Question 86

Consider a Cournot duopoly with the following inverse demand function: P = 100 - 2Q₁ - 2Q₂.The firms' marginal cost are identical and given by MC_i(Q_i) = 2Q_i.Based on this information consumer surplus in this market is

(Multiple Choice)

4.8/5

(31)

Question 87

The inverse demand curve for a Stackelberg duopoly is

(Essay)

4.9/5

(39)

Question 88

Two firms compete as a Stackelberg duopoly.The demand they face is P = 100 - 3Q.The cost function for each firm is C(Q) = 4Q.The outputs of the two firms are:

(Multiple Choice)

4.8/5

(34)

Question 89

Which of the following is true?

(Multiple Choice)

4.9/5

(40)

Question 90

Which of the following statements is not a condition for a Stackelberg oligopoly?

(Multiple Choice)

4.9/5

(33)

Question 91

When firm 1 enjoys a first-mover advantage in a Stackelberg duopoly, it will produce:

(Multiple Choice)

4.8/5

(30)

Question 92

Consider two firms competing to sell a homogeneous product by setting price.The inverse demand curve is given by P = 6 - Q.If each firms' cost function is C_i(Q_i) = 2Q_i, then consumer surplus in this market is

(Multiple Choice)

4.7/5

(45)

Question 93

Consider a market consisting of two firms where the inverse demand curve is given by P = 500 - 2Q₁ - 2Q₂.Each firm has a marginal cost of $50.Based on this information we can conclude that equilibrium price in the different oligopoly models will follow which of the following orderings.

(Multiple Choice)

4.7/5

(37)

Question 94

Consider a Cournot duopoly with the following inverse demand function: P = 100 - 2Q₁ - 2Q₂.The firms' marginal cost are identical and given by MC_i(Q_i) = 2Q_i.Based on this information firm 1 and 2's reaction functions are

(Multiple Choice)

4.7/5

(38)

Question 95

Which of the following are quantity-setting oligopoly models?

(Multiple Choice)

4.8/5

(38)

Question 96

An oligopolist has a marginal revenue curve that jumps down at 500 units of output.What kind of oligopoly does the firm most likely belong to?

(Multiple Choice)

4.8/5

(32)

Question 97

A new firm enters a market which is initially serviced by a Cournot duopoly charging a price of $20.What will the new market price be should the three firms co-exist after the entry?

(Multiple Choice)

4.8/5

(32)

Question 98

Suppose that the duopolists competing in Cournot fashion agree to produce the collusive output.Given that firm one commits to this collusive output, it pays firm two to

(Multiple Choice)

4.9/5

(36)

Question 99

The Sweezy model of oligopoly reveals that

(Multiple Choice)

4.9/5

(31)

Question 100

Showing 81 - 100 of 125

Consider a Cournot duopoly with the following inverse demand function: P = 100 - 2Q₁ - 2Q₂.The firms' marginal cost are identical and given by MC_i(Q_i) = 2Q_i.Based on this information firm 1 and 2's marginal revenue functions are

Which of the following is true?

Both firms in a Cournot duopoly would experience lower profits if

Which of the following is true of a perfectly contestable market?

The market demand in a Bertrand duopoly is P = 10 - 3Q, and the marginal costs are $1.Fixed costs are zero for both firms.Based on this information we can conclude that

Two identical firms compete as a Cournot duopoly.The demand they face is P = 100 - 2Q.The cost function for each firm is C(Q) = 4Q.In equilibrium, the deadweight loss is:

Consider a Cournot duopoly with the following inverse demand function: P = 100 - 2Q₁ - 2Q₂.The firms' marginal cost are identical and given by MC_i(Q_i) = 2Q_i.Based on this information consumer surplus in this market is

The inverse demand curve for a Stackelberg duopoly is

Two firms compete as a Stackelberg duopoly.The demand they face is P = 100 - 3Q.The cost function for each firm is C(Q) = 4Q.The outputs of the two firms are:

Which of the following is true?

Which of the following statements is not a condition for a Stackelberg oligopoly?

When firm 1 enjoys a first-mover advantage in a Stackelberg duopoly, it will produce:

Consider two firms competing to sell a homogeneous product by setting price.The inverse demand curve is given by P = 6 - Q.If each firms' cost function is C_i(Q_i) = 2Q_i, then consumer surplus in this market is

Consider a market consisting of two firms where the inverse demand curve is given by P = 500 - 2Q₁ - 2Q₂.Each firm has a marginal cost of $50.Based on this information we can conclude that equilibrium price in the different oligopoly models will follow which of the following orderings.

Consider a Cournot duopoly with the following inverse demand function: P = 100 - 2Q₁ - 2Q₂.The firms' marginal cost are identical and given by MC_i(Q_i) = 2Q_i.Based on this information firm 1 and 2's reaction functions are

Which of the following are quantity-setting oligopoly models?

An oligopolist has a marginal revenue curve that jumps down at 500 units of output.What kind of oligopoly does the firm most likely belong to?

A new firm enters a market which is initially serviced by a Cournot duopoly charging a price of $20.What will the new market price be should the three firms co-exist after the entry?

Suppose that the duopolists competing in Cournot fashion agree to produce the collusive output.Given that firm one commits to this collusive output, it pays firm two to

The Sweezy model of oligopoly reveals that

The Fundamentals of Managerial Economics

Market Forces: Demand and Supply

Quantitative Demand Analysis

The Theory of Individual Behavior

The Production Process and Costs

The Organization of the Firm

The Nature of Industry

Managing in Competitive, Monopolistic, and Monopolistically Competitive Markets

Game Theory: Inside Oligopoly

Pricing Strategies for Firms With Market Power

The Economics of Information

Advanced Topics in Business Strategy

A Managers Guide to Government in the Marketplace

Filters

Exam 9: Basic Oligopoly Models

Consider a Cournot duopoly with the following inverse demand function: P = 100 - 2Q1 - 2Q2.The firms' marginal cost are identical and given by MCi(Qi) = 2Qi.Based on this information firm 1 and 2's marginal revenue functions are

Which of the following is true?

Both firms in a Cournot duopoly would experience lower profits if

Which of the following is true of a perfectly contestable market?

The market demand in a Bertrand duopoly is P = 10 - 3Q, and the marginal costs are $1.Fixed costs are zero for both firms.Based on this information we can conclude that

Two identical firms compete as a Cournot duopoly.The demand they face is P = 100 - 2Q.The cost function for each firm is C(Q) = 4Q.In equilibrium, the deadweight loss is:

Consider a Cournot duopoly with the following inverse demand function: P = 100 - 2Q1 - 2Q2.The firms' marginal cost are identical and given by MCi(Qi) = 2Qi.Based on this information consumer surplus in this market is

The inverse demand curve for a Stackelberg duopoly is

Two firms compete as a Stackelberg duopoly.The demand they face is P = 100 - 3Q.The cost function for each firm is C(Q) = 4Q.The outputs of the two firms are:

Which of the following is true?

Which of the following statements is not a condition for a Stackelberg oligopoly?

When firm 1 enjoys a first-mover advantage in a Stackelberg duopoly, it will produce:

Consider two firms competing to sell a homogeneous product by setting price.The inverse demand curve is given by P = 6 - Q.If each firms' cost function is Ci(Qi) = 2Qi, then consumer surplus in this market is

Consider a market consisting of two firms where the inverse demand curve is given by P = 500 - 2Q1 - 2Q2.Each firm has a marginal cost of $50.Based on this information we can conclude that equilibrium price in the different oligopoly models will follow which of the following orderings.

Consider a Cournot duopoly with the following inverse demand function: P = 100 - 2Q1 - 2Q2.The firms' marginal cost are identical and given by MCi(Qi) = 2Qi.Based on this information firm 1 and 2's reaction functions are

Which of the following are quantity-setting oligopoly models?

An oligopolist has a marginal revenue curve that jumps down at 500 units of output.What kind of oligopoly does the firm most likely belong to?

A new firm enters a market which is initially serviced by a Cournot duopoly charging a price of $20.What will the new market price be should the three firms co-exist after the entry?

Suppose that the duopolists competing in Cournot fashion agree to produce the collusive output.Given that firm one commits to this collusive output, it pays firm two to

The Sweezy model of oligopoly reveals that

The Fundamentals of Managerial Economics

Market Forces: Demand and Supply

Quantitative Demand Analysis

The Theory of Individual Behavior

The Production Process and Costs

The Organization of the Firm

The Nature of Industry

Managing in Competitive, Monopolistic, and Monopolistically Competitive Markets

Game Theory: Inside Oligopoly

Pricing Strategies for Firms With Market Power

The Economics of Information

Advanced Topics in Business Strategy

A Managers Guide to Government in the Marketplace

Filters

Consider a Cournot duopoly with the following inverse demand function: P = 100 - 2Q₁ - 2Q₂.The firms' marginal cost are identical and given by MC_i(Q_i) = 2Q_i.Based on this information firm 1 and 2's marginal revenue functions are

Consider a Cournot duopoly with the following inverse demand function: P = 100 - 2Q₁ - 2Q₂.The firms' marginal cost are identical and given by MC_i(Q_i) = 2Q_i.Based on this information consumer surplus in this market is

Consider two firms competing to sell a homogeneous product by setting price.The inverse demand curve is given by P = 6 - Q.If each firms' cost function is C_i(Q_i) = 2Q_i, then consumer surplus in this market is

Consider a market consisting of two firms where the inverse demand curve is given by P = 500 - 2Q₁ - 2Q₂.Each firm has a marginal cost of $50.Based on this information we can conclude that equilibrium price in the different oligopoly models will follow which of the following orderings.

Consider a Cournot duopoly with the following inverse demand function: P = 100 - 2Q₁ - 2Q₂.The firms' marginal cost are identical and given by MC_i(Q_i) = 2Q_i.Based on this information firm 1 and 2's reaction functions are