Exam 14: Selfishness and Altruism

When the dictator game is played in the laboratory, any time a dictator gives money to the recipient his actions can be explained by altruism.

Which of the following is a public good?

Which of the following goods are non-rival?

The free-rider problem occurs when goods are

The common saying: "the best way to make yourself happy is to make someone else happy," is an example of the "warm glow."

In any subgame perfect nash equilibrium (SPNE), how much money should the dictator allocate in the dictator game?

Which of the following goods are non-excludable?

One solution to the free-rider problem is to make payment for the good compulsory through taxes.

Consider the game in Figure 14.6. If player 1 plans to play $T$ at the first node, then his strategy for the game is given by $s_{1}=\{T\}$ .

If preferences satisfy transitivity then they also satisfy SARP.

There is a set of goods, $x=\left(x_{1}, x_{2}, \ldots x_{N}\right)$ . Bruce can only afford $x_{1}, x_{4}, x_{N-1}$ . Bruce directly reveal prefers $x_{1}$ over $x_{2}$ and $x_{2}$ over $x_{N-1}$ and indirectly reveal prefers $x_{1}$ over $x_{N-1}$ .

Joe can afford two bundles of goods: $x_{1}$ and $x_{2}$ . Joe chooses $x_{1}$ . Thus $x_{1}$ is strictly revealed preferred to $x_{2}$ only if

Consider the utility function specified on page 14-17: $u(x, r, c)$ , where $x$ is the size of an individual's home, $r$ is their rank in home size relative to their neighbors, and $c$ is other goods. $u(x, r, c)$ is increasing in $c$ and $x$ and decreasing in $r$ . Suppose a tornado comes through your neighbourhood and either totally destroys a house or leaves it undamaged. The largest house in the neighbourhood is destroyed and your house is undamaged. Based only on this information, you can be sure that you utility increased.