Exam 14: Game Theory and the Economics of Information
Exam 1: An Introduction to Microeconomics95 Questions
Exam 2: Supply and Demand94 Questions
Exam 3: The Theory of Consumer Choice75 Questions
Exam 4: Individual and Market Demand100 Questions
Exam 5: Using Consumer Choice Theory85 Questions
Exam 6: Exchange, Efficiency, and Prices79 Questions
Exam 7: Production112 Questions
Exam 8: The Cost of Production121 Questions
Exam 9: Profit Maximization in Perfectly Competitive Markets97 Questions
Exam 10: Using the Competitive Model96 Questions
Exam 11: Monopoly112 Questions
Exam 12: Product Pricing With Monopoly Power89 Questions
Exam 13: Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly98 Questions
Exam 14: Game Theory and the Economics of Information88 Questions
Exam 15: Using Noncompetitive Market Models78 Questions
Exam 16: Employment and Pricing of Inputs99 Questions
Exam 17: Wages, Rent, Interest, and Profit92 Questions
Exam 18: Using Input Market Analysis83 Questions
Exam 19: General Equilibrium Analysis and Economic Efficiency95 Questions
Exam 20: Public Goods and Externalities102 Questions
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Which of the following is true for a two-person game which has a Nash equilibrium?
(Multiple Choice)
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Like a market for "lemons," the labor market can also be affected by asymmetric information.Suppose a firm wants to hire more workers.The workers (or sellers of labor)know much more about their true productivity than the firm (or buyer of labor).The firm would like to hire workers and pay them according to their productivity but it is costly for them to hire workers,observe their behavior and productivity (do they work hard? are they on time?),and then fire those that do not perform well.Therefore,the firm would like to know how productive a worker will be before it hires that person.Can the firm acquire information (called a signal)about a worker's future productivity before hiring them? Can workers somehow signal their future productivity to firms?
This example is based on Michael Spence,"Job Market Signaling," Quarterly Journal of Economics,87 (August 1973),pp.205 - 221 and adapted from Ehrenberg and Smith,Modern Labor Economics,7th edition,Addison-Wesley.
Assume there are only 2 types of workers,low productivity or high productivity.Workers with 16 years or more of education will be offered a wage leading to a present value of lifetime income of $2,000,000.Those completing less than 16 years of education are offered a wage leading to a present value of lifetime income equal to $1,000,000.
Suppose that the total cost of various levels of education is given by the equations CA = 300,000(E-12)and CB = 200,000(E-12)where type A workers are "low productivity" workers and type B workers are "high productivity" workers,and E represents years of education.
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A)What is the net benefit (difference between the present value of income and total cost)a type A person derives from attaining 16 years of education? What would be the net benefit for type A from 12 years of education? What is the optimal level of education for a type A person?
(b)Is 16 years of education an effective way to distinguish low-ability workers from high-ability workers? Why?
(c)Suppose firms raised the cutoff for the higher wage job to 18 years of education.Would this be an effective signal of worker productivity? Why or why not?
(d)To be an effective signal,what must be the relationship between the cost of acquiring the signal and a worker's productivity?
(e)How might grade inflation affect the effectiveness of the signal?
(Essay)
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_____ is the term used to describe the total amount of the hospital cost that is borne by a patient before insurance coverage becomes effective.
(Multiple Choice)
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Health insurance companies often place limitations on the services covered by the insurance to deal with the:
(Multiple Choice)
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For which of the following commodities will the benefit from search be the highest?
(Multiple Choice)
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Assume that two firms are engaged in a pricing rivalry and attempt collusion.If each firm knows that the pricing game will last for a finite number of periods,and the collusion contract is not enforceable,then they will have an incentive to:
(Multiple Choice)
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An effective and enforceable collusion in a duopoly will result in:
(Multiple Choice)
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