Exam 18: Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions: Analysis and Valuation

Licensing allows a firm to purchase the right to manufacture and sell another firm's products within a specific country or set of countries.

Overcoming Political Risk in Cross-Border Transactions: China's CNOOC Invests in Chesapeake Energy Cross-border transactions often are subject to considerable political risk. In emerging countries, this may reflect the potential for expropriation of property or disruption of commerce due to a breakdown in civil order. However, as Chinese efforts to secure energy supplies in recent years have shown, foreign firms have to be highly sensitive to political and cultural issues in any host country, developed or otherwise. In addition to a desire to satisfy future energy needs, the Chinese government has been under pressure to tap its domestic shale gas deposits due to the clean burning nature of such fuels to reduce its dependence on coal, the nation's primary source of power. However, China does not currently have the technology for recovering gas and oil from shale. In an effort to gain access to the needed technology and to U.S. shale gas and oil reserves, China National Offshore Oil Corporation Ltd. in October 2010 agreed to invest up to $2.16 billion in selected reserves of U.S. oil and gas producer Chesapeake Energy Corp. Chesapeake is a leader in shale extraction technologies and an owner of substantial oil and gas shale reserves, principally in the southwestern United States. The deal grants CNOOC the option of buying up to a third of any other fields Chesapeake acquires in the general proximity of the fields the firm currently owns. The terms of the deal call for CNOOC to pay Chesapeake $1.08 billion for a one-third stake in a South Texas oil and gas field. CNOOC could spend an additional $1.08 billion to cover 75 percent of the costs of developing the 600,000 acres included in this field. Chesapeake will be the operator of the JV project in Texas, handling all leasing and drilling operations, as well as selling the oil and gas production. The project is expected to produce as much as 500,000 barrels of oil daily within the next decade, about 2.5 percent of the current U.S. daily oil consumption. Having been forced in 2005 to withdraw what appeared to be a winning bid for U.S. oil company Unocal, CNOOC stayed out of the U.S. energy market until 2010. The firm's new strategy includes becoming a significant partner in joint ventures to develop largely untapped reserves. The investment had significant appeal to U.S. interests because it represented an opportunity to develop nontraditional sources of energy while creating thousands of domestic jobs and millions of dollars in tax revenue. This investment was particularly well timed, as it coincided with a nearly double-digit U.S. jobless rate; yawning federal, state, and local budget deficits; and an ongoing national desire for energy independence. The deal makes sense for debt-laden Chesapeake, since it lacked the financial resources to develop its shale reserves. In contrast to the Chesapeake transaction, CNNOC tried to take control of Unocal, triggering what may be the most politicized takeover battle in U.S. history. Chevron, a large U.S. oil and gas firm, had made an all-stock $16 billion offer (subsequently raised to $16.5 billion) for Unocal, which was later trumped by an all-cash $18.5 billion bid by CNOOC. About three-fourths of CNOOC's all-cash offer was financed through below-market-rate loans provided by its primary shareholder: the Chinese government. CNOOC's all-cash offer sparked instant opposition from members of Congress, who demanded a lengthy review and introduced legislation to place even more hurdles in CNOOC's way. Hoping to allay fears, CNOOC offered to sell Unocal's U.S. assets and promised to retain all of Unocal's workers, something Chevron was not prone to do. U.S. lawmakers expressed concern that Unocal's oil drilling technology might have military applications and CNOOC's ownership structure (i.e., 70 percent owned by the Chinese government) would enable the firm to secure low-cost financing that was unavailable to Chevron. The final blow to CNOOC's bid was an amendment to an energy bill passed in July requiring the Departments of Energy, Defense, and Homeland Security to spend four months studying the proposed takeover before granting federal approval. Perhaps somewhat naively, the Chinese government viewed the low-cost loans as a way to "recycle" a portion of the huge accumulation of dollars it was experiencing. While the Chinese remained largely silent through the political maelstrom, CNOOC's management appeared to be greatly surprised and embarrassed by the public criticism in the United States about the proposed takeover of a major U.S. company. Up to that point, the only other major U.S. firm acquired by a Chinese firm was the 2004 acquisition of IBM's personal computer business by Lenovo, the largest PC manufacturer in China. Many foreign firms desirous of learning how to tap shale deposits from U.S. firms like Chesapeake and to gain access to such reserves have invested in U.S. projects, providing a much-needed cash infusion. In mid-2010, Indian conglomerate Reliance Industries acquired a 45 percent stake in Pioneer Natural Resources Company's Texas natural gas assets and has negotiated deals totaling $2 billion for minority stakes in projects in the eastern United States. Norwegian oil producer Statoil announced in late 2010 that it would team up with Norwegian oil producer Talisman Energy to buy $1.3 billion worth of assets in the Eagle Ford fields, the same shale deposit being developed by Chesapeake and CNOOC. -Do you believe that countries should permit foreign ownership of vital scarce natural resources? Explain your answer.

Which of the following represent common components of the global capital asset pricing model when applied to valuing firms in emerging countries?

A sometimes overlooked challenge is the failure of the legal system in an emerging country to honor contracts.

For an acquirer evaluating a target firm in another country,the target's cash flows can be expressed in which of the following ways?

An analyst can determine if a country's equity market is likely to be segmented from the global equity market if the ß derived by regressing returns in the foreign market with returns on the global equity market is significantly different from one.

In civil law countries (which include Western Europe,South America,Japan,and Korea),the acquisition will generally be in the form of a share company or limited liability company.

Excess capacity in many industries often drives M&A activity as firms strive to achieve greater economies of scale and scope,as well as pricing power with customers and suppliers.

In globally integrated markets,it makes little difference whether the ß is calculated by regressing the target firm's (or a similar firm's)historical returns against the returns for a broadly defined global index,U.S.equity market index,or a broadly defined equity index in the target's country.

M&A practitioners utilize nominal cash flows except in circumstances of high rates of inflation,when real cash flows are preferable.

Investors in segmented markets will bear a lower level of risk by holding a disproportionately large share of their investments in their local market as opposed to the level of risk if they invested in a globally diversified portfolio.

The methodology for valuing cross-border transactions using discounted cash flow analysis is substantially different from that employed when both the acquiring and target firms are within the same country.True of False

Despite accounting practices varying widely from country to country,the seller should not be required to confirm that their financial statements have been prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles if to do so would endanger the deal.

Firms with significant expertise,brands,patents,copyrights,and proprietary technologies seek to grow by exploiting these advantages in emerging markets.

The American Depository Receipt (ADR)market evolved as a means of enabling foreign firms to raise funds in the U.S.equity markets.

Which of the following is not true of exporting as a market entry strategy?

Arcelor Outbids ThyssenKrupp for Canada's Dofasco Steelmaking Operations Arcelor Steel of Luxembourg, the world's second largest steel maker, was eager to make an acquisition. Having been outbid by Mittal, the world's leading steel firm, in its efforts to buy Turkey's state-owned Erdemir and Ukraine's Kryvorizhstal, Guy Dolle, Arcelor's CEO, seemed determined not to let that happen again. Arcelor and Dofasco had been in talks for more than four months before Arcelor decided to initiate a tender offer on November 23, 2005, valued at $3.8 billion in cash. Dofasco, Canada's largest steel manufacturer, owned vast coal and iron ore reserves, possessed a nonunion workforce, and sold much of its steel to Honda assembly plants in the United States. The merger would enable Arcelor, whose revenues were concentrated primarily in Europe, to diversify into the United States. Contrary to their European operations, Arcelor found the flexibility offered by Dofasco's nonunion labor force highly attractive. Moreover, by increasing its share of global steel production, Arcelor's management reasoned that it would be able to exert additional pricing leverage with both customers and suppliers. Serving the role of "white knight," Germany's ThyssenKrupp, the sixth largest steel firm in the world, offered to acquire Dofasco one week later for $4.1 billion in cash. Dofasco's board accepted the bid, which included a $187 million breakup fee should another firm acquire Dofasco. Investors soundly criticized Dofasco's board for not opening up the bidding to an auction. In its defense, the board expressed concern about stretching out the process in an auction over several weeks. In late December, Arcelor topped the ThyssenKrupp bid by offering $4.2 billion. Not to be outdone, ThyssenKrupp matched the Arcelor offer on January 4, 2006. The Dofasco board reaffirmed its preference for the ThyssenKrupp bid, due to the breakup fee and ThyssenKrupp's willingness (unlike Arcelor) to allow Dofasco to continue to operate under its own name and management. In a bold attempt to put Dofasco out of reach of the already highly leveraged ThyssenKrupp, Arcelor raised its bid to $4.8 billion on January 16, 2006. This bid represented an approximate 80 percent premium over Dofasco's closing share price on the day Arcelor announced its original tender offer. The Arcelor bid was contingent on Dofasco withdrawing its support for the ThyssenKrupp bid. On January 24, 2006, ThyssenKrupp said it would not raise its bid. Events in the dynamically changing global steel market were not to end here. The Arcelor board and management barely had time to savor their successful takeover of Dofasco before Mittal initiated a hostile takeover of Arcelor. Ironically, Mittal succeeded in acquiring its archrival, Arcelor, just six months later in a bid to achieve further industry consolidation. and Answers: -What were the motives for Arcelor's and ThyssenKrupp's interest in Dofasco?

With tax avoidance and fraud common in many countries,the buyer may find that some assets will transfer encumbered by tax liens.

Firms are likely to achieve significant diversification by investing in all of the following except for

Like globally integrated capital markets,segmented capital markets exhibit different bond and equity prices in different geographic areas for different assets in terms of risk and maturity.