Exam 12: Choices Involving Strategy

-Refer to Figure b.Kate and Alice are sisters with a very strict mother.The girls are not allowed to watch television during the day when their mother is at work.The mother comes home one day and knows at least one girl was watching the television because it is warm.She sends the girls to their separate bedrooms while she decides what to do.After giving it some thought,she decides to send a message to the naughty girls and offers them the following deal: if they both deny watching TV,they will each be grounded for 3 weeks; if one squeals on the other,but the other denies watching TV,the squealer is grounded for 2 weeks,while the denier is grounded for 10; if they both squeal,each is grounded for 6 weeks.The following payoff matrix illustrates the girls' dilemma,with Kate's payoff shown in the upper left-hand corner of each cell and Alice's in the lower right-hand corner.What is Kate's best response?

-Refer to Figure b.What is the Nash equilibrium in problem 13?

A strategy is dominant if

-In a Nash equilibrium

A strategy is weakly dominated if

-Refer to Figure a.Given the game described in problem 9,if Joe knows Charlie knows he always throws scissors,what is Joe's best response?

-Refer to Figures b and c.Assume instead of the rules described in problem 13,the girls' mother shows favoritism towards Kate because she is the younger of the two girls.If both girls deny watching TV,Kate will not be punished,but Alice will still be grounded for 3 weeks because she is older and should be setting a good example for her younger sister.The altered game is shown in the following payoff matrix.What is Kate's best response?

-Refer to Figure b.Given the game described in problem 13,what is Alice's dominant strategy?

-Refer to Figure d.In the game described in problem 21,for Travis,north is

A self-enforcing agreement

In a multiple-stage game

-Refer to Figure b.Given the game described in problem 13,what is Alice's best response?

Free riding

A player is playing a pure strategy when

-Refer to Figure d.What is the Nash equilibrium in problem 21?

Playing the equilibrium of a one-stage game over and over again when the one-stage game is repeated is

In a mixed strategy equilibrium

In a one-stage game

A game is

The iterative deletion of dominated strategies refers to the following process: