Exam 13: Advanced Topics in Business Strategy
Exam 1: The Fundamentals of Managerial Economics143 Questions
Exam 2: Market Forces: Demand and Supply150 Questions
Exam 3: Quantitative Demand Analysis170 Questions
Exam 4: The Theory of Individual Behavior179 Questions
Exam 5: The Production Process and Costs173 Questions
Exam 6: The Organization of the Firm157 Questions
Exam 7: The Nature of Industry123 Questions
Exam 8: Managing in Competitive, Monopolistic, and Monopolistically Competitive Markets130 Questions
Exam 9: Basic Oligopoly Models134 Questions
Exam 10: Game Theory: Inside Oligopoly140 Questions
Exam 11: Pricing Strategies for Firms With Market Power140 Questions
Exam 12: The Economics of Information128 Questions
Exam 13: Advanced Topics in Business Strategy89 Questions
Exam 14: A Managers Guide to Government in the Marketplace112 Questions
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Suppose the inverse market demand is given by P = 150 - 2Q. If the incumbent continues to produce 10 units of output, which of the following equations best summarizes the potential entrant's residual demand curve?
(Multiple Choice)
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Refer to the following payoff matrix:
Suppose the simultaneous-move game depicted in this payoff matrix could be turned into a sequential-move game with player 1 moving first. In this case, the equilibrium payoffs will be:

(Multiple Choice)
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Which of the following is the best example of a one-way network?
(Multiple Choice)
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Refer to the following payoff matrix:
Suppose the production game depicted in the payoff matrix is a sequential-move game. Identify the strategy leading to a first-mover advantage for player 2.

(Multiple Choice)
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A single firm that charges the monopoly price in the market earns $600. If another firm successfully enters the market, the incumbent's profits fall to $350 and the entrant earns $275. If the incumbent engages in limit pricing, its profits are $400. For what interest rate, i, is limit pricing a profitable strategy for the incumbent?
(Multiple Choice)
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A monopolist earns $50 million annually and will maintain that level of profit indefinitely, provided no other firm enters the market. If another firm successfully enters the market, the incumbent's profits remain at $50 million the first period, but fall to $25 million annually thereafter. The opportunity cost of funds is 10 percent, and profits in each period are realized at the beginning of each period. What is the present value of the firm's current and future earnings if entry occurs?
(Multiple Choice)
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Refer to the following payoff matrix:
Suppose the production game depicted in the payoff matrix is a sequential-move game. Identify the strategy leading to a first-mover advantage for player 1.

(Multiple Choice)
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Consider the following normal-form game.
a. What is player B's best strategy in a simultaneous-move play of this game?
b. What is player A's best strategy in a simultaneous-move play of this game?
c. What are player A and B's equilibrium payoff in a simultaneous-move play of this game?
d. Use an extensive-form representation to show that player B can earn higher payoffs by exercising a first-mover advantage. (Note: Player B's payoffs will appear first in this extensive-form game since it is the first mover.)
e. List two things player B must do in order to be able to achieve these higher payoffs.

(Essay)
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A single firm that charges the monopoly price in the market earns $1,300. If another firm successfully enters the market, the incumbent's profits fall to $700 and the entrant earns $575. If the interest rate is 0.5, how high must the firm's profits from limit pricing be for limit pricing to be a profitable strategy for the incumbent?
(Multiple Choice)
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You are the owner of a new network that is superior to an existing two-way network. The network you aim to replace currently has 50 users, each of whom is willing to pay an average of $75,000 for each connection service within the current network. You are confident that each user values connection services within your new two-way network at an average of $100,000 per connection service.
a. What is the maximum price the existing network can charge each user for its services?
b. Devise a pricing strategy that will permit your firm to overcome the first-mover advantage enjoyed by the existing network.
(Essay)
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Suppose that Microsoft and Google compete in the market for PC Internet browsers. Initially these firms compete as Cournot duopolies with symmetric reaction functions. If Microsoft enters into exclusive contracts with PC suppliers that preclude suppliers from loading Google's Internet browser on PCs loaded with the Windows operating system, then Google's marginal cost of distributing its browser will increase to $5 per unit.
The new equilibrium would entail Microsoft supplying __________ browsers and Google supplying ____________ browsers to the market. The end result is ________ profits for Google.
(Multiple Choice)
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Suppose the inverse market demand is given by P = 20 - Q. If the incumbent continues to produce eight units of output, which of the following equations best summarizes the potential entrant's residual demand curve?
(Multiple Choice)
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Consider an incumbent that is a monopoly currently earning $2 million annually. Given the declining costs of raw materials, the incumbent believes a new firm may enter the market. If successful, a new entrant would reduce the incumbent's profits to $1.2 million annually. To keep potential entrants out of the market, the incumbent lowers its price to the point where it is earning $1.6 million annually for the indefinite future. If the interest rate is 10 percent, does it make sense for the incumbent to limit price to prevent entry?
(Multiple Choice)
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A two-way network linking nine users creates how many potential network connections?
(Multiple Choice)
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In general, adding one more user to a two-way network tends to:
(Multiple Choice)
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