Deck 10: Cooperation and Conflict

Question 1

A situation in which the interests of two or more interdependent parties are perceived as incompatible is known as:

A) conflict
B) aggression
C) hostility
D) both a and b
E) all of the above

Answer 1

a

Question 2

_______ is so natural to us that it is linked to activation in the brain associated with reward and pleasure

A) Conflict
B) Competition
C) Aggression
D) Cooperation
E) Perceiving incompatible goals

Answer 2

d

Question 3

Social exchange involves:

A) an interaction involving rewards and costs
B) giving each other social reinforcement such as praise
C) what two people can provide for each other
D) cooperation between warring parties
E) none of the above

Answer 3

a

Question 4

Juan and Martha are living together. Juan enjoys being with Martha even though it means that he cannot hang out with his friends. According to social exchange theory, Juan's behavior is determined by:

A) his interaction with Martha
B) ratio of rewards and costs
C) cooperation with Martha
D) perceived incompatible goals
E) conflict with Martha

Question 5

In the situation of Juan and Martha, Juan's satisfaction with the relationship is determined by:

A) ratio of rewards and costs
B) ratio of rewards and costs outcome X comparison level
C) ratio of rewards and costs outcome - comparison level
D) ratio of rewards and costs - satisfaction
E) none of the above

Question 6

'Dependence = outcome - comparison level for alternatives'. This formula represents:

A) satisfaction with the relationship
B) probability of leaving the relationship
C) probability of staying home with Martha
D) all of the above
E) none of the above

Question 7

What does CLalt mean?

A) conflict level for alteration
B) comparison level for alterations
C) comparison level for alternatives
C) conflict level for alternatives
E) both c and d

Question 8

Which theory looks at conflict and relationships in terms of rewards and costs provided to each party?

A) social learning
B) conflict level for alternative
C) social exchange
D) game theory
E) relativity theory

Question 9

What is the basic assumption of game theory?

A) people rationally act to maximize rewards and minimize costs
B) people attempt to manipulate each other to gain in conflict
C) cooperation is always the most rational response
D) people play 'games' with each other
E) people act emotionally rather than rationally to maximize their rewards

Question 10

People are very selective in their interactions, carefully trying to maximize their rewards and minimize their costs. This view is suggested by:

A) social comparison theory
B) comparative economic theory
C) social exchange theory
D) S-R theory
E) the theory of behavioural economics

Question 11

According to Thibaut and Kelley, an individual assesses the richness of the outcome in a given situation:

A) solely in terms of rewards minus costs
B) not just in terms of rewards and costs, but also in comparison with what he/she perceives to be the outcomes of others in a similar situation
C) not just in terms of rewards and costs, but also in terms of whether or not the person can get a better deal elsewhere
D) both b and c
E) none of the above

Question 12

Which of the following is an 'economic' theory?

A) social learning theory
B) social exchange theory
C) the theory of games
D) both b and c
E) none of the above

Question 13

Social exchange theory:

A) defines social interaction on the basis of the needs of those involved
B) views social interaction in economic terms
C) views social interaction as a collective dilemma
D) defines social interaction in terms of the relationship between the perceived and objective source of conflict
E) views social interactions as a system of checks and balances

Question 14

Social exchange theory involves such resources as:

A) affection
B) money
C) information
D) all of the above
E) none of the above

Question 15

The philosophy of utilitarianism is related to:

A) the equity norm
B) social exchange theory
C) the norm of reciprocity
D) legal intervention in conflicts
E) distributive justice

Question 16

The key assumption(s) in the theory of games is/are that:

A) each party in a conflict is rational in that each is capable of ordering preferences for various outcomes
B) each party is capable of acting to minimize losses and maximize gains
C) in an exchange, people try to get the most for themselves
D) both b and c
E) all of the above

Question 17

In _______ games, one party's gain is exactly matched by the opponent's loss.

A) rational
B) utility
C) zero-sum
D) non-zero-sum
E) all of the above

Question 18

There is evidence that __________ have found game theory very attractive.

A) school psychologists
B) public opinion pollsters
C) military strategists
D) physical education instructors
E) politicians

Question 19

The 'theory of games' is a model of:

A) aggression
B) conflict
C) altruism
D) attribution
E) communication

Question 20

A two-handed game of poker is an example of:

A) a zero-sum game
B) a non-zero-sum game
C) a utility game
D) a structural game
E) a negative game

Question 21

In social psychological terms, most competitive games are:

A) enjoyable
B) zero-sum games
C) non-zero-sum games
D) economic
E) difficult

Question 22

Utility in game theory refers to:

A) the fact that the value of an outcome is very personal
B) how difficult games are to play
C) the fact that rational players act to obtain maximum utility
D) the fact that all values are the same
E) a and c

Question 23

In 'non-zero-sum games':

A) cooperation is impossible
B) gains and losses of each player sum up to zero
C) more than one motivate is involved
D) once competition starts, it does not end until there is a winner
E) gains and losses of the players add up to zero on a given trial

Question 24

In any game situation a payoff matrix:

A) shows the range of possible outcomes
B) shows the interdependence of the players
C) is used for zero-sum games
D) is used for non-zero-sum games
E) all of the above

Question 25

Characteristics of a zero-sum game include:

A) there is no possibility of cooperation
B) communication would not help
C) communication would help
D) a and b
E) the possibility for both sides to win

Question 26

The game in which each party is a criminal, but the police lack sufficient evidence is known as the _____ Game.

A) prison
B) Prisoner's Dilemma
C) social exchange
D) zero-sum
E) non-zero-sum

Question 27

The Prisoner's Dilemma Game:

A) is a zero-sum game
B) usually results in cooperative motivation
C) often results in individualistic motivation
D) a and b
E) none of the above

Question 28

Suppose you are a professional cyclist in competition with an equal opponent. You are contemplating using performance-enhancing drugs, but must also consider the risk of being caught and the probability of your opponent using the drugs. In the PD game paradigm, your considerations can be represented by:

A) CL and CLalt
B) payoff matrix
C) zero-sum game
D) non-zero-sum
E) none of the above

Question 29

In the Prisoner's Dilemma Game, which factor is likely to prevent a collectively rational choice being made?

A) lack of trust
B) honesty
C) lack of values
D) anger
E) selfishness

Question 30

What would likely produce an outcome that was individually rational and yet collectively irrational?

A) the Prisoner's Dilemma
B) the experimental game
C) the trucking game
D) GRIT
E) social exchange

Question 31

A major constraint placed on the behaviour observed in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game is:

A) the utility preferences
B) that individually rational choices are usually collectively irrational
C) the absence of communication
D) the wide range of alternative responses
E) that it revolves solely around an individualistic motivational orientation

Question 32

Which of the following is true of the difference between collective dilemmas and the Prisoner's Dilemma?

A) in the Prisoner's Dilemma, the selfish alternative is usually adopted
B) more than two people are involved in collective dilemmas
C) in collective dilemmas, communication eventually resolves the dilemma
D) all of the above are differences between the two
E) none of the above differentiates the dilemmas

Question 33

What is a collective dilemma?

A) the payoff matrix is the same for everyone
B) individual rational actions produce an outcome that depends on the CLalt
C) individual rational actions produce an outcome that is collective
D) individual rational actions produce an outcome that is collectively undesirable
E) collective actions produce individual outcomes that is tragic

Question 34

The tragedy of the commons illustrates how:

A) a non-zero-sum game can degenerate into a zero-sum game
B) individual irrationality results in group rationality
C) superordinate goals may fail to produce cooperation in capitalistic societies
D) individuals can benefit from a group without contributing to it
E) the pursuit of short-term individual gain leads to long-term collective costs

Question 35

Research on dilemmas in the laboratory reveals that cooperation is facilitated:

A) if the game is changed into a zero-sum game
B) if one person cooperates 90 percent of the time or more
C) if the opponents can communicate with one another
D) if the players' combined outcomes never equal zero
E) if only one party has threat capability

Question 36

The commons problem:

A) concerns a pasture and the number of cows
B) concerns overuse of individual resources
C) concerns overuse of a common resource
D) concerns the provision of public goods
E) concerns the legislative assembly in certain countries

Question 37

The public goods problem:

A) involves conflict spirals
B) concerns the division of labour
C) is related to the contributions by individuals to the collective good
D) concerns a dilemma with consequences
E) involves people drawing individually from a common resource

Question 38

You should keep using pesticides in your garden only if you are content that others will also use them. This reflects:

A) zero-sum game thinking
B) the Kant imperative
C) conflict spirals
D) conflict rectangles
E) the free rider problem

Question 39

Which of the following is (are) among the motives involved in resource dilemmas?

A) self-interest
B) conformity to group norms
C) the wish to act responsibly
D) a and c only
E) all of the above

Question 40

The 'free rider' problem is an aspect of:

A) the commons problem
B) non-zero-sum games
C) the public goods problem
D) the resource dilemma
E) the Piliavin model

Question 41

Delayed consequences would be most closely associated with:

A) social exchange
B) the Prisoner's Dilemma
C) the resource dilemma
D) the trucking game
E) group size

Question 42

Collective dilemmas would be minimized if everyone acted according to the:

A) laws of nature
B) Kant imperative
C) principles of behaviourism
D) Piliavin model
E) scientific method

Question 43

According to Kiyonari & Barclay (2008) imposing costs on overconsumption of water, such as fines or public shaming can maintain cooperation. This address the ____ problem.

A) free rider
B) easy rider
C) the Kant imperative
D) social exchange
E) social pressure

Question 44

Which of the following is the most likely cause of non-cooperation within a group game structure?

A) deindividuation
B) coercion
C) collective identity of the group
D) group size
E) normative pressure

Question 45

Conflict resolution depends, in part, on predispositional variables such as:

A) previous interactions between the antagonists
B) personality of the participants
C) cultural background
D) beliefs about each other
E) all of the above

Question 46

The Kant imperative says that we should always:

A) put our own needs first
B) care for those closest to us
C) act for the common good
D) give to worthy causes
E) look to maximize payoffs

Question 47

Which of the following is likely to foster behaviour based on the collective good?

A) coercion
B) normative pressure
C) salience of the collective identity
D) both a and b
E) all of the above

Question 48

The only way to resolve the commons problem is:

A) mutual coercion
B) normative pressure against self interest
C) to create a collective identity
D) both a and b
E) none of the above

Question 49

Brinkmanship:

A) is dependent on sincere negotiation
B) refers to the game of chicken as played at the international level
C) is independent of the credibility of threats
D) both a and c
E) none of the above

Question 50

What is/are the characteristic(s) of a prototypical dangerous game?

A) goal-directed behaviour and threat behaviour are identical
B) cooperation cannot help
C) any conciliatory move by one player will only encourage the other to press on
D) both b and c
E) all of the above

Question 51

According to the text, a threat is:

A) a promise
B) an unconditional reciprocity
C) a kind of promise with undesirable outcomes
D) a dilemma
E) none of the above captures the definition given in the text

Question 52

What does a zero-sum game have in common with a dangerous game?

A) cooperation is not possible
B) they are both non-negotiable
C) there can be only one winner
D) all of the above
E) none of the above

Question 53

in a study of Canadian and Indian students in bargaining game by Alcock (1975), participants were more _____ when they believed they were advantaged, while Indian students were more _____ in that situation.

A) cooperative, cooperative
B) competitive, competitive
C) competitive, cooperative
D) cooperative, competitive
E) none of the above

Question 54

Variables in a conflict situation which refer to the characteristics of the protagonists themselves and to their prior history of interaction are known as:

A) structural variables
B) predispositional variables
C) subjective variables
D) strategic variables
E) antecedent variables

Question 55

Predispositional variables in a conflict situation reflect:

A) the nature of the conflict situation
B) the relative degree of power of the protagonists
C) the strategy adopted by the protagonists
D) the characteristics and the history of the protagonists
E) the strategy the conflict situation allows

Question 56

Structural variables in a conflict refer to:

A) the reliability of outcomes
B) the importance of an outcome to a specific individual
C) the characteristics of the protagonists
D) the nature of the motivational orientation adopted by protagonists
E) the nature of the conflict situation

Question 57

Which of the following is a structural variable that could influence behaviour in conflict situations?

A) the possibility of communication
B) the use of threats
C) unilateral cooperation
D) type of matrix
E) a and b

Question 58

The variables that influence behaviour in a conflict situation may be classified in terms of:

A) reciprocity, utility, hostility
B) reciprocity, equity, equality
C) need, particularism, concreteness
D) structure, strategy, predisposition
E) utility, strategy, predisposition

Question 59

A threat which carries too high a cost may:

A) provoke hostility
B) not be understood
C) lack credibility to the party threatened
D) increase competition
E) be successful

Question 60

For a threat to be successful, it must be __________.

A) severe
B) credible
C) have positive consequences for the person making it
D) issued repeatedly
E) both b and c

Question 61

When ______ in a conflict immediately presents arguments and opinions, _______ often become irritated by what they perceive as threatening the equilibrium of the relationship.

A) men, women
B) women, men
C) individualists collectivists
D) collectivists, individualists
E) winners, losers

Question 62

A threat by one party in a conflict often results in an escalation of threats. This is referred to as:

A) reciprocal uncertainty
B) unregulated competition
C) misattributed conflicts
D) a conflict spiral
E) face-saving

Question 63

According to the text, why does threat often lead to increased conflict?

A) in most cultures, yielding to threats leads to a loss of 'face'
B) face-saving is important in terms of self-esteem
C) yielding may encourage more threats in the future
D) both a and c
E) all of the above

Question 64

A couple seeking marriage counseling disagree about where to go on an evening out. In order to press the point, one offers to stay home, and the other responds that a good time will be enjoyed without the partner. The dispute escalates into a state intent to end the marriage. What we have here is case of:

A) failure to communicate
B) promises
C) unregulated threat
D) power play
E) threat-counter-threat spiral

Question 65

The mechanism which is most likely to lead to conflict spiral is:

A) overmatching low intensity threats
B) overmatching high intensity threats
C) tit-for-tat responses
D) negative feedback loops
E) undermatching high intensity threats

Question 66

Which strategy is most effective in inducing cooperation in an adversary?

A) tit-for-tat (delayed matching)
B) threat-counter-threat spiral
C) resist exploitation
D) unconditionally tough strategy
E) none of the above works

Question 67

What are the conditions under which communication is beneficial in eliciting cooperation?

A) when disputants have a threat option
B) when face-saving is an important factor
C) in situations with no clear competitive motivation
D) when face saving is not important
E) both c and d

Question 68

Parties with moderate power are more likely to use:

A) an unconditionally cooperative strategy
B) coercion
C) a pacifist strategy
D) illusory power
E) a fixed strategy

Question 69

You have just joined a union and are participating in a meeting to devise a bargaining strategy. Although you begin with a cooperative orientation, your voice is soon drowned out by calls for strong action. This is known as the _______ effect.

A) tit-for-tat
B) delayed matching
C) fixed
D) interindividual-intergroup discontinuity
E) interindividual-intergroup

Question 70

Groups are more likely than individuals in a conflict situation to:

A) exploit cooperative behavior from their adversary
B) be more competitive
C) be more cooperative
D) a and b
E) a and c

Question 71

Which of the following is a core collective belief in intergroup conflict?

A) belief that one's own group is superior
B) belief that one's group has been wronged by the other
C) belief that one's own group is vulnerable to the other
D) belief that one's group is collectively helpless
E) all of the above

Question 72

According to Eidelson & Eidelson (2003), a belief that your own group is vulnerable to the other and is helpless is:

A) illusion
B) core belief
C) core collective belief
D) fundamental to social power
E) a collective dilemma

Question 73

Terrorism involves:

A) an intent to cause fear in civilian populations
B) random and direct attack on civilian targets
C) greater loss of life
D) all of the above
E) both a and b

Question 74

The least effective strategy for encouraging cooperation in experimental games is:

A) an unconditionally cooperative strategy
B) a tit-for-tat strategy
C) an unconditionally tough strategy
D) delayed matching
E) both a and c

Question 75

A study by Pape (2006) of 315 terrorist attacks in a 23-year period revealed that the attacks in general could be explained by:

A) mental illness
B) a prior history of criminal behavior
C) fanatical religious beliefs
D) all of the above
E) none of the above

Question 76

Delayed matching refers to the strategy whereby:

A) disputants delay their reaction to each other's moves
B) a subject makes the same response as the other subject did on the previous trial
C) one of the parties always begins the interaction with a cooperative move
D) a subject decides to go back to cooperation after appropriate retaliation
E) one party responds in a positive way but does not reinforce hostile moves by the other party

Question 77

Which of the following is an essential property that leads to stable cooperation?

A) forgiveness
B) niceness
C) provocability
D) both a and b
E) all of the above

Question 78

One way of reducing conflict within a group is:

A) reciprocal concessions
B) make group identity more salient
C) communication
D) threat
E) all of the above

Question 79

Conflict between groups of boys in Sherif's Robbers' Cave experiment was reduced by:

A) communication
B) threat-counter-threat
C) delayed matching
D) superordinate goals
E) enhanced group identity

Question 80

Which of the following is a strategic variable?

A) the commons problem
B) the Prisoner's Dilemma
C) delayed matching
D) threat-counter-threat spiral
E) deindividuation