Deck 4: Subjectivism Julia Driver

Question 1

Driver rejects subjectivism for which of the following reasons?

A) It is intolerant.
B) It cannot explain how moral disagreement is possible.
C) It denies that moral judgments have truth-values.
D) It makes the community the authority on moral questions.

Answer 1

B

Question 2

As a form of moral relativism, subjectivism

A) holds that moral truth can be explored by science.
B) recognizes at least a few universal moral truths.
C) is consistent with the phenomenon of moral disagreement.
D) holds that moral truth varies from person to person.

Answer 2

D

Question 3

If subjectivism is true, then when a person says, "Abortion is wrong," this means

A) "I disapprove of abortion."
B) "God forbids abortion."
C) "Every human life is precious."
D) "Abortion is bad for society."

Answer 3

A

Question 4

According to Driver, we discover the truth of descriptive claims by

A) consulting tradition.
B) consulting popular opinion.
C) investigating the world.
D) testing our ideas against each other.

Question 5

The form of subjectivism that Driver focuses on treats moral claims as

A) reports about community standards.
B) reports about expert consensus.
C) reports of an individual's approval or disapproval.
D) expressions of divine authority.

Question 6

According to Driver, if subjectivism is false, then which of the following must be true?

A) Some moral truths are known by everyone.
B) Moral disagreement is impossible.
C) There are objective moral values.
D) Something beyond individual belief is needed to morally justify an action.

Question 7

By Driver's lights, the view that "what is 'right' for me may not be 'right' for you" has the troubling implication that

A) there are no moral truths.
B) virtually any practice, however clearly evil, could be considered true.
C) morality has no basis in scientific fact.
D) society has the right to silence dissenters.

Question 8

Driver thinks that it is natural to believe that, when moral argumentation occurs,

A) something objective is at stake.
B) at least one party must be wrong.
C) there is always a right answer.
D) there can be no final resolution.

Question 9

Driver's ultimate view of subjectivism can best be described as

A) endorsement.
B) partial acceptance.
C) rejection.
D) ambivalence.

Question 10

Driver believes that the example of Heinrich Himmler

A) refutes subjectivism.
B) supports subjectivism.
C) has more to do with descriptive claims than normative ones.
D) is a problem for any theory of moral judgment.

Question 11

Driver argues that moral claims are radically different from descriptive claims.

Question 12

According to Driver, subjectivism is a form of moral relativism.

Question 13

Driver explains that subjectivism is the proper way to understand descriptive judgments.

Question 14

Subjectivism, as presented by Driver, holds that the larger social community determines whether a given practice is morally right or wrong.

Question 15

On Driver's view, claims like "Abortion is always wrong" cannot be true for one person but false for another.

Question 16

Driver rejects moral subjectivism partly on the grounds that it cannot explain how genuine moral disagreement is possible.

Question 17

Driver supports the view that a person's beliefs are what determines morality for them.

Question 18

Driver explains that, in her view, a moral statement must be believed by someone or other in order for it to have a truth-value.

Question 19

Driver admits that subjectivism is an attractive view because it appears tolerant of diverse viewpoints.

Question 20

Subjectivism views morality as being about personal preference, not truth-values.

Question 21

Are some acts right or wrong regardless of what anyone happens to believe? If so, what explains that fact?

Question 22

Driver defines subjectivism as a form of moral relativism which holds that individual beliefs or attitudes determine the truth-value of moral claims. Suppose Driver is right that subjectivism is untenable. Are there other, more plausible forms of moral relativism? How would they differ from subjectivism?

Question 23

Driver's arguments against subjectivism presuppose that moral disagreement over truth is an essential part of morality, for which any good theory of moral truth must account. Is she right about this? Why or why not?