Deck 2: Noncooperative, One-Time, Static Games

Question 1

A strategy that is uniformly worse than all other strategies is called a:

A) Minimax regret strategy.
B) Dominated strategy.
C) Weakly dominant strategy.
D) Savage strategy.
E) Second-best strategy.

Answer 1

Dominated strategy.

Question 2

In a two-player, noncooperative, static game, it is usually assumed that:

A) Players to know the exact payoffs from alternative strategy profiles.
B) Players have different information about the payoffs from alternative strategy profiles.
C) At least one player is rational.
D) The specific identity of the players is not required to find a Nash equilibrium.
E) There are multiple Nash equilibria.

Answer 2

The specific identity of the players is not required to find a Nash equilibrium.

Question 3

A strategy profile in a noncooperative, static game is a Nash equilibrium when:

A) Each player has only dominated strategies.
B) The payoffs from alternative strategy profiles is probabilistic.
C) Each player's strategy is the best response to the strategy adopted by rivals.
D) Either player has a dominant strategy.
E) Answers c and d are correct.

Answer 3

Answers c and d are correct.

Question 4

When both players in a noncooperative, one-time, static game have strictly dominant strategies, the resulting strategy profile is:

A) A market equilibrium.
B) A game-theoretic stasis.
C) A strictly-dominant-strategy equilibrium.
D) Always a prisoner's dilemma.
E) All of the above.

Question 5

-Refer to Figure 2.1, which represents the normal form of a non-cooperative, simultaneous-move, one-time game. If larger payoffs are preferred, _____ has/have a strictly dominant strategy?

A) Firm A
B) Firm B
C) Both firms
D) Neither firm

Question 6

-Refer to Figure 2.1, which represents a noncooperative, one-time, static game. Firm A's secure strategy is:

A) Raise price.
B) Don't raise price.
C) It's dominant strategy.
D) It's dominated strategy.
E) Answers b and d are correct.

Question 7

-Refer to Figure 2.1, which represents a noncooperative, one-time, static game. Firm B's secure strategy is:

A) Raise price if Firm A does not raise price.
B) Raise price if Firm A raises price.
C) Don't raise price if Firm A does not raise price.
D) Don't raise price if Firm A raises price.

Question 8

-Refer to Figure 2.1, which represents the normal form of a noncooperative, one-time, static game. A Nash equilibrium occurs at the strategy profile:

A) {Raise price, Raise price}.
B) {Raise price, Don't raise price}.
C) {Don't raise price, Raise price}.
D) {Don't raise price, Don't raise price}.

Question 9

-Refer to Figure 2.2, which represents a simultaneous-move, noncooperative, one-time game. If larger payoffs are preferred, which firm has a strictly dominant strategy?

A) Firm A
B) Firm B
C) Both firms
D) Neither firm

Question 10

-Refer to Figure 2.2, which represents a simultaneous-move, noncooperative, one-time game. A Nash equilibrium occurs at the strategy profile:

A) {Raise price, Raise price}.
B) {Raise price, Don't raise price}.
C) {Don't raise price, Raise price}.
D) {Don't raise price, Don't raise price}.

Question 11

-Refer to Figure 2.3, which represents a noncooperative, one-time, static game. If larger payoffs are preferred, which firm has a strictly dominant strategy?

A) Firm A
B) Firm B
C) Both firms
D) Neither firm

Question 12

-Refer to Figure 2.3, which represents a simultaneous-move, non-cooperative, one-time game. A Nash equilibrium occurs at the strategy profile:

A) {Raise price, Raise price}.
B) {Raise price, Don't raise price}.
C) {Don't raise price, Raise price}.
D) {Don't raise price, Don't raise price}.
E) This game does not have a Nash equilibrium.

Question 13

-Consider the simultaneous-move game depicted in Figure 2.4. Which team has a dominant strategy?

A) New York Giants
B) Baltimore Ravens
C) Both teams
D) Neither team

Question 14

-Consider the simultaneous-move game depicted in Figure 2.4. What is the Nash equilibrium strategy profile for this game?

A) {Pass defense, Pass offense}
B) {Pass defense, Run offense}
C) {Run defense, Pass offense}
D) {Run defense, Run offense}
E) This is a zero-sum game and does not have a Nash equilibrium strategy profile.

Question 15

-Use Figure 2.5 to answer this question. Suppose that two teenagers have a crush on each other, but neither know's the other's feelings. At a school dance both have to decide whether or not to "declare" their feelings for the other. If both "declare" they get significant positive utility, but if they are rebuffed they face humiliation in front of their friends, which results in significant negative utility. Finally, if they choose to ignore each other they will maximize their worst outcome, that is, they will avoid humiliation. Social convention dictates that the teenage boy makes the first move. His dominant strategy is to:

A) Declare.
B) Rebuff/Ignore.
C) Choose at random.
D) None of the above.

Question 16

-Consider the noncooperative, one-time, static game depicted in Figure 2.6. For what values of x is Strategy 2 dominant for player A?

A) x < 2
B) x ? 1
C) x ? 5
D) x = 5
E) There is no value for which Strategy 2 is a dominant strategy for player

Question 17

-Refer to Figure 2.6. For what values of x is Strategy 3 a strictly dominant strategy for player B?

A) x < 2
B) x ? 2
C) x > 3
D) x ? 3
E) There is no value for which strategy 2 is a dominant strategy for player

Question 18

-Refer to Figure 2.6. For what values of x is the strategy profile {Strategy 2, Strategy 3} a weakly-dominant-strategy Nash equilibrium?

A) 1
B) 2
C) 3
D) 5
E) Cannot be determined on the basis of the information provided.

Question 19

-Refer to Figure 2.6. If x = 2, the Nash equilibrium strategy profile for this game is:
I. {Strategy 1, Strategy 3}
II. {Strategy 1, Strategy 4}
III. {Strategy 2, Strategy 3}
IV. {Strategy 2, Strategy 4}
Which of the following is correct?

A) I only.
B) II only.
C) c. III only.
D) IV only.
E) II and III only.

Question 20

Suppose that both players in a non-cooperative, one-time, static game have a strictly dominant strategy. The strategy profile for this game is a:
I. Nash equilibrium.
II. Strictly-dominant-strategy equilibrium.
III. Market equilibrium.
Which of the following is correct?

A) I only.
B) II only.
C) III only.
D) I and II only.
E) I and III only.

Question 21

For a noncooperative, one-time, static game to have a unique Nash equilibrium, it is necessary for _____ to have a dominant strategy.

A) one player
B) both players
C) neither player
D) All of the above are correct.

Question 22

-Refer to Figure 2.7, which summarizes the payoffs in thousands of dollars to two firms ina duopolistic industry arising from alternative pricing strategies. Assume that this is asimultaneous-move, non-cooperative, one-time game. Which firm has a strictly dominant strategy?

A) Firm A
B) Firm B
C) Both firms
D) Neither firm

Question 23

-Refer to Figure 2.7, which summarizes the payoffs in thousands of dollars to two firms in a duopolistic industry arising from alternative pricing strategies. Assume that this is a simultaneous-move, cooperative, one-time game. The Nash equilibrium strategy profile for this game is:

A) {Raise price, Raise price}.
B) {Raise price, Lower price}.
C) {Lower price, Raise price}.
D) {Lower price, Lower price}.
E) This game does not have a unique Nash equilibrium strategy profile.

Question 24

-Refer to Figure 2.7, which summarizes the payoffs in thousands of dollars to two firms in a duopolistic industry arising from alternative pricing strategies. Assume that this is a simultaneous-move, non-cooperative, one-time game. The payoffs for this game are:

A) (300, 350).
B) (-100, 425).
C) (400, -150).
D) (190, 180).
E) (400, 425).

Question 25

-Refer to Figure 2.7, which summarizes the payoffs in thousands of dollars to two firms in a duopolistic industry arising from alternative pricing strategies. If both firms adopt a maximin decision rule, the strategy profile for this game is:

A) {Raise price, Raise price}.
B) {Raise price, Lower price}.
C) {Lower price, Raise price}.
D) {Lower price, Lower price}.

Question 26

-The Pie-Eye and Red-Nose Beer Companies are considering their upcoming advertising campaigns. This noncooperative, one-time, static game is depicted in Figure 2.8, which summarizes the expected increase in profits from alternative advertising strategy profiles for both companies. What is the Nash equilibrium strategy profile for this game?

A) {Don't advertise on TV, Don't advertise on TV}
B) {Advertise on TV, Don't advertise on TV}
C) {Don't advertise on TV, Advertise on TV}
D) {Advertise on TV, Advertise on TV}
E) This game does not have a Nash equilibrium.

Question 27

-The Snake River Company and the Loblolly River Company are considering their respective advertising campaigns. Figure 2.9 summarizes the payoffs (in thousands of dollars) from alternative advertising strategies. If larger payoffs are preferred, what is the Nash equilibrium strategy profile for this game is:

A) {Television, Radio}.
B) {Television, Magazines}.
C) {Newspapers, Radio}.
D) {Newspapers, Magazines}.
E) This game does not have a Nash equilibrium.

Question 28

-The Snake River Company and the Loblolly River Company are considering their respective advertising campaigns. Figure 2.10 summarizes the possible payoffs (in thousands of dollars) to each company from each combination of advertising strategies. If larger payoffs are preferred, which firm has a strictly dominant strategy?

A) Snake River Company
B) Loblolly River Company
C) Both companies
D) Neither company

Question 29

-The Snake River Company and the Loblolly River Company are considering their respective advertising campaigns. Figure 2.10 summarizes the possible payoffs (in thousands of dollars) to each company from each combination of advertising strategies. The Snake River Company has a:

A) Weakly dominant strategy.
B) Nondominant strategy.
C) Strictly dominated strategy.
D) Iterated weakly dominated strategy.
E) None of the above.

Question 30

-The Snake River Company and the Loblolly River Company are considering their respective advertising campaigns. Figure 2.10 summarizes the possible payoffs (in thousands of dollars) to each company from each combination of advertising strategies. The Nash equilibrium strategy profile for this game is:

A) {Television, Radio}
B) {Television, Magazines}
C) {Newspapers, Radio}
D) {Newspapers, Magazines}
E) This game does not have a unique Nash equilibrium strategy profile.

Question 31

Firm A is considering entering a market in which firm B is a monopolist. Firm B must decide how to respond to this challenge. If firm A decides to enter, firm B can either adopt an aggressive pricing strategy or a passive pricing strategy. If firm B adopts an aggressive pricing strategy, firm A will lose $5 million, although firm B will only earn $1 million. If firm B adopts a passive pricing strategy, firm A will earn $3 million and firm B will earn $7 million. Finally, if firm A decides to stay out of the market, firm B will earn $14 million regardless of its pricing strategy. Firm A:

A) Has a weakly dominant strategy.
B) Does not have a dominant strategy.
C) Has a strictly dominant strategy.
D) Has a iterated weakly dominant strategy.
E) None of the above

Question 32

Firm A is considering entering a market in which firm B is a monopolist. Firm B must decide how to respond to this challenge. If firm A decides to enter, firm B can either adopt an aggressive pricing strategy or a passive pricing strategy. If firm B adopts an aggressive pricing strategy, firm A will lose $5 million, although firm B will only earn $1 million. If firm B adopts a passive pricing strategy, firm A will earn $3 million and firm B will earn $7 million. Finally, if firm A decides to stay out of the market, firm B will earn $14 million regardless of its pricing strategy. Firm B:

A) Has a weakly dominant strategy.
B) Does not have a dominant strategy.
C) Has a strictly dominant strategy.
D) Has a iterated weakly dominant strategy.
E) None of the above

Question 33

Firm A is considering entering a market in which firm B is a monopolist. Firm B must decide how to respond to this challenge. If firm A decides to enter, firm B can either adopt an aggressive pricing strategy or a passive pricing strategy. If firm B adopts an aggressive pricing strategy, firm A will lose $5 million, although firm B will only earn $1 million. If firm B adopts a passive pricing strategy, firm A will earn $3 million and firm B will earn $7 million. Finally, if firm A decides to stay out of the market, firm B will earn $14 million regardless of its pricing strategy. The Nash equilibrium strategy profile for this game is:

A) {Enter, Aggressive}.
B) {Enter, Passive}.
C) {Stay out, Aggressive}.
D) {Stay out, Passive}.
E) Undecided. This game has multiple Nash equilibria.

Question 34

A secure strategy is:

A) The best of two dominant strategies.
B) The worst of two dominant strategies
C) The strategy that results in the best of the worst possible payoffs.
D) A maximin strategy.
E) Both c and d are correct.

Question 35

A maximin decision rule selects:

A) The best of two weakly dominant strategies.
B) The strategy that results in the best of the worst possible payoffs.
C) A secure strategy.
D) Both b and c are correct.
E) None of the above are correct.

Question 36

Players who adopt a secure strategy:

A) Are trying to secure for themselves a guaranteed payoff.
B) Also have a strictly dominant strategy.
C) Always involve a focal-point equilibrium.
D) Are assured of avoiding the worst possible payoffs.
E) None of the above are correct.

Question 37

Adopting a secure strategy is appropriate:

A) For extremely risk averse players.
B) In games in which the worst possible outcome is too onerous to contemplate.
C) When neither player has a strictly dominant strategy.
D) All of the above are correct.
E) None of the above are correct.

Question 38

-Consider the noncooperative, one-time, static game depicted in Figure 2.11. Fly-by-night Airlines and Going-going-gone Airways are rival air carriers operating in the lucrative northeast corridor. Each air carrier is considering implementing a frequent-flyer program or continuing with their standard fare schedule. Which company has a dominant strategy?

A) Fly-by-night
B) Going-going-gone
C) Both airlines
D) Neither airline

Question 39

-Consider the noncooperative, one-time, static game depicted in Figure 2.11. Fly-by-night Airlines and Going-going-gone Airways are rival air carriers operating in the lucrative northeast corridor. Each air carrier is considering implementing a frequent-flyer program or continuing with their standard fare schedule. If both players adopt a maximin decision rule, what is the resulting strategy profile for this game?

A) {Standard, Standard}
B) {Standard, Frequent flyer}
C) {Frequent flyer, Standard}
D) {Frequent flyer, Frequent flyer}

Question 40

-Refer to the noncooperative, one-time, static game depicted in Figure 2.12. Rah-Rah and7th Heaven are convenience store chains that are considering opening a franchise in downtown Pawtucket, or just off Interstate 95. Monthly payoffs are in thousands of dollars. If larger payoffs are preferred, which convenience store chain has astrictly dominant strategy?

A) 7th Heaven
B) Rah-Rah
C) Both firms
D) Neither firm

Question 41

-Refer to the noncooperative, one-time, static game depicted in Figure 2.12. Rah-Rah and 7th Heaven are convenience store chains that are considering opening a franchise in downtown Pawtucket, or just off Interstate 95. Monthly payoffs are in thousands of dollars. If both stores adopt a secure strategy, what is the equilibrium strategy profile for this game?

A) {Pawtucket, Interstate}
B) {Interstate, Pawtucket}
C) {Pawtucket, Pawtucket}
D) {Interstate, Interstate}

Question 42

-Refer to the noncooperative, one-time, static game depicted in Figure 2.12. Rah-Rah and 7th Heaven are convenience store chains that are considering opening a franchise in downtown Pawtucket, or just off Interstate 95. Monthly payoffs are in thousands of dollars. If both stores adopt a minimax regret decision rule, what is the equilibrium strategy profile for this game?

A) {Pawtucket, Interstate}
B) {Interstate, Pawtucket}
C) {Pawtucket, Pawtucket}
D) {Interstate, Interstate}

Question 43

-Refer to the noncooperative, one-time, static game depicted in Figure 2.12. Rah-Rah and 7th Heaven are convenience store chains that are considering opening a franchise in downtown Pawtucket, or just off Interstate 95. Monthly payoffs are in thousands of dollars. If 7th Heaven adopts a secure strategy and Rah-Rah adopts a minimax regret strategy, what is the equilibrium strategy profile for this game?

A) {Pawtucket, Interstate}
B) {Interstate, Pawtucket}
C) {Pawtucket, Pawtucket}
D) {Interstate, Interstate}

Question 44

-Consider the noncooperative, one-time, static game depicted in Figure 2.13 in which larger payoffs are preferred. If both players adopt a maximin decision rule, the resulting strategy profile for this game is:

A) {A1, B1}.
B) {A1, B2}.
C) {A2, B1}.
D) {A2, B2}.

Question 45

-Consider the noncooperative, one-time, static game depicted in Figure 2.13 in which larger payoffs are preferred. If both players adopt a minimax regret decision rule, the resulting strategy profile for this game is:

A) {A1, B1}.
B) {A1, B2}.
C) {A2, B1}.
D) {A2, B2}.

Question 46

-Consider the noncooperative, one-time, static game depicted in Figure 2.14 in which the payoffs are in millions of dollars. Suppose that Tsunami Corporation and Cyclone Company contemplating a change in their advertising strategies. If both players adopt a maximin decision rule, the resulting strategy profile is:

A) {Newspapers, Magazines}.
B) {Television, Magazines}.
C) {Newspapers, Radio}.
D) {Television, Radio}.

Question 47

-Consider the noncooperative, one-time, static game depicted in Figure 2.14 in which the payoffs are in millions of dollars. Suppose that Tsunami Corporation and Cyclone Company contemplating a change in their advertising strategies. If both players adopt a minimax regret decision rule, the resulting strategy profile is:

A) {Newspapers, Magazines}.
B) {Television, Magazines}.
C) {Newspapers, Radio}.
D) {Television, Radio}.

Question 48

Suppose that firm A and firm B enter into a collusive agreement. Suppose firm A violate the agreement, which results in firm B deciding never again to cooperate with firm A. This is an example of a:

A) Strictly dominant strategy.
B) Trigger strategy.
C) Cheating rule.
D) Backward iteration.
E) Focal-point strategy.

Question 49

A player who adopts a minimax regret strategy:

A) Is trying to get out from under a bad situation.
B) Is trying to minimize any possible feelings of regret from making an incorrect decision.
C) Is extremely risk averse, even when rational behavior suggests that he or she should adopt a strictly dominant strategy.
D) Will only do so when the sum of the payoffs for both players in a two-person game is exactly equal to zero.
E) Is usually afraid of his or her own shadow.

Question 50

-Refer to Figure 2.15, which represents a simultaneous-move, noncooperative, one-time game in which larger payoffs are preferred. If both players adopt a minimax regret decision rule, the resulting strategy profile for this game is:

A) {A1, B1}.
B) {A1, B2}.
C) {A2, B1}.
D) {A2, B2}.

Question 51

Fred and Ethel are contestants on the game show Truth or Consequences. Fred and Ethel were introduced to each other moments before the show began. The game begins with the two contestants answering a trivia question. If they answer correctly, they are sent to separate isolation chambers where they must choose Truth or Consequences. They are told that if they both choose Truth then they will share equally a $10,000 prize. If one chooses Truth and the other chooses Consequences, the player choosing Consequences gets the entire $10,000 while the player choosing Truth gets nothing. If they both choose Consequences, they each get $100 as a parting gift. In this game, who has a dominant strategy?

A) Fred
B) Ethel
C) Both
D) Neither
E) Cannot be determined based on the information provided.

Question 52

Fred and Ethel are contestants on the game show Truth or Consequences. Fred and Ethel were introduced to each other moments before the show began. The game begins with the two contestants answering a trivia question. If they answer correctly, they are sent to separate isolation chambers where they must choose Truth or Consequences. They are told that if they both choose Truth then they will share equally a $10,000 prize. If one chooses Truth and the other chooses Consequences, the player choosing Consequences gets the entire $10,000 while the player choosing Truth gets nothing. If they both choose Consequences, they each get $100 as a parting gift. This game is an example of:

A) A prisoner's dilemma.
B) A zero-sum game.
C) The end-of-game problem.
D) A first mover advantage.
E) None of the above.

Question 53

Fred and Ethel are contestants on the game show Truth or Consequences. Fred and Ethel were introduced to each other moments before the show began. The game begins with the two contestants answering a trivia question equally a $10,000 prize. If one chooses Truth and the other chooses Consequences, th. If they answer correctly, they are sent to separate isolation chambers where they must choose Truth or Consequences. They are told that if they both choose Truth then they will share e player choosing Consequences gets the entire $10,000 while the player choosing Truth gets nothing. If they both choose Consequences, they each get $100 as a parting gift. The Nash equilibrium strategy profile for this game is:

A) {Truth, Truth}.
B) {Consequences, Consequences}.
C) {Truth, Consequences}.
D) {Consequences, Truth}.
E) This game does not have a Nash equilibrium

Question 54

Fred and Ethel are contestants on the game show Truth or Consequences. Fred and Ethel were introduced to each other moments before the show began. The game begins with the two contestants answering a trivia question. If they answer correctly, they are sent to separate isolation chambers where they must choose Truth or Consequences. They are told that if they both choose Truth then they will share equally a $10,000 prize. If one chooses Truth and the other chooses Consequences, the player choosing Consequences gets the entire $10,000 while the player choosing Truth gets nothing. If they both choose Consequences, they each get $100 as a parting gift. If both players use a maximin decision rule, the strategy profile for this game is:

A) {Truth, Truth}.
B) {Consequences, Consequences}.
C) {Truth, Consequences}.
D) {Consequences, Truth}.
E) This game does not have a Nash equilibrium

Question 55

Fred and Ethel are contestants on the game show Truth or Consequences. Fred and Ethel were introduced to each other moments before the show began. The game begins with the two contestants answering a trivia question. If they answer correctly, they are sent to separate isolation chambers where they must choose Truth or Consequences. They are told that if they both choose Truth then they will share equally a $10,000 prize. If one chooses Truth and the other chooses Consequences, the player choosing Consequences gets the entire $10,000 while the player choosing Truth gets nothing. If they both choose Consequences, they each get $100 as a parting gift. If both players use a minimax regret decision rule, the strategy profile for this game is:

A) {Truth, Truth}.
B) {Consequences, Consequences}.
C) {Truth, Consequences}.
D) {Consequences, Truth}.
E) This game does not have a Nash equilibrium

Question 56

-Suppose that an industry consists of two firms: Magna Corporation and Summa Corporation. Each firm produces an identical product. Magna and Summa are considering whether to expand (None) their production capacity for the next operating period. If the decision is to expand, the two firms must decide whether the expansion should be Moderate or Extensive. The tradeoff confronting each firm is that expansion will result in greater output that will lower the selling price of the product in the market. The normal form of this game is summarized in Figure 2.16. If larger payoffs are preferred, which firm has a strictly dominant strategy?

A) Magna Corporation.
B) Summa Corporation.
C) Both companies.
D) Neither company.

Question 57

-Suppose that an industry consists of two firms: Magna Corporation and Summa Corporation. Each firm produces an identical product. Magna and Summa are considering whether to expand (None) their production capacity for the next operating period. If the decision is to expand, the two firms must decide whether the expansion should be Moderate or Extensive. The tradeoff confronting each firm is that expansion will result in greater output that will lower the selling price of the product in the market. The normal form of this game is summarized in Figure 2.16. If larger payoffs are preferred, Magna has _____ dominated strategy or strategies.

A) 0
B) 1
C) 2
D) 3

Question 58

-Suppose that an industry consists of two firms: Magna Corporation and Summa Corporation. Each firm produces an identical product. Magna and Summa are considering whether to expand (None) their production capacity for the next operating period. If the decision is to expand, the two firms must decide whether the expansion should be Moderate or Extensive. The tradeoff confronting each firm is that expansion will result in greater output that will lower the selling price of the product in the market. The normal form of this game is summarized in Figure 2.16. If larger payoffs are preferred, Summa has _____ dominated strategy or strategies.

A) 0
B) 1
C) 2
D) 3

Question 59

-Suppose that an industry consists of two firms: Magna Corporation and Summa Corporation. Each firm produces an identical product. Magna and Summa are considering whether to expand (None) their production capacity for the next operating period. If the decision is to expand, the two firms must decide whether the expansion should be Moderate or Extensive. The tradeoff confronting each firm is that expansion will result in greater output that will lower the selling price of the product in the market. The normal form of this game is summarized in Figure 2.16. If larger payoffs are preferred, the Nash equilibrium strategy profile(s) for this game is (are):
I. {None, None}.
II. {Moderate, Moderate}.
III. {Extensive, Extensive}.
IV. {Extensive, None}.
V. {None, Extensive}.
Which of the following is correct?

A) I only.
B) II only.
C) I and II only.
D) I, II, and III only.
E) IV and V only.

Question 60

-Consider the noncooperative, one-time, static game depicted in depicted in Figure 2.17. Which player has a dominant strategy?

A) P1
B) P2
C) Both players
D) Neither player

Question 61

-Consider the noncooperative, one-time, static game depicted in Figure 2.17. P1 has _____ dominated strategy or strategies.

A) 0
B) 1
C) 2
D) 3

Question 62

-Consider the noncooperative, one-time, static game depicted in Figure 2.17. P2 has _____ dominated strategy or strategies.

A) 0
B) 1
C) 2
D) 3

Question 63

-Consider the noncooperative, one-time, static game depicted in Figure 2.17. The Nash equilibrium strategy profile(s) for this game is(are):
I. {A, F}.
II. {B, E}.
III. {C, F}.
IV. {B, D}.
V. {B, F}.
Which of the following is correct?

A) I only.
B) II only.
C) III only.
D) IV only.
E) I, II, and III.

Question 64

-Consider the game depicted in Figure 2.18. Which player has a dominant strategy:

A) Player A
B) Player B
C) Both players
D) Neither player

Question 65

-Consider the static game depicted in Figure 2.18. Player A has _____ dominated strategy or strategies.

A) 0
B) 1
C) 2
D) 3

Question 66

-Consider the static game depicted in Figure 2.18. Player B has _____ dominated strategy or strategies.

A) 0
B) 1
C) 2
D) 3

Question 67

-Consider the static game depicted in Figure 2.18. The Nash equilibrium strategy profile(s) for this game is (are):
I. {A1, B1}.
II. {A2, B1}.
III. {A2, B2}.
IV. {A3, B3}.
V. {A3, B1}.
Which of the following is correct?

A) I only.
B) II only.
C) V only.
D) IV and V only.
E) I, III, and V only.

Question 68

-Consider the static game depicted in Figure 2.19. Which player has a dominant strategy:

A) P1
B) P2
C) Both players
D) Neither player

Question 69

-Consider the static game depicted in Figure 2.19. P1 has _____ dominated strategy or strategies.

A) 0
B) 1
C) 2
D) 3

Question 70

-Consider the static game depicted in Figure 2.19. P2 has _____ dominated strategy or strategies.

A) 0
B) 1
C) 2
D) 3

Question 71

-Consider the static game depicted in Figure 2.19. The Nash equilibrium strategy profile for this game is:
I. {A, F}.
II. {B, D}.
III. {C, E}.
IV. {B, F}.
V. {D, F}.
Which of the following is correct?

A) I only.
B) II only.
C) III only.
D) IV only.
E) I, II, and III.

Question 72

-Consider the simultaneous-move game depicted in Figure 2.20. Which team has a dominant strategy?

A) New York Giants
B) Baltimore Ravens
C) Both teams
D) Neither team

Question 73

-Consider the simultaneous-move game depicted in Figure 2.20. What is the Nash equilibrium strategy profile for this game?

A) {Pass defense, Pass offense}
B) {Pass defense, Run offense}
C) {Run defense, Pass offense}
D) {Run defense, Run offense}
E) This is a zero-sum game and does not have a Nash equilibrium strategy profile.

Question 74

-Figure 2.21 summarizes a static game involving three oil companies that have purchased leases on land lying above the same crude oil deposit. Each oil company must decide whether to drill a wide or a narrow well. All payoffs are in millions of dollars. Suppose that the U.S. government wishes to encourage the development of narrow drilling technology. It does this by offering each company a $5 million production subsidy to drill narrow wells. The payoff matrix includes this subsidy. If larger payoffs are preferred, the Nash equilibrium strategy profile for this game is:
I. {Wide, Wide, Narrow}.
II. {Narrow, Wide, Wide}.
III. {Narrow, Wide, Narrow}.
IV. {Narrow, Narrow, Wide}.
V. {Wide, Narrow, Narrow}.
Which of the following is correct?

A) I, II, and III only.
B) II, III, and IV only.
C) I, III, and IV only.
D) III, IV and V only.
E) This game does not have a Nash equilibrium strategy profile.

Question 75

-Consider the noncooperative, one-time, static game depicted in depicted in Figure 2.22. Which player has a dominant strategy?

A) Moe
B) Larry
C) Curley
D) Moe and Curly
E) None of the above

Question 76

-Consider the noncooperative, one-time, static game depicted in Figure 2.22. Which player has a _____ dominated strategy.

A) Moe
B) Larry
C) Curley
D) Larry and Curly
E) None of the above

Question 77

-Consider the noncooperative, one-time, static game depicted in Figure 2.22. The Nash equilibrium strategy profile(s) for this game is(are):
I. {Robin, Popeye, Bullwinkle}.
II. {Batman, Popeye, Rocky}
III. {Batman, Bluto, Bullwinkle}
IV. {Robin, Bluto, Rocky}
V. {Robin, Popeye, Rocky}
Which of the following is correct?

A) I only.
B) II only.
C) III only.
D) IV only.
E) I, II, and III.

Question 78

-Consider the noncooperative, one-time, static game depicted in depicted in Figure 2.23. Which player has a dominant strategy?

A) Groucho
B) Chico
C) Harpo
D) Harpo and Chico
E) None of the above

Question 79

-Consider the noncooperative, one-time, static game depicted in Figure 2.23. Which player has a dominated strategy?

A) Groucho
B) Chico
C) Harpo
D) Harpo and Chico
E) None of the above

Question 80

-Consider the noncooperative, one-time, static game depicted in Figure 2.23. The Nash equilibrium strategy profile(s) for this game is(are):
I. {Horse Feathers, Night at the Opera, Animal Crackers}.
II. {Horse Feathers, Day at the Races, Animal Crackers}
III. {Duck Soup, Night at the Opera, Monkey Business}
IV. {Horse Feathers, Night at the Opera, Monkey Business}
V. {Duck Soup, Day at the Races, Monkey Business}
Which of the following is correct?

A) I only.
B) II only.
C) III only.
D) II and IV.
E) I and III.