Question 1

-Refer to Figure 2.2, which represents a simultaneous-move, noncooperative, one-time game. A Nash equilibrium occurs at the strategy profile:

Accepted Answer

A)  {Raise price, Raise price}. 
B)  {Raise price, Don't raise price}. 
C)  {Don't raise price, Raise price}. 
D)  {Don't raise price, Don't raise price}. 
A)  {Raise price, Raise price}. 
B)  {Raise price, Don't raise price}. 
C)  {Don't raise price, Raise price}. 
D)  {Don't raise price, Don't raise price}. D

Question 2

-Refer to the noncooperative, one-time, static game depicted in Figure 2.12. Rah-Rah and 7th Heaven are convenience store chains that are considering opening a franchise in downtown Pawtucket, or just off Interstate 95. Monthly payoffs are in thousands of dollars. If both stores adopt a minimax regret decision rule, what is the equilibrium strategy profile for this game?

Accepted Answer

A)  {Pawtucket, Interstate} 
B)  {Interstate, Pawtucket} 
C)  {Pawtucket, Pawtucket} 
D)  {Interstate, Interstate} 
A)  {Pawtucket, Interstate} 
B)  {Interstate, Pawtucket} 
C)  {Pawtucket, Pawtucket} 
D)  {Interstate, Interstate} D

Question 3

-Consider the noncooperative, one-time, static game depicted in depicted in Figure 2.17. Which player has a dominant strategy?

Accepted Answer

A)  P1 
B)  P2 
C)  Both players 
D)  Neither player 
A)  P1 
B)  P2 
C)  Both players 
D)  Neither player D

Question 4

-Consider the static game depicted in Figure 2.19. Which player has a dominant strategy:

Accepted Answer

A)  P1 
B)  P2 
C)  Both players 
D)  Neither player 
A)  P1 
B)  P2 
C)  Both players 
D)  Neither player

Question 5

-Refer to Figure 2.6. For what values of x is Strategy 3 a strictly dominant strategy for player B?

Accepted Answer

A)  x  3 
D)  x ? 3 
E)  There is no value for which strategy 2 is a dominant strategy for player 
A)  x  3 
D)  x ? 3 
E)  There is no value for which strategy 2 is a dominant strategy for player

Question 6

A strategy that is uniformly worse than all other strategies is called a:

Accepted Answer

A)  Minimax regret strategy. 
B)  Dominated strategy. 
C)  Weakly dominant strategy. 
D)  Savage strategy. 
E)  Second-best strategy. 
A)  Minimax regret strategy. 
B)  Dominated strategy. 
C)  Weakly dominant strategy. 
D)  Savage strategy. 
E)  Second-best strategy.

Question 7

-Refer to Figure 2.7, which summarizes the payoffs in thousands of dollars to two firms in a duopolistic industry arising from alternative pricing strategies. If both firms adopt a maximin decision rule, the strategy profile for this game is:

Accepted Answer

A)  {Raise price, Raise price}. 
B)  {Raise price, Lower price}. 
C)  {Lower price, Raise price}. 
D)  {Lower price, Lower price}. 
A)  {Raise price, Raise price}. 
B)  {Raise price, Lower price}. 
C)  {Lower price, Raise price}. 
D)  {Lower price, Lower price}.

Question 8

For a noncooperative, one-time, static game to have a unique Nash equilibrium, it is necessary for _____ to have a dominant strategy.

Accepted Answer

A)  one player 
B)  both players 
C)  neither player 
D)  All of the above are correct. 
A)  one player 
B)  both players 
C)  neither player 
D)  All of the above are correct.

Question 9

Fred and Ethel are contestants on the game show Truth or Consequences. Fred and Ethel were introduced to each other moments before the show began. The game begins with the two contestants answering a trivia question. If they answer correctly, they are sent to separate isolation chambers where they must choose Truth or Consequences. They are told that if they both choose Truth then they will share equally a $10,000 prize. If one chooses Truth and the other chooses Consequences, the player choosing Consequences gets the entire $10,000 while the player choosing Truth gets nothing. If they both choose Consequences, they each get $100 as a parting gift. This game is an example of:

Accepted Answer

A)  A prisoner's dilemma. 
B)  A zero-sum game. 
C)  The end-of-game problem. 
D)  A first mover advantage. 
E)  None of the above. 
A)  A prisoner's dilemma. 
B)  A zero-sum game. 
C)  The end-of-game problem. 
D)  A first mover advantage. 
E)  None of the above.

Question 10

-Consider the noncooperative, one-time, static game depicted in Figure 2.14 in which the payoffs are in millions of dollars. Suppose that Tsunami Corporation and Cyclone Company contemplating a change in their advertising strategies. If both players adopt a minimax regret decision rule, the resulting strategy profile is:

Accepted Answer

A)  {Newspapers, Magazines}. 
B)  {Television, Magazines}. 
C)  {Newspapers, Radio}. 
D)  {Television, Radio}. 
A)  {Newspapers, Magazines}. 
B)  {Television, Magazines}. 
C)  {Newspapers, Radio}. 
D)  {Television, Radio}.

Question 11

-Refer to Figure 2.6. If x = 2, the Nash equilibrium strategy profile for this game is:
I. {Strategy 1, Strategy 3}
II. {Strategy 1, Strategy 4}
III. {Strategy 2, Strategy 3}
IV. {Strategy 2, Strategy 4}
Which of the following is correct?

Accepted Answer

A)  I only. 
B)  II only. 
C)  c. III only. 
D)  IV only. 
E)  II and III only. 
A)  I only. 
B)  II only. 
C)  c. III only. 
D)  IV only. 
E)  II and III only.

Question 12

-Refer to Figure 2.2, which represents a simultaneous-move, noncooperative, one-time game. If larger payoffs are preferred, which firm has a strictly dominant strategy?

Accepted Answer

A)  Firm A 
B)  Firm B 
C)  Both firms 
D)  Neither firm 
A)  Firm A 
B)  Firm B 
C)  Both firms 
D)  Neither firm

Question 13

Adopting a secure strategy is appropriate:

Accepted Answer

A)  For extremely risk averse players. 
B)  In games in which the worst possible outcome is too onerous to contemplate. 
C)  When neither player has a strictly dominant strategy. 
D)  All of the above are correct. 
E)  None of the above are correct. 
A)  For extremely risk averse players. 
B)  In games in which the worst possible outcome is too onerous to contemplate. 
C)  When neither player has a strictly dominant strategy. 
D)  All of the above are correct. 
E)  None of the above are correct.

Question 14

-The Snake River Company and the Loblolly River Company are considering their respective advertising campaigns. Figure 2.10 summarizes the possible payoffs (in thousands of dollars) to each company from each combination of advertising strategies. If larger payoffs are preferred, which firm has a strictly dominant strategy?

Accepted Answer

A)  Snake River Company 
B)  Loblolly River Company 
C)  Both companies 
D)  Neither company 
A)  Snake River Company 
B)  Loblolly River Company 
C)  Both companies 
D)  Neither company

Question 15

Firm A is considering entering a market in which firm B is a monopolist. Firm B must decide how to respond to this challenge. If firm A decides to enter, firm B can either adopt an aggressive pricing strategy or a passive pricing strategy. If firm B adopts an aggressive pricing strategy, firm A will lose $5 million, although firm B will only earn $1 million. If firm B adopts a passive pricing strategy, firm A will earn $3 million and firm B will earn $7 million. Finally, if firm A decides to stay out of the market, firm B will earn $14 million regardless of its pricing strategy. Firm B:

Accepted Answer

A)  Has a weakly dominant strategy. 
B)  Does not have a dominant strategy. 
C)  Has a strictly dominant strategy. 
D)  Has a iterated weakly dominant strategy. 
E)  None of the above 
A)  Has a weakly dominant strategy. 
B)  Does not have a dominant strategy. 
C)  Has a strictly dominant strategy. 
D)  Has a iterated weakly dominant strategy. 
E)  None of the above

Question 16

-Refer to Figure 2.1, which represents a noncooperative, one-time, static game. Firm B's secure strategy is:

Accepted Answer

A)  Raise price if Firm A does not raise price. 
B)  Raise price if Firm A raises price. 
C)  Don't raise price if Firm A does not raise price. 
D)  Don't raise price if Firm A raises price. 
A)  Raise price if Firm A does not raise price. 
B)  Raise price if Firm A raises price. 
C)  Don't raise price if Firm A does not raise price. 
D)  Don't raise price if Firm A raises price.

Question 17

In the text application "Run with the Pitch," Derek Jeter is on first base. There are twoouts and the pitch count is two strikes and three balls. Jeter's strictly dominant strategy is to:

Accepted Answer

A)  Run with the pitch. 
B)  Attempt to steal second base. 
C)  Wait and see. 
D)  Answers b and c. 
E)  All of the above. 
A)  Run with the pitch. 
B)  Attempt to steal second base. 
C)  Wait and see. 
D)  Answers b and c. 
E)  All of the above.

Question 18

-Consider the static game depicted in Figure 2.18. Player B has _____ dominated strategy or strategies.

Accepted Answer

A)  0 
B)  1 
C)  2 
D)  3 
A)  0 
B)  1 
C)  2 
D)  3

Question 19

-Consider the simultaneous-move game depicted in Figure 2.4. What is the Nash equilibrium strategy profile for this game?

Accepted Answer

A)  {Pass defense, Pass offense} 
B)  {Pass defense, Run offense} 
C)  {Run defense, Pass offense} 
D)  {Run defense, Run offense} 
E)  This is a zero-sum game and does not have a Nash equilibrium strategy profile. 
A)  {Pass defense, Pass offense} 
B)  {Pass defense, Run offense} 
C)  {Run defense, Pass offense} 
D)  {Run defense, Run offense} 
E)  This is a zero-sum game and does not have a Nash equilibrium strategy profile.

Question 20

-Consider the noncooperative, one-time, static game depicted in Figure 2.17. P1 has _____ dominated strategy or strategies.

Accepted Answer

A)  0 
B)  1 
C)  2 
D)  3 
A)  0 
B)  1 
C)  2 
D)  3

-Refer to Figure 2.2, which represents a simultaneous-move, noncooperative, one-time game. A Nash equilibrium occurs at the strategy profile:

-Consider the noncooperative, one-time, static game depicted in depicted in Figure 2.17. Which player has a dominant strategy?

-Consider the static game depicted in Figure 2.19. Which player has a dominant strategy:

-Refer to Figure 2.6. For what values of x is Strategy 3 a strictly dominant strategy for player B?

A strategy that is uniformly worse than all other strategies is called a:

-Refer to Figure 2.7, which summarizes the payoffs in thousands of dollars to two firms in a duopolistic industry arising from alternative pricing strategies. If both firms adopt a maximin decision rule, the strategy profile for this game is:

For a noncooperative, one-time, static game to have a unique Nash equilibrium, it is necessary for _____ to have a dominant strategy.

-Refer to Figure 2.6. If x = 2, the Nash equilibrium strategy profile for this game is: I. {Strategy 1, Strategy 3} II. {Strategy 1, Strategy 4} III. {Strategy 2, Strategy 3} IV. {Strategy 2, Strategy 4} Which of the following is correct?

-Refer to Figure 2.2, which represents a simultaneous-move, noncooperative, one-time game. If larger payoffs are preferred, which firm has a strictly dominant strategy?

Adopting a secure strategy is appropriate:

-Refer to Figure 2.1, which represents a noncooperative, one-time, static game. Firm B's secure strategy is:

In the text application "Run with the Pitch," Derek Jeter is on first base. There are twoouts and the pitch count is two strikes and three balls. Jeter's strictly dominant strategy is to:

-Consider the static game depicted in Figure 2.18. Player B has _____ dominated strategy or strategies.

-Consider the simultaneous-move game depicted in Figure 2.4. What is the Nash equilibrium strategy profile for this game?

-Consider the noncooperative, one-time, static game depicted in Figure 2.17. P1 has _____ dominated strategy or strategies.

Introduction to Game Theory

Focal-Point and Evolutionary Equilibria

Infinitely-Repeated, Static Games

Finitely-Repeated, Static Games

Mixing Pure Strategies

Static Games With Continuous Strategies

Imperfect Competition

Perfect Competition and Monopoly

Strategic Trade Policy

Dynamic Games With Complete

Bargaining

Pure Strategies With Uncertain Payoffs

Torts and Contracts

Auctions

Dynamic Games With Incomplete Information

Filters

Exam 2: Noncooperative, One-Time, Static Games

-Refer to Figure 2.2, which represents a simultaneous-move, noncooperative, one-time game. A Nash equilibrium occurs at the strategy profile:

-Consider the noncooperative, one-time, static game depicted in depicted in Figure 2.17. Which player has a dominant strategy?

-Consider the static game depicted in Figure 2.19. Which player has a dominant strategy:

-Refer to Figure 2.6. For what values of x is Strategy 3 a strictly dominant strategy for player B?

A strategy that is uniformly worse than all other strategies is called a:

-Refer to Figure 2.7, which summarizes the payoffs in thousands of dollars to two firms in a duopolistic industry arising from alternative pricing strategies. If both firms adopt a maximin decision rule, the strategy profile for this game is:

For a noncooperative, one-time, static game to have a unique Nash equilibrium, it is necessary for _____ to have a dominant strategy.

-Refer to Figure 2.6. If x = 2, the Nash equilibrium strategy profile for this game is: I. {Strategy 1, Strategy 3} II. {Strategy 1, Strategy 4} III. {Strategy 2, Strategy 3} IV. {Strategy 2, Strategy 4} Which of the following is correct?

-Refer to Figure 2.2, which represents a simultaneous-move, noncooperative, one-time game. If larger payoffs are preferred, which firm has a strictly dominant strategy?

Adopting a secure strategy is appropriate:

-Refer to Figure 2.1, which represents a noncooperative, one-time, static game. Firm B's secure strategy is:

In the text application "Run with the Pitch," Derek Jeter is on first base. There are twoouts and the pitch count is two strikes and three balls. Jeter's strictly dominant strategy is to:

-Consider the static game depicted in Figure 2.18. Player B has _____ dominated strategy or strategies.

-Consider the simultaneous-move game depicted in Figure 2.4. What is the Nash equilibrium strategy profile for this game?

-Consider the noncooperative, one-time, static game depicted in Figure 2.17. P1 has _____ dominated strategy or strategies.

Introduction to Game Theory

Focal-Point and Evolutionary Equilibria

Infinitely-Repeated, Static Games

Finitely-Repeated, Static Games

Mixing Pure Strategies

Static Games With Continuous Strategies

Imperfect Competition

Perfect Competition and Monopoly

Strategic Trade Policy

Dynamic Games With Complete

Bargaining

Pure Strategies With Uncertain Payoffs

Torts and Contracts

Auctions

Dynamic Games With Incomplete Information

Filters