Essay
Two firms produce a homogenous product. Let p denote the product's price. The output level of firm 1 is denoted by q1, and the output level of firm 2 by q2. The aggregate industry output is denoted by Q with Q = q1
+q2. The aggregate industry (inverse)demand is given by p = 10 - Q. The cost functions of the two firms are
c1(q1)= 4q1 and c2(q2)= 4q2.
i)Assume that the firms choose their output levels simultaneously (i.e., we have Cournot competition). What are the equilibrium output levels and profits of each firm in this case?
ii)Suppose that firm 2 finds a cheaper way to produce the same product. The new cost function of firm 2 is c2(q2)= q2. Assuming that the firms choose their output levels simultaneously, find the equilibrium output levels and profits of each firm.
Correct Answer:

Verified
i)q1 = q2 = ; p =4 ; pro...View Answer
Unlock this answer now
Get Access to more Verified Answers free of charge
Correct Answer:
Verified
View Answer
Unlock this answer now
Get Access to more Verified Answers free of charge
Q49: As the number of firms in a
Q50: A self enforcing agreement is:<br>A)one that only
Q51: There are only two souvenir vendors at
Q52: When modeling an oligopoly as a prisoners
Q53: A particular market is served by three
Q55: Suppose the demand function in the industry
Q56: The generalized no- entry condition is that
Q57: Market demand is given by P =
Q58: The collusive solution is:<br>A)collectively irrational because each
Q59: When modeling an oligopoly as a prisoners