In the Following Voter Profile, Use the Borda Method to Determine

Multiple Choice

In the following voter profile, use the Borda Method to determine the winner. If candidate d drops out, and a second election is held, who is the winner if the Borda Method is again used? Does the Borda Method violate the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Criterion in this election
Process?
$\begin{array}{c|l}\text { Number of Voters } & \text { Ranking } \\\hline 3 & a>c>b>d \\7 & b>a>c>d \\5 & a>b>c>d \\8 & a>c>d>b \\7 & c>d>a>b \\4 & b>d>a>c \\6 & d>b>a>c \\6 & c>b>d>a \\4 & c>a>d>b\end{array}$

A) a; a, no
B) a; b, yes
C) $b ; b$ , no
D) $b$ ; $a$ , yes