Multiple Choice
Suppose there is a used car market with 1,000 cars for sale. Buyers know that 500 of the used cars are of poor quality and are worth only $500, while the other 500 used cars are of good quality and are worth $1,500. However, buyers do not know which individual cars are of poor quality or good quality. The seller of a car knows the worth of the car. Which of the following statements is true?In equilibrium, only poor quality cars will be sold.The asymmetric information in this market will cause adverse selection.The equilibrium price of a used car will be $500.
A) I only
B) I and III only
C) II and III only
D) I, II, and III
Correct Answer:

Verified
Correct Answer:
Verified
Q109: Screening is when someone takes action to:<br>A)reveal
Q110: The nutritional information now available at many
Q111: Auto insurance providers charge higher premiums to
Q112: Information asymmetry becomes a problem when:<br>A)a buyer
Q113: Because the seller of a used car
Q115: Statistical discrimination:<br>A)can limit individuals' opportunities simply because
Q116: A college requiring applicants to submit their
Q117: Moral hazard:<br>A)is a normative judgement about the
Q118: User-feedback scores on eBay are an example
Q119: People with auto insurance tend to drive