Multiple Choice
Consider a Cournot duopoly with the following inverse demand function: P = 100 − 2Q1 − 2Q2.The firms' marginal costs are identical and are given by MCi(Qi) = 2Qi.Based on this information,firm 1 and 2's marginal revenue functions are:
A) MR1(Q1,Q2) = 100 − 2Q1 − Q2 and MR2(Q1,Q2) = 100 − Q1 − 2Q2.
B) MR1(Q1,Q2) = 100 − 4Q1 − 2Q2 and MR2(Q1,Q2) = 100 − 2Q1 − 4Q2.
C) MR1(Q1,Q2) = 100 − 2Q1 − 4Q2 and MR2(Q1,Q2) = 100 − 4Q1 − 2Q2.
D) MR1(Q1,Q2) = 24.5 − 0.5Q2 and MR2(Q1,Q2) = 24.5 − 0.5Q1.
Correct Answer:

Verified
Correct Answer:
Verified
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