Chaudhuri and Gangadharan Argue That in a Trust Game Where

Multiple Choice

Chaudhuri and Gangadharan argue that in a trust game where amount sent by Senders is tripled: Those who are trustworthy are also trusting but the converse is not necessarily true. This implies that:

A) Those who return more than one-third as the Receiver also send a much a higher proportion of their endowment as the Sender; those who send more as the Sender do not necessarily send back a higher proportion as the Receiver.
B) Those who return less than one-third as the Receiver also send a much a higher proportion of their endowment as the Sender; those who send more as the Sender also return a much higher proportion as the Receiver.
C) Those who send more as the Sender tend to keep all of the money received as the Receiver; those who return a higher proportion as the Receiver tend to send very small amounts as the Sender.
D) Senders typically send little and Receivers, upon receiving money also return very little in keeping with the backward induction equilibrium of the trust game.