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  2. Topic
    Mathematics
  3. Study Set
    Game Theory in Business and Economics
  4. Exam
    Exam 5: Finitely-Repeated, Static Games
  5. Question
    Tit-For-Tat
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Tit-For-Tat

Question 33

Question 33

Multiple Choice

Tit-for-tat:


A) Is similar to backward induction.
B) Is an enforcement mechanism in repeated games where cooperation is possible.
C) Is the same thing as a scorched-earth policy.
D) Results in minimax payoffs.
E) None of the above.

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