Multiple Choice
The Nash equilibrium existence theorem guarantees that:
A) A pure-strategy Nash equilibrium always exists for static games with a finite number of players and pure strategies.
B) A mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium only exists for zero-sum games.
C) A mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium exists for any game with a finite number of players and pure strategies.
D) mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium exists for games in which one player has a dominant strategy.
E) Answers c and d are correct.
Correct Answer:

Verified
Correct Answer:
Verified
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