Multiple Choice
If effort is unobservable and revenues are riskless,firms can design incentive-compatible compensation schemes by offering workers:
A) profit shares.
B) increased nonmonetary benefits.
C) increased fixed salary.
D) decreased effort requirements.
E) increased future compensation in the form of retirement pay.
Correct Answer:

Verified
Correct Answer:
Verified
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