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    Managerial Economics Study Set 1
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    Exam 16: Auctions
  5. Question
    ​In Common Value Auctions
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​In Common Value Auctions

Question 5

Question 5

Multiple Choice

​In common value auctions


A) ​Every bidder know the value of the object being sold
B) Each bidder makes the same estimate of the value of the good
C) Bidders do not know the estimates of the others
D) ​The true value of the item differs across bidders

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