Multiple Choice
What can be said about a non-credible threat that is part of a Nash equilibrium in a sequential game?
A) It is also part of a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium.
B) It cannot be part of a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium.
C) It can be a dominated strategy.
D) It may be a dominant strategy.
Correct Answer:
Verified
Correct Answer:
Verified
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