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    Exam 20: Contracts and Moral Hazards
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    In the Presence of Asymmetric Information with Costless Monitoring and Enforcement,a
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In the Presence of Asymmetric Information with Costless Monitoring and Enforcement,a

Question 89

Question 89

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In the presence of asymmetric information with costless monitoring and enforcement,a hire contract results in production efficiency.

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