Multiple Choice
A risk-averse manager is hired to run a firm for shareholders. If the manager's effort can be observed and specified in a contract,which would be the best employment contract?
A) a high-powered incentive contract to elicit the most effort.
B) a fixed salary paid as long as the required effort is undertaken.
C) a proportion of profits paid as long as the required effort is undertaken.
D) a wage well in excess of his or her outside opportunity.
Correct Answer:

Verified
Correct Answer:
Verified
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