(See Problem 3

Multiple Choice

(See Problem 3.) Two players are engaged in a game of "chicken." There are two possible strategies, Swerve and Drive Straight. A player who chooses to Swerve is called "chicken" and gets a payoff of zero, regardless of what the other player does. A player who chooses to Drive Straight gets a payoff of 84 if the other player Swerves and a payoff of -36 if the other player also chooses to Drive Straight. This game has two pure strategy equilibria and

A) a mixed strategy equilibrium in which each player swerves with probability 0.30 and drives straight with probability 0.70.
B) two mixed strategies in which players alternate between swerving and driving straight.
C) a mixed strategy equilibrium in which one player swerves with probability 0.30 and the other swerves with probability 0.70.
D) a mixed strategy in which each player swerves with probability 0.15 and drives straight with probability 0.85.
E) no mixed strategies.