(See Problem 3

Multiple Choice

(See Problem 3.) Two players are engaged in a game of "chicken." There are two possible strategies, Swerve and Drive Straight. A player who chooses to Swerve is called "chicken" and gets a payoff of zero, regardless of what the other player does. A player who chooses to Drive Straight gets a payoff of 15.43 if the other player Swerves and a payoff of -36 if the other player also chooses to Drive Straight. This game has two pure strategy equilibria and

A) two mixed strategies in which players alternate between swerving and driving straight.
B) a mixed strategy in which each player swerves with probability 0.35 and drives straight with probability 0.65.
C) a mixed strategy equilibrium in which one player swerves with probability 0.70 and the other swerves with probability 0.30.
D) a mixed strategy equilibrium in which each player swerves with probability 0.70 and drives straight with probability 0.30.
E) no mixed strategies.