Essay
Consider voter preferences over a public good y that is being funded by a proportional income tax.
a.Illustrate how this might lead to single peaked voter preferences.
b.Suppose there exists a privately available good x that is substitute for y.How does this introduce non-single peakedness?
c.Now suppose x is relatively complementary to y.What would you expect to happen to voter preferences as this complementarity gets stronger?
Correct Answer:
Verified
Correct Answer:
Verified
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