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Suppose That You Are a Manager

Question 24

Multiple Choice

Suppose that you are a manager. You are considering whether or not to monitor employees with the payoffs in the normal-form game shown below. Suppose that you are a manager. You are considering whether or not to monitor employees with the payoffs in the normal-form game shown below.   Management and a labor union are bargaining over how much of a $50 surplus to give to the union. The $50 is divisible up to one cent. The players have one shot to reach an agreement. Management has the ability to announce what it wants first, and then the labor union can accept or reject the offer. Both players get zero if the total amounts asked for exceed $50. Which of the following is true? A)  There are multiple Nash equilibria. B)  ($25, $25)  is a Nash equilibrium. C)  A Nash equilibrium is also a perfect equilibrium. D)  There are multiple Nash equilibria, and ($25, $25)  is a Nash equilibrium. Management and a labor union are bargaining over how much of a $50 surplus to give to the union. The $50 is divisible up to one cent. The players have one shot to reach an agreement. Management has the ability to announce what it wants first, and then the labor union can accept or reject the offer. Both players get zero if the total amounts asked for exceed $50. Which of the following is true?


A) There are multiple Nash equilibria.
B) ($25, $25) is a Nash equilibrium.
C) A Nash equilibrium is also a perfect equilibrium.
D) There are multiple Nash equilibria, and ($25, $25) is a Nash equilibrium.

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