Deck 10: Incentive Conflicts and Contracts
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Deck 10: Incentive Conflicts and Contracts
1
Which one of the following is a source of conflict between owners and managers?
A)Managers and owners have a very short time horizon.
B)Managers and owners worry about the entire future cash flows.
C)Managers have short time horizons,while owners have to worry about future cash flows.
D)Owners have short time horizons,while managers have to worry about future cash flows.
A)Managers and owners have a very short time horizon.
B)Managers and owners worry about the entire future cash flows.
C)Managers have short time horizons,while owners have to worry about future cash flows.
D)Owners have short time horizons,while managers have to worry about future cash flows.
C
2
Markets use prices to allocate resources,while firms use:
A)cost-price ratios.
B)managers.
C)the board of directors.
D)random decisions.
A)cost-price ratios.
B)managers.
C)the board of directors.
D)random decisions.
B
3
Which one of the following is a source of conflict between owners and managers?
A)A manager's effort leaves the firm's value and the manager's utility unchanged.
B)A manager's effort decreases the firm's value and the manager's utility.
C)A manager's effort increases the firm's value but decreases the manager's utility.
D)A manager's effort increases the firm's value and the manager's utility.
A)A manager's effort leaves the firm's value and the manager's utility unchanged.
B)A manager's effort decreases the firm's value and the manager's utility.
C)A manager's effort increases the firm's value but decreases the manager's utility.
D)A manager's effort increases the firm's value and the manager's utility.
C
4
Which one of the following is a big problem in large groups?
A)Useless group leader
B)Adverse selection problem
C)Free-rider problem
D)Buyer-supplier conflicts
A)Useless group leader
B)Adverse selection problem
C)Free-rider problem
D)Buyer-supplier conflicts
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5
A pilot for a private jet stops for refueling in Omaha,Nebraska.Topper Fuels offers him a case of French wine to refuel with them (a total retail value of $324 to the pilot).For refueling,inspections,and minor repairs,Topper charges $2,700,$400 more than the least expensive fuel company.What has happened to the company that owns the private jet?
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6
While many managers and lawyers might claim that implicit contracts "aren't worth the paper that they are not written on," most understandings between companies and their customers and employees are implicit.Why?
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7
A firm is a focal point for a set of contracts.Explain the problems that (1)agency relationships,(2)asymmetric information,and (3)adverse selection can introduce to building a successful contract between two people.
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8
Which one of the following is a source of conflict between owners and managers?
A)Managers are often reluctant to increase the size of the firm.
B)Owners are reluctant to lay off the manager and want to empire-build.
C)Managers are reluctant to lay off their friends and want to empire-build.
D)Owners are reluctant to lay off their friends and want to empire-build.
A)Managers are often reluctant to increase the size of the firm.
B)Owners are reluctant to lay off the manager and want to empire-build.
C)Managers are reluctant to lay off their friends and want to empire-build.
D)Owners are reluctant to lay off their friends and want to empire-build.
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9
Which of the following is not a problem in owner-manager or principal-agent conflicts?
A)Choice of effort
B)Perquisite taking
C)Identical time horizons
D)Differential risk exposure
A)Choice of effort
B)Perquisite taking
C)Identical time horizons
D)Differential risk exposure
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10
What is an agency relationship? What are agency problems?
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11
Always Round Tire hires Plain Truth Advertising to write copy for its newspaper advertisements.Always Round has a demand for advertising of MB = 400 − 2S where S is the number of hours that Plain Truth works.If Plain Truth has a fixed supply cost given by MC = $150 per hour,what are the number of hours that Always Round purchases from Plain Truth under the assumption of costless monitoring? How much is the contract worth to Always Round? If Always Round offers half of the surplus to Plain Truth as an incentive,how much is Plain Truth paid for the job?
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12
Always Round Tire hires Plain Truth Advertising to write copy for its newspaper advertisements.Always Round has a demand for advertising of MB = 400 − 2S where S is the number of hours that Plain Truth works.If Plain Truth has a fixed supply cost given by MC = $150 per hour,what are the number of hours that Always Round purchases from Plain Truth? Now,if the copy writers are slackers and only deliver 100 hours of work each week,and if the each company must spend $1,250 in monitoring and bonding costs,what is the surplus and residual loss in this environment?
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13
What are some ways of reducing adverse selection in the insurance market?
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14
Often people in business work in teams,each using specialized knowledge to get the tasks done.If one member of the team does no work,this is called:
A)signaling
B)bargaining
C)free-riding.
D)costless contracting
A)signaling
B)bargaining
C)free-riding.
D)costless contracting
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15
What is adverse selection? Give an example to illustrate this problem.
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16
Which one of the following is a source of conflict between owners and managers?
A)The amount owners and the managers want to pay to the shareholders
B)The amount owners and the managers want to receive
C)The amount owners want to pay and the amount managers want to receive
D)The amount owners want to receive and the amount managers want to pay
A)The amount owners and the managers want to pay to the shareholders
B)The amount owners and the managers want to receive
C)The amount owners want to pay and the amount managers want to receive
D)The amount owners want to receive and the amount managers want to pay
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17
While CEO of General Electric,Jack Welch was a very successful corporate manager,he also loaded up his retirement program with numerous unusual benefits such as rented apartments,free airplanes,and numerous club memberships.The owners (stockholders)were generally unaware of these benefits.The source of conflict between owners and managers in this case was:
A)the choice of effort of Mr.Welch while he was CEO.
B)perquisite taking on the part of Mr.Welch.
C)differential risk exposure between Mr.Welch and the typical stockholder.
D)overinvestment in company offices by Mr.Welch.
A)the choice of effort of Mr.Welch while he was CEO.
B)perquisite taking on the part of Mr.Welch.
C)differential risk exposure between Mr.Welch and the typical stockholder.
D)overinvestment in company offices by Mr.Welch.
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18
Which one of the following is a source of conflict between owners and managers?
A)Managers and owners are both highly risk-averse.
B)Managers and owners are both risk-takers.
C)Managers are more risk-averse whereas owners are not.
D)Managers are less risk-averse whereas owners are not.
A)Managers and owners are both highly risk-averse.
B)Managers and owners are both risk-takers.
C)Managers are more risk-averse whereas owners are not.
D)Managers are less risk-averse whereas owners are not.
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19
J.T.Smith runs Gamemaker,an equipment producer for gaming service corporations.As CEO,Smith is seemingly worth $2.5 million per year in the marketplace.The directors are attempting to decide how to divide his compensation package between cash salary and perquisites.Using budget constraints and indifference curves,illustrate the potential outcomes for the board of directors.
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20
The firm or corporation is the focal point for:
A)a set of contracts.
B)the interaction of demand and supply.
C)dealing with asymmetric information.
D)value minimization.
A)a set of contracts.
B)the interaction of demand and supply.
C)dealing with asymmetric information.
D)value minimization.
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21
It is in the interest of all parties to develop efficient solutions to agency problems through ______ so that more wealth can be shared among the contracting parties.
A)adverse selection
B)value maximization
C)contracting until marginal benefit (MB)equals zero
D)implicit contracts
A)adverse selection
B)value maximization
C)contracting until marginal benefit (MB)equals zero
D)implicit contracts
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22
Mary Jo Smith is willing to work for $3,200 per month.She asks the HR manager at Plain Truth Advertising for $4,000 per month.He was willing to pay only $3,700 per month,so he rejects her application and begins to search for a new employee again.This is an example of:
A)adverse selection.
B)value maximization.
C)bargaining failure.
D)agency problem.
A)adverse selection.
B)value maximization.
C)bargaining failure.
D)agency problem.
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23
Monitoring costs are:
A)the costs of a failure in bargaining.
B)rarely incurred in contracts between a principal and an agent.
C)the insurance costs of guaranteeing that the principal will not incur a cost of contract failure.
D)the costs of reviewing and overseeing the actions of an agent.
A)the costs of a failure in bargaining.
B)rarely incurred in contracts between a principal and an agent.
C)the insurance costs of guaranteeing that the principal will not incur a cost of contract failure.
D)the costs of reviewing and overseeing the actions of an agent.
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24
______ makes designing efficient contracts costly.
A)Signaling
B)Self-selection
C)Huge monitoring costs for the principal
D)Huge monitoring costs for the agent
A)Signaling
B)Self-selection
C)Huge monitoring costs for the principal
D)Huge monitoring costs for the agent
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25
Total agency costs are:
A)the monitoring costs plus residual loss.
B)the monitoring costs plus out of pocket costs.
C)out of pocket costs plus residual loss.
D)out of pocket costs minus residual loss.
A)the monitoring costs plus residual loss.
B)the monitoring costs plus out of pocket costs.
C)out of pocket costs plus residual loss.
D)out of pocket costs minus residual loss.
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26
Precontractual informational asymmetries that generate contracting costs can lead to
A)bargaining failures and adverse selection.
B)implicit contracts and reputational concerns.
C)explicit contracts and credibility issues.
D)perquisite taking and differential risk exposure.
A)bargaining failures and adverse selection.
B)implicit contracts and reputational concerns.
C)explicit contracts and credibility issues.
D)perquisite taking and differential risk exposure.
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27
Joan Petty,a human resource manager,offers Billy Self $2,750 per month as an inventory manager.She is willing to offer $750 more per month,but Billy does not have that information and walks away from the job offer.This is an example of a:
A)market at work.
B)bargaining success.
C)bargaining failure.
D)market in transition.
A)market at work.
B)bargaining success.
C)bargaining failure.
D)market in transition.
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28
______ can provide incentives to honor implicit contracts.
A)Value maximization
B)Adverse selection
C)Reputational concerns
D)Bargaining power
A)Value maximization
B)Adverse selection
C)Reputational concerns
D)Bargaining power
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29
FancyFoods restaurant decided to introduce an all-you-can-eat buffet on Tuesdays and Wednesdays to increase business.They found that they acquired a whole new set of customers,most of whom were very big eaters.After a time,they increased the price of the buffet.FancyFoods suffered from the problem of:
A)excessive high costs.
B)adverse selection.
C).incentives
D)implicit contracts
A)excessive high costs.
B)adverse selection.
C).incentives
D)implicit contracts
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30
An informal understanding about the quality of product components supplied is a key to the relationship between most companies and their suppliers.This is a good example of:
A)an implicit contract.
B)an explicit contract.
C)a principal-agent conflict resolution.
D)an adverse selection problem.
A)an implicit contract.
B)an explicit contract.
C)a principal-agent conflict resolution.
D)an adverse selection problem.
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31
J.T.Smith's company,Gamemaker,sells gambling equipment to gaming service companies.Since the quality of the equipment is difficult to monitor and gamblers are often the source of machine failure,Smith could cheat on the level of machine quality.However,Smith has a strong quality assurance program.A primary reason for that may be:
A)cost containment.
B)company reputation.
C)the need for reinforcement.
D)the asymmetric information Smith holds on quality.
A)cost containment.
B)company reputation.
C)the need for reinforcement.
D)the asymmetric information Smith holds on quality.
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32
In an agency relationship,the costs incurred by agents to ensure that a principal is compensated if they take any action that is detrimental to the principal is known as:
A)monitoring costs
B)bonding costs
C)recurring losses
D)residual losses
A)monitoring costs
B)bonding costs
C)recurring losses
D)residual losses
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33
In most models of managerial conflict,the owner is the ______ and the manager is the ______.
A)wage earner; stockholder
B)employee; director
C)principal; agent
D)resource; resource owner
A)wage earner; stockholder
B)employee; director
C)principal; agent
D)resource; resource owner
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34
Adverse selection in bargaining arises from:
A)signaling private information to other parties.
B)self-selection based on private information.
C)implicit contracts between the principal and the agent.
D)asymmetric information held by the principal or the agent.
A)signaling private information to other parties.
B)self-selection based on private information.
C)implicit contracts between the principal and the agent.
D)asymmetric information held by the principal or the agent.
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35
Designing efficient contracts are costly when:
A)there is perquisite involved.
B)there is complete information.
C)there is asymmetric information.
D)there is an agency relationship.
A)there is perquisite involved.
B)there is complete information.
C)there is asymmetric information.
D)there is an agency relationship.
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36
You want to hire a law firm to represent you from which you derive benefit.The law firm incurs costs from providing this service.As long as marginal benefits are greater than marginal costs,value is:
A)minimized.
B)not maximized because more hours of services are provided.
C)not maximized because fewer hours of services are provided.
D)maximized.
A)minimized.
B)not maximized because more hours of services are provided.
C)not maximized because fewer hours of services are provided.
D)maximized.
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37
Which of the following is true of implicit contracts?
A)Enforcement depends on the private incentives of individuals.
B)Agents do not act in the best interest of principals.
C)The gains from trade are low and there are market failures.
D)The opportunity cost of residual loss is low.
A)Enforcement depends on the private incentives of individuals.
B)Agents do not act in the best interest of principals.
C)The gains from trade are low and there are market failures.
D)The opportunity cost of residual loss is low.
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38
Kaneshi Hartfield is a sales representative with Plain Truth Advertising.She is an excellent sales representative,but corporate management feels that she is too independent.But they are afraid to act,since Kaneshi maintains her own list of key contacts.This is an example of:
A)an asymmetric information problem.
B)different time horizons of the sales representative and management.
C)the free rider problem.
D)the failure of bargaining.
A)an asymmetric information problem.
B)different time horizons of the sales representative and management.
C)the free rider problem.
D)the failure of bargaining.
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39
One of the ways of overcoming the problem of adverse selection is through:
A)signaling.
B)bargaining.
C)free-riding.
D)costless contracting.
A)signaling.
B)bargaining.
C)free-riding.
D)costless contracting.
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40
Billy Mac Tailor drives an eighteen-wheeler CG Carriers.He always stops at All Bright truck stops to buy diesel fuel.He is a preferred customer and gets a free meal and shower worth $10.00.But All Bright charges $12.00 more for a fill up than most competitors.Which of the following is true?
A)CG Carriers gets a benefit of $22.00 because Tailor is a preferred customer.
B)CG Carriers has a wealth reduction of $2.00 even though they do not know about Tailor's actions.
C)There is a wealth transfer to Billy Mac Tailor and CG Carriers has a wealth reduction of $12.00.
D)Billy Mac Tailor increases his income by $10.00 and CG Carriers also benefits.
A)CG Carriers gets a benefit of $22.00 because Tailor is a preferred customer.
B)CG Carriers has a wealth reduction of $2.00 even though they do not know about Tailor's actions.
C)There is a wealth transfer to Billy Mac Tailor and CG Carriers has a wealth reduction of $12.00.
D)Billy Mac Tailor increases his income by $10.00 and CG Carriers also benefits.
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41
Using piece rates for employees in an assembly line usually increases ________,but it may reduce ________.
A)output; quality
B)costs; revenue
C)quality; output
D)revenue; costs
A)output; quality
B)costs; revenue
C)quality; output
D)revenue; costs
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42
It is in the self-interest of individuals to:
A)minimize the total contracting costs in any relationship.
B)maximize the total contracting costs in any relationship.
C)eliminate the total bargaining costs in any relationship.
D)reduce value through formal contracting costs.
A)minimize the total contracting costs in any relationship.
B)maximize the total contracting costs in any relationship.
C)eliminate the total bargaining costs in any relationship.
D)reduce value through formal contracting costs.
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43
Incentive problems in contractual relationships generate:
A)revenues that increase value.
B)revenues that decrease value.
C)costs that increase value.
D)costs that decrease value.
A)revenues that increase value.
B)revenues that decrease value.
C)costs that increase value.
D)costs that decrease value.
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