Deck 7: Explaining Tastes: The Importance of Altruism and

Question 1

Based on the present-aim standard a person who drinks gasoline and subsequently dies could be consider rational as long as:

A)Her behavior helps other peoples
B)She really likes the taste of gasoline
C)She thinks her behavior will result in more gasoline for other people
D)Her death is not painful

Answer 1

B

Question 2

In evolutionary models, where each individual reproduces in proportion to its average payoff, if cooperators and defectors look exactly alike, then

A)Cooperators are destined for extinction
B)Defectors are destined for extinction
C)An equilibrium will result with more than half of the population being cooperators
D)There will be no change in the population proportions from the starting point

Answer 2

A

Question 3

The hawks and doves example illustrate in the textbook shows that an important property of evolution by natural selection is that traits are often favored by their effects:

A)On individual payoffs
B)On population payoffs
C)On regardless of the payoffs,
D)And not on the costs to obtain those traits

Answer 3

A

Question 4

What is the strategy we would expect from X and Y in the following prisoner's dilemma?                                     $\text { Prisoner Y }$

$\begin{array}{l}\begin{array} { l } &\text { confess} \\\text { Prisoner X } \\&\text { remain silent } \\\end{array}\begin{array} {| l| l|} \hline {\text { confess }} & {\text { remain silent }} \\\hline 10 \text { years each } & \begin{array}{l}\text { 0 years for } \mathrm{X} \\30 \text { years for } \mathrm{Y}\end{array} \\\hline \begin{array}{l}\text { 0 years for } \mathrm{Y} \\30 \text { years for } \mathrm{X}\end{array} & \text { 2 years for each } \\\hline\end{array}\end{array}$

A)Both prisoners to remain silent
B)Both prisoners will confess
C)There is no single predictable strategy
D)X will confess.Y will remain silent

Question 5

The prisoner's dilemma exercise assumes

A)Prisoners are rational
B)Prisoners are altruistic to each other if they know each other well
C)Prisoners believe other prisoners are different then they themselves are
D)Prisoners do not know what the penalties are when they are interrogated

Question 6

In this chapter we are told that people's tastes not only can differ but must differ.This is because

A)Genetic programming makes it impossible for people to have the same preferences
B)People with differing tastes can profitably invade any population of similar tastes
C)Homogeneous populations become complacent and lose their vigilant qualities
D)No two persons could have the same preferences

Question 7

If prisoners X and Y in the table shown could develop a credible commitment device, then we would expect                                     $\text { Prisoner Y }$

$\begin{array}{l}\begin{array} { l } &\text { confess} \\\text { Prisoner X } \\&\text { remain silent } \\\end{array}\begin{array} {| l| l|} \hline {\text { confess }} & {\text { remain silent }} \\\hline 10 \text { years each } & \begin{array}{l}\text { 0 years for } \mathrm{X} \\30 \text { years for } \mathrm{Y}\end{array} \\\hline \begin{array}{l}\text { 0 years for } \mathrm{Y} \\30 \text { years for } \mathrm{X}\end{array} & \text { 2 years for each } \\\hline\end{array}\end{array}$

A)Both prisoners to remain silent
B)Both prisoners to confess
C)No specific strategy to dominate their decisions
D)X will confess.Y will remain silent

Question 8

Consider a population with the following givens: 1) 75% cooperators and 25% defectors,
2) a 8 unit payoff goes to cooperators who interact with another cooperator,
3) a zero unit payoff goes to a cooperator who interacts with a defector,
4) the cost of knowing which is which is 2
If the population balance falls below 75%

A)It will no longer make sense for cooperators to pay the price of scrutiny
B)Defectors will have a higher payoff
C)Cooperators will all pay the cost of scrutiny
D)Less than 75% of the cooperators will pay the cost of scrutiny

Question 9

If you care not only about your own income level but also about your relatives' income level, with increasing concern for them as they get poorer, then your indifference curves (defined over your income level and that of your relatives)

A)Will be negatively sloped, and concave from above
B)Will be positively sloped, and concave from the origin
C)Will be negatively sloped and linear
D)Can not be specified until more information is provided

Question 10

Given the following: if Shirley believes Betsy will behave in a self-interested way, Shirley will                                 $\text { Betsy }$

$\begin{array}{l}\begin{array} { l } &\text { defect} \\\text { Shirley} \\&\text { cooperate } \\\end{array}\begin{array} {| l| l|} \hline {\text { defect }} & {\text { cooperate }} \\\hline 1 \text { for each} & \begin{array}{l}\text {0 for Betsy } \\ \text { 3 for Betsy } \end{array} \\\hline \begin{array}{l}\text {3 for Betsy } \\ \text {0 for Betsy }\end{array} & \text { 2 for each } \\\hline\end{array}\end{array}$

A)Predict that Betsy will cooperate, and so Shirley will also cooperate
B)Predict that Betsy will cooperate, and so Shirley will decide to defect
C)Predict that Betsy will defect, and so Shirley will also defect
D)Predict that Betsy will defect, and so Shirley will decide to cooperate

Question 11

In evolutionary models, where each individual reproduces in proportion to its average payoff, if cooperators are perfectly distinguishable from defectors, then

A)Cooperators are destined for extinction
B)Defectors are destined for extinction
C)An equilibrium will result with more than half of the population being defectors
D)There will be no change in the population proportions from the starting point

Question 12

In a society consisting of 75% cooperators and 25% defectors, with an 8-unit payoff to a cooperator who interacts with another cooperator and a 0-unit payoff to the cooperator who interacts with a defector, if the cost of scrutiny is 2, the cooperator

A)Should pay the cost of scrutiny even if it were 3
B)Should not interact with either cooperators or defectors
C)Should not pay the cost of scrutiny
D)Will break even by paying the cost of scrutiny

Question 13

If the receiver in the "ultimate bargaining game" cares not just about his final wealth level but also about fairness,

A)The allocator will make a one-sided offer
B)The receiver will accept a one-sided offer
C)The receiver will reject a one-sided proposal
D)The receiver will always receive the full $20

Question 14

Consider a population with the following givens: 1) 75% cooperators and 25% defectors,
2) a 8 unit payoff goes to cooperators who interact with another cooperator,
3) a zero unit payoff goes to a cooperator who interacts with a defector,
4) the cost of knowing which is which is 2.
If the population balance rises above 75%

A)It will no longer make sense for cooperators to pay the price of scrutiny
B)Defectors will have a lower payoff
C)Cooperators will all pay the cost of scrutiny
D)Defectors will all pay the cost of scrutiny

Question 15

When Anna maximizes her utility her utility level is equal to:

A)5,000
B)100
C)10,000
D)200

Question 16

The self-interest model predicts that the outcome of the "ultimatum bargaining game" in which the allocator starts with $20 is that

A)The allocator will offer the receiver $10 and keep $10 for himself
B)The allocator will offer the receiver $0.01 and will propose to keep $19.99 for himself
C)The receiver will always reject the allocator's proposal
D)The allocator will always keep the full $20

Question 17

Say Anna's utility function was given by UA = MAMM, where MA is Anna's wealth and MM is Marie's wealth. Initially, Anna has 160 units of wealth and Marie has 40. In order to maximize her utility Anna should:

A)transfer all her wealth to Marie
B)transfer 60 units to Marie
C)keep all her wealth for herself.
D)get 40 units from Marie.

Question 18

In the prisoner's dilemma exercise, the strategy that is assumed to result is which of the following?

A)The prisoners will discuss the problem ahead of time and trust each other to cooperate
B)The prisoners will discuss the problem ahead of time and then both cheat on each other
C)The prisoners will develop a foolproof commitment device and then both confess
D)The prisoners will individually decide it is in their interest to confess

Question 19

The "self-interest theory" considers an act to be rational if

A)It is an efficient pursuit of whatever aims one has at the moment of deliberation and action
B)It conforms to generally accepted views of justice and also serves one's interests
C)It efficiently promotes the ongoing material interest of the person who performs it without the requirement that social justice be achieved
D)The act was done while the person was sane and coherent

Question 20

In the doves and hawks society there is a place for the doves because

A)There is more waste in joint production processes when participants cooperate
B)Doves do not well when paired with other doves
C)Hawkish behavior can be damaging even to hawks
D)There are always more doves and hawks

Question 21

Describe a situation where you have been a cooperator and explain how the commitment problem was solved.In other words, how did you know your partner would not cheat?

Question 22

Use the following to answer the next three questions:
C.The students with the best grades are the ones who stay on in school.From this information answer the following questions.

Question 23

The hawks and doves example illustrate in the textbook illustrate how the usefulness of a certain mode of behavior depends on:

A)the frequency with which others also prefer that behavior
B)the frequency of that behavior
C)the scarcity of resources available.
D)the number of doves at any moment

Question 24

If the teacher allows the students to pick their team partners without a grade penalty, what will the population of the class eventually become? Draw a payoff graph again showing this outcome.

Question 25

According to the textbook, the real difficulty with prisoners' dilemma is:

A)That the prisoners can not communicate with each other
B)Lack of trust between the two prisoners
C)That both prisoners are wrongly convicted
D)Irrational behavior on the part of the prisoners

Question 26

Suppose you have been assigned to complete a group project with one of your classmates.Each of you can choose to Shirk or Work.If one or more of you chooses to Work, the project is completed and provides each with extra credit valued at 4 payoff units each.The cost of completing the project is that 6 total units of effort (measured in payoff units) divided equally among all players who choose to Work and this is subtracted from their payoff.If both of you Shirk, then neither of you have to expend any effort but the project is not completed, giving each a payoff of 0.The teacher can only tell whether the project is completed and not which students contributed to it.What is the dominant strategy for you?

A)Work
B)Shirk
C)There is not dominant strategy
D)Work if your friend also work

Question 27

If the teacher allows students to choose partners for a 1/3 letter grade penalty, what will happen to the student body population.Draw another payoff graph and show the proportion of socialites and individualists on the graph.You cannot use a numerical percentage because the letter grades are not numerically specified.Simply label the horizontal axis with an X at the left side and a Y on the right side and a Z where the proportion of socialites will be fixed.The percentage population then becomes XZ/XY.

Question 28

Describe a situation in which you were a defector.Did your partners know you were a defector or did you fool them?

Question 29

In this chapter, virtue can lead to material gain and therefore is an inevitable part of the social order.Evaluate this view of virtue or moral behavior.Is material gain a sufficient motive for morality? Is moral behavior based on more than the possibility for personal gain?

Question 30

Suppose you and your friend have decided to go into a very lucrative joint venture together, which would make $5,000 for both of you.Nevertheless your friend, who does not need the money as much as you, say he will not cooperate with you unless he gets at least 90% of the earnings.It will be in your advantage not to capitulate to your friend's demands as long as:

A)You follow a self-interest goal
B)You cared only about the absolute distribution of the winnings
C)You follow a no egoistic goal
D)Your friend does not know anything about your goals

Question 31

For the sake of argument, assume that the rules of the game are defined in such a way that hawks (competitors) are denied the use of violence or force and that competition is conditioned by the rule of law.This might approximate a highly competitive capitalist society.If everyone is a hawk in this world, describe the conditions necessary for this society to have all hawks permanently.

Question 32

Assuming that there is a continuum numerical grading scale between all the letter grades, draw a payoff graph assuming that the groups are randomly chosen and indicate what the population of students in the class will eventually become.