Exam 7: Explaining Tastes: The Importance of Altruism and
Exam 1: Thinking Like an Economist45 Questions
Exam 2: Supply and Demand63 Questions
Exam 3: Rational Consumer Choice47 Questions
Exam 4: Individual and Market Demand60 Questions
Exam 5: Applications of Rational Choice and Demand Theories46 Questions
Exam 6: The Economics of Information and Choice Under Uncertainty45 Questions
Exam 7: Explaining Tastes: The Importance of Altruism and32 Questions
Exam 8: Cognitive Limitations and Consumer Behavior31 Questions
Exam 9: Production54 Questions
Exam 10: Costs66 Questions
Exam 11: Perfect Competition66 Questions
Exam 12: Monopoly61 Questions
Exam 13: Imperfect Competition: a Game-Theoretic Approach75 Questions
Exam 14: Labor51 Questions
Exam 15: Capital39 Questions
Exam 16: Externalities Property Rights and the Coase Theorem39 Questions
Exam 17: Explaining Tastes: The Importance of Altruism and39 Questions
Exam 18: General Equilibrium and Market Efficiency42 Questions
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Based on the present-aim standard a person who drinks gasoline and subsequently dies could be consider rational as long as:
Free
(Multiple Choice)
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Correct Answer:
B
For the sake of argument, assume that the rules of the game are defined in such a way that hawks (competitors) are denied the use of violence or force and that competition is conditioned by the rule of law.This might approximate a highly competitive capitalist society.If everyone is a hawk in this world, describe the conditions necessary for this society to have all hawks permanently.
Free
(Essay)
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Correct Answer:
If the payoff to hawks of two hawks paired together is greater than the payoff to doves when two doves work together, then the hawks will dominate permanently.This could happen in a society that constrained the destructive tendency of paired hawks.
The "self-interest theory" considers an act to be rational if
Free
(Multiple Choice)
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Correct Answer:
C
Suppose you and your friend have decided to go into a very lucrative joint venture together, which would make $5,000 for both of you.Nevertheless your friend, who does not need the money as much as you, say he will not cooperate with you unless he gets at least 90% of the earnings.It will be in your advantage not to capitulate to your friend's demands as long as:
(Multiple Choice)
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In evolutionary models, where each individual reproduces in proportion to its average payoff, if cooperators are perfectly distinguishable from defectors, then
(Multiple Choice)
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If the receiver in the "ultimate bargaining game" cares not just about his final wealth level but also about fairness,
(Multiple Choice)
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In the doves and hawks society there is a place for the doves because
(Multiple Choice)
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Suppose you have been assigned to complete a group project with one of your classmates.Each of you can choose to Shirk or Work.If one or more of you chooses to Work, the project is completed and provides each with extra credit valued at 4 payoff units each.The cost of completing the project is that 6 total units of effort (measured in payoff units) divided equally among all players who choose to Work and this is subtracted from their payoff.If both of you Shirk, then neither of you have to expend any effort but the project is not completed, giving each a payoff of 0.The teacher can only tell whether the project is completed and not which students contributed to it.What is the dominant strategy for you?
(Multiple Choice)
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Use the following to answer the next three questions:
C.The students with the best grades are the ones who stay on in school.From this information answer the following questions.
(Essay)
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If prisoners X and Y in the table shown could develop a credible commitment device, then we would expect
confess Prisoner X remain silent confess remain silent 10 years each 0 years for 30 years for 0 years for 30 years for 2 years for each
(Multiple Choice)
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Consider a population with the following givens: 1) 75% cooperators and 25% defectors,
2) a 8 unit payoff goes to cooperators who interact with another cooperator,
3) a zero unit payoff goes to a cooperator who interacts with a defector,
4) the cost of knowing which is which is 2.
If the population balance rises above 75%
(Multiple Choice)
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If the teacher allows the students to pick their team partners without a grade penalty, what will the population of the class eventually become? Draw a payoff graph again showing this outcome.
(Essay)
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Describe a situation where you have been a cooperator and explain how the commitment problem was solved.In other words, how did you know your partner would not cheat?
(Essay)
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The hawks and doves example illustrate in the textbook shows that an important property of evolution by natural selection is that traits are often favored by their effects:
(Multiple Choice)
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Assuming that there is a continuum numerical grading scale between all the letter grades, draw a payoff graph assuming that the groups are randomly chosen and indicate what the population of students in the class will eventually become.
(Essay)
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According to the textbook, the real difficulty with prisoners' dilemma is:
(Multiple Choice)
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In evolutionary models, where each individual reproduces in proportion to its average payoff, if cooperators and defectors look exactly alike, then
(Multiple Choice)
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In this chapter we are told that people's tastes not only can differ but must differ.This is because
(Multiple Choice)
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Describe a situation in which you were a defector.Did your partners know you were a defector or did you fool them?
(Essay)
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