Exam 15: Oligopoly and Game Theory

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One sign of the cartel power of the NBA is the use of salary caps.

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A firm receives the largest profit from cheating on a cartel agreement when:

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  Reference: Ref 15-4 (Table: Payoff Matrix) Refer to the table. What is Player 2's strategy in this game? Reference: Ref 15-4 (Table: Payoff Matrix) Refer to the table. What is Player 2's strategy in this game?

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Which of the following statements is TRUE?

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Prices in an oligopolistic market are likely to be:

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The prisoner's dilemma describes situations where the pursuit of:

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    Reference: Ref 15-3 (Table: Three-Country Oil Production) Refer to the table. Suppose that three countries are engaged in oil production. For simplicity, assume zero costs so that revenue equals profit. Assume that Country A cheats on the cartel agreement by producing 200 more barrels than the other two countries. What is the new market price when Country A cheats on the agreement?     Reference: Ref 15-3 (Table: Three-Country Oil Production) Refer to the table. Suppose that three countries are engaged in oil production. For simplicity, assume zero costs so that revenue equals profit. Assume that Country A cheats on the cartel agreement by producing 200 more barrels than the other two countries. What is the new market price when Country A cheats on the agreement? Reference: Ref 15-3 (Table: Three-Country Oil Production) Refer to the table. Suppose that three countries are engaged in oil production. For simplicity, assume zero costs so that revenue equals profit. Assume that Country A cheats on the cartel agreement by producing 200 more barrels than the other two countries. What is the new market price when Country A cheats on the agreement?

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Cartels tend to collapse and lose their power for three reasons. List these reasons and briefly explain why each of them causes cartels to collapse.

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One way a cartel gets its power is by controlling a natural resource that is found in large quantities in a few places.

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  Reference: Ref 15-3 (Table: Three-Country Oil Production) Refer to the table. Suppose that three countries are engaged in oil production. For simplicity, assume zero costs so that revenue equals profit. Assume that Country A cheats on the cartel agreement by producing 200 more barrels than the other two countries. What is the resultant profit earned by Country A? Reference: Ref 15-3 (Table: Three-Country Oil Production) Refer to the table. Suppose that three countries are engaged in oil production. For simplicity, assume zero costs so that revenue equals profit. Assume that Country A cheats on the cartel agreement by producing 200 more barrels than the other two countries. What is the resultant profit earned by Country A?

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Figure: Competitive Market Figure: Competitive Market   Reference: Ref 15-1 (Figure: Competitive Market) Refer to the figure. If all firms in the market form a successful cartel, price and output in the market would be: Reference: Ref 15-1 (Figure: Competitive Market) Refer to the figure. If all firms in the market form a successful cartel, price and output in the market would be:

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  Reference: Ref 15-7 (Table: Oil Output) Refer to the table. The equilibrium outcome is: Reference: Ref 15-7 (Table: Oil Output) Refer to the table. The equilibrium outcome is:

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The more successful a cartel is in raising the profits of the firms in the cartel, the:

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The more firms there are in an oligopolistic market, the closer prices will be to monopoly levels.

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  Reference: Ref 15-3 (Table: Three-Country Oil Production) Refer to the table. Suppose that three countries are engaged in oil production. For simplicity, assume zero costs so that revenue equals profit. Assume that Country A cheats on the cartel agreement by producing 200 more barrels than the other two countries. What is the resultant profit earned by each of the other two countries? Reference: Ref 15-3 (Table: Three-Country Oil Production) Refer to the table. Suppose that three countries are engaged in oil production. For simplicity, assume zero costs so that revenue equals profit. Assume that Country A cheats on the cartel agreement by producing 200 more barrels than the other two countries. What is the resultant profit earned by each of the other two countries?

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A dominant strategy is a strategy that has a higher payoff than any other strategy no matter what the other player does.

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  Reference: Ref 15-7 (Table: Oil Output) Refer to the table. The situation between Iraq and Iran is similar to a: Reference: Ref 15-7 (Table: Oil Output) Refer to the table. The situation between Iraq and Iran is similar to a:

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The copper cartel (the International Council of Copper Exporting Countries) has been very successful.

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(Table: Market Outcomes) Refer to the table. Suppose two firms create a cartel that attempts to mimic the monopoly profit outcome. Assume zero costs and answer the following questions. (Table: Market Outcomes) Refer to the table. Suppose two firms create a cartel that attempts to mimic the monopoly profit outcome. Assume zero costs and answer the following questions.     a. What quantity would each firm produce if together they were to achieve the monopoly market outcome? What would each producer's profit be? b. Is there any incentive for either of the producers to cheat and increase production by 200 units? c. If one of the producers cheats by increasing quantity by 200 units, will the other producer also retaliate and increase quantity? d. How far will market quantity increase if cheating ensues? (Table: Market Outcomes) Refer to the table. Suppose two firms create a cartel that attempts to mimic the monopoly profit outcome. Assume zero costs and answer the following questions.     a. What quantity would each firm produce if together they were to achieve the monopoly market outcome? What would each producer's profit be? b. Is there any incentive for either of the producers to cheat and increase production by 200 units? c. If one of the producers cheats by increasing quantity by 200 units, will the other producer also retaliate and increase quantity? d. How far will market quantity increase if cheating ensues? a. What quantity would each firm produce if together they were to achieve the monopoly market outcome? What would each producer's profit be? b. Is there any incentive for either of the producers to cheat and increase production by 200 units? c. If one of the producers cheats by increasing quantity by 200 units, will the other producer also retaliate and increase quantity? d. How far will market quantity increase if cheating ensues?

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  Reference: Ref 15-7 (Table: Oil Output) Refer to the table. If both countries abide by the cartel agreement (i.e., not cheat): Reference: Ref 15-7 (Table: Oil Output) Refer to the table. If both countries abide by the cartel agreement (i.e., not cheat):

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