Question 1

How can institutions be used to overcome the Prisoner's Dilemma?

Accepted Answer

Institutions can be used to overcome the

Question 2

Institutions facilitate cooperation by doing all of the following EXCEPT:

Accepted Answer

A) forcing actors to collaborate. 
B) setting standards of behavior. 
C) verifying compliance. 
D) reducing costs of joint decision making. 
E) resolving disputes. 
A) forcing actors to collaborate. 
B) setting standards of behavior. 
C) verifying compliance. 
D) reducing costs of joint decision making. 
E) resolving disputes.

Question 3

In 2003,why did Saddam Hussein keep it a secret that Iraq had destroyed its weapons of mass destruction?

Accepted Answer

A) Saddam Hussein thought Iran might attack if the Iranians knew he did not have any weapons of mass destruction. 
B) Saddam Hussein thought that the United States would be deterred from invading if it thought Iraq still had weapons of mass destruction. 
C) Saddam Hussein had been lied to by Iraqi scientists and thought that Iraq really did have weapons of mass destruction. 
D) Saddam Hussein thought that Russia would approve of an invasion if it knew Iraq did not have weapons of mass destruction. 
E) Saddam Hussein thought that inspectors from the United Nations would be able to find out for themselves that Iraq did not have weapons of mass destruction. 
A) Saddam Hussein thought Iran might attack if the Iranians knew he did not have any weapons of mass destruction. 
B) Saddam Hussein thought that the United States would be deterred from invading if it thought Iraq still had weapons of mass destruction. 
C) Saddam Hussein had been lied to by Iraqi scientists and thought that Iraq really did have weapons of mass destruction. 
D) Saddam Hussein thought that Russia would approve of an invasion if it knew Iraq did not have weapons of mass destruction. 
E) Saddam Hussein thought that inspectors from the United Nations would be able to find out for themselves that Iraq did not have weapons of mass destruction.

Question 4

If the United Nations Security Council decides not to intervene to stop genocide,the reversion outcome would be:

Accepted Answer

A) the Security Council members would return for more negotiations. 
B) the genocide would be ended. 
C) the genocide would continue. 
D) economic sanctions would automatically be enacted. 
E) a 30-day cooling-off period would begin. 
A) the Security Council members would return for more negotiations. 
B) the genocide would be ended. 
C) the genocide would continue. 
D) economic sanctions would automatically be enacted. 
E) a 30-day cooling-off period would begin.

Question 5

Why is enforcement by institutions actually "self-enforcement"?

Accepted Answer

A) Institutions can force their own members to comply with their agreements without outside help. 
B) There is no central international authority capable of forcing actors to cooperate. 
C) To force members to cooperate,actors pay dues to their institutions to create their own enforcement agency. 
D) Each institution is defined as a sovereign entity or "self." 
E) Conflicts are resolved by a rotating panel of members who punish those who violate the rules. 
A) Institutions can force their own members to comply with their agreements without outside help. 
B) There is no central international authority capable of forcing actors to cooperate. 
C) To force members to cooperate,actors pay dues to their institutions to create their own enforcement agency. 
D) Each institution is defined as a sovereign entity or "self." 
E) Conflicts are resolved by a rotating panel of members who punish those who violate the rules.

Question 6

Why would the leader of a state want to invite outside monitors during an election?

Accepted Answer

The leader of a state might want to invi

Question 7

What is true about national elections prior to 1962?

Accepted Answer

A) More people turned out for elections than after 1962. 
B) Elections were rarely or never monitored. 
C) There were more elections held internationally. 
D) Most elections were monitored by other states. 
E) Some elections were monitored by other states. 
A) More people turned out for elections than after 1962. 
B) Elections were rarely or never monitored. 
C) There were more elections held internationally. 
D) Most elections were monitored by other states. 
E) Some elections were monitored by other states.

Question 8

What kind of problem does the Prisoner's Dilemma story illustrate?

Accepted Answer

A) Coordination. 
B) Linkage. 
C) Coercion. 
D) Collaboration. 
E) Zero-sum. 
A) Coordination. 
B) Linkage. 
C) Coercion. 
D) Collaboration. 
E) Zero-sum.

Question 9

For the game below,what is the equilibrium (or equilibria)for A1 and A2?

Accepted Answer

A) C,C. 
B) C,D. 
C) D,C. 
D) D,D. 
E) C,C and D,D. 
A) C,C. 
B) C,D. 
C) D,C. 
D) D,D. 
E) C,C and D,D.

Question 10

Which of the following is an example of a game of Chicken?

Accepted Answer

A) A trade agreement in which each side wants more concessions from the other country. 
B) A nuclear crisis in which each side wants to take a tough stance. 
C) A peacekeeping mission for which countries are reluctant to send their troops. 
D) A conference in which countries negotiate over setting international standards for encoding CDs. 
E) An invasion of a small country by a large coalition of countries that did not want to attack alone. 
A) A trade agreement in which each side wants more concessions from the other country. 
B) A nuclear crisis in which each side wants to take a tough stance. 
C) A peacekeeping mission for which countries are reluctant to send their troops. 
D) A conference in which countries negotiate over setting international standards for encoding CDs. 
E) An invasion of a small country by a large coalition of countries that did not want to attack alone.

Question 11

What does line segment qb represent?

Accepted Answer

A) Possible improvements for actor A that do not affect the welfare of B. 
B) Possible improvements for actor B that do not affect the welfare of A. 
C) The set of all possible improvements for actors A and B. 
D) The zone in which neither actor would agree to a bargain. 
E) The zone of potential losses for both actors. 
A) Possible improvements for actor A that do not affect the welfare of B. 
B) Possible improvements for actor B that do not affect the welfare of A. 
C) The set of all possible improvements for actors A and B. 
D) The zone in which neither actor would agree to a bargain. 
E) The zone of potential losses for both actors.

Question 12

Below is an example of which game?

Accepted Answer

A) Chicken. 
B) The Prisoner's Dilemma. 
C) Stag Hunt. 
D) Coordination. 
E) Cooperation. 
A) Chicken. 
B) The Prisoner's Dilemma. 
C) Stag Hunt. 
D) Coordination. 
E) Cooperation.

Question 13

Even though currently powerful countries like Germany,Brazil,and Japan would like a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council,they have not started their own competing international organization but have kept their protests within the United Nations' system.This is best an example of what?

Accepted Answer

A) Often it is cheaper and easier to use existing institutions even if they do not exactly match an actor's preferences. 
B) Institutions with self-enforcement are more likely to last. 
C) Institutions are created to reflect the biases of those who have the most power at that time. 
D) Institutions lower the costs of joint decision making by providing a forum for actors to have repeated interactions. 
E) Institutions are most effective when they serve multiple roles,such as assisting in verifying compliance and reducing costs of joint decision making. 
A) Often it is cheaper and easier to use existing institutions even if they do not exactly match an actor's preferences. 
B) Institutions with self-enforcement are more likely to last. 
C) Institutions are created to reflect the biases of those who have the most power at that time. 
D) Institutions lower the costs of joint decision making by providing a forum for actors to have repeated interactions. 
E) Institutions are most effective when they serve multiple roles,such as assisting in verifying compliance and reducing costs of joint decision making.

Question 14

Two actors facing a coordination problem are:

Accepted Answer

A) unlikely to find a mutually acceptable solution to the problem. 
B) likely to find a mutually acceptable solution only if one actor has more power than the other. 
C) likely to find an acceptable solution that is much more beneficial for one actor than for the other. 
D) likely to find a mutually acceptable solution that is difficult to enforce. 
E) likely to find a mutually acceptable solution that requires little enforcement. 
A) unlikely to find a mutually acceptable solution to the problem. 
B) likely to find a mutually acceptable solution only if one actor has more power than the other. 
C) likely to find an acceptable solution that is much more beneficial for one actor than for the other. 
D) likely to find a mutually acceptable solution that is difficult to enforce. 
E) likely to find a mutually acceptable solution that requires little enforcement.

Question 15

If not resolved,all of the following can hinder cooperation EXCEPT:

Accepted Answer

A) incentives to defect. 
B) large numbers of actors. 
C) nonrepeated interactions. 
D) coalition building. 
E) imperfect information. 
A) incentives to defect. 
B) large numbers of actors. 
C) nonrepeated interactions. 
D) coalition building. 
E) imperfect information.

Question 16

Why are countries more likely to cooperate when there is iteration?

Accepted Answer

A) Countries are better able to threaten reciprocal punishment and cooperation in the future. 
B) Countries that are closer together are also more likely to cooperate. 
C) Countries are more likely to comply with treaties when their commitments are clearly specified. 
D) Countries are more likely to cooperate when no country is more powerful than the other. 
E) Multiple interactions make the threat of force less credible. 
A) Countries are better able to threaten reciprocal punishment and cooperation in the future. 
B) Countries that are closer together are also more likely to cooperate. 
C) Countries are more likely to comply with treaties when their commitments are clearly specified. 
D) Countries are more likely to cooperate when no country is more powerful than the other. 
E) Multiple interactions make the threat of force less credible.

Question 17

A state wanting to promote democracy in developing countries would be pursuing which kind of goal?

Accepted Answer

A) Power. 
B) Security. 
C) Ideological. 
D) Economic gain. 
E) Material welfare. 
A) Power. 
B) Security. 
C) Ideological. 
D) Economic gain. 
E) Material welfare.

Question 18

For the game below,what is the equilibrium (or equilibria)for A1 and A2?

Accepted Answer

A) C,C. 
B) C,D. 
C) C,C and D,D. 
D) C,D and D,C. 
E) C,C;D,D;and C,D. 
A) C,C. 
B) C,D. 
C) C,C and D,D. 
D) C,D and D,C. 
E) C,C;D,D;and C,D.

Question 19

Which of the following is an example of cooperation?

Accepted Answer

A) A group of friends each contributing money to throw a party. 
B) A single corporation lobbying Congress for trade protection from foreign imports. 
C) A country cutting back on its emission of greenhouse gases. 
D) Media companies dividing up the limited radio spectrum among themselves. 
E) Two water districts agreeing that each should get half of a local river's water. 
A) A group of friends each contributing money to throw a party. 
B) A single corporation lobbying Congress for trade protection from foreign imports. 
C) A country cutting back on its emission of greenhouse gases. 
D) Media companies dividing up the limited radio spectrum among themselves. 
E) Two water districts agreeing that each should get half of a local river's water.

Question 20

Cooperation is a type of:

Accepted Answer

A) institution that makes agreements easier for two actors. 
B) institution that sets the rules for interactions between actors. 
C) interaction in which one actor will receive more and the other actor less of the desired outcome. 
D) interaction involving two or more actors working together to achieve some outcome they prefer. 
E) interaction in which at least one party prefers the status quo. 
A) institution that makes agreements easier for two actors. 
B) institution that sets the rules for interactions between actors. 
C) interaction in which one actor will receive more and the other actor less of the desired outcome. 
D) interaction involving two or more actors working together to achieve some outcome they prefer. 
E) interaction in which at least one party prefers the status quo.

How can institutions be used to overcome the Prisoner's Dilemma?

Institutions facilitate cooperation by doing all of the following EXCEPT:

In 2003,why did Saddam Hussein keep it a secret that Iraq had destroyed its weapons of mass destruction?

If the United Nations Security Council decides not to intervene to stop genocide,the reversion outcome would be:

Why is enforcement by institutions actually "self-enforcement"?

Why would the leader of a state want to invite outside monitors during an election?

What is true about national elections prior to 1962?

What kind of problem does the Prisoner's Dilemma story illustrate?

For the game below,what is the equilibrium (or equilibria)for A1 and A2?

Which of the following is an example of a game of Chicken?

What does line segment qb represent?

Below is an example of which game?

Two actors facing a coordination problem are:

If not resolved,all of the following can hinder cooperation EXCEPT:

Why are countries more likely to cooperate when there is iteration?

A state wanting to promote democracy in developing countries would be pursuing which kind of goal?

For the game below,what is the equilibrium (or equilibria)for A1 and A2?

Which of the following is an example of cooperation?

Cooperation is a type of:

Introduction

What Shaped Our World

Why Are There Wars

Domestic Politics and War

International Institutions and War

Violence by Nonstate Actors: Civil War and Terrorism

International Trade

International Financial Relations

International Monetary Relations

Development: Causes of the Wealth and Poverty of Nations

International Law and Norms

Human Rights

The Global Environment

The Future of International Politics

Foundations, war, and Peace

International Political Economy, transnational Politics, and Looking Ahead

Filters

Exam 3: Understanding Interests, interactions, and Institutions

How can institutions be used to overcome the Prisoner's Dilemma?

Institutions facilitate cooperation by doing all of the following EXCEPT:

In 2003,why did Saddam Hussein keep it a secret that Iraq had destroyed its weapons of mass destruction?

If the United Nations Security Council decides not to intervene to stop genocide,the reversion outcome would be:

Why is enforcement by institutions actually "self-enforcement"?

Why would the leader of a state want to invite outside monitors during an election?

What is true about national elections prior to 1962?

What kind of problem does the Prisoner's Dilemma story illustrate?

For the game below,what is the equilibrium (or equilibria)for A1 and A2?

Which of the following is an example of a game of Chicken?

What does line segment qb represent?

Below is an example of which game?

Two actors facing a coordination problem are:

If not resolved,all of the following can hinder cooperation EXCEPT:

Why are countries more likely to cooperate when there is iteration?

A state wanting to promote democracy in developing countries would be pursuing which kind of goal?

For the game below,what is the equilibrium (or equilibria)for A1 and A2?

Which of the following is an example of cooperation?

Cooperation is a type of:

Introduction

What Shaped Our World

Why Are There Wars

Domestic Politics and War

International Institutions and War

Violence by Nonstate Actors: Civil War and Terrorism

International Trade

International Financial Relations

International Monetary Relations

Development: Causes of the Wealth and Poverty of Nations

International Law and Norms

Human Rights

The Global Environment

The Future of International Politics

Foundations, war, and Peace

International Political Economy, transnational Politics, and Looking Ahead

Filters