Exam 11: Game Theory and the Tools of Strategic Business Analysis
Exam 1: Economics and Institutions: a Shift of Emphasis40 Questions
Exam 2: Consumers and Their Preferences40 Questions
Exam 3: Utilities Indifference Curves40 Questions
Exam 4: Demand and Behavior in Markets40 Questions
Exam 5: Some Applications of Consumer Demand, and Welfare Analysis40 Questions
Exam 6: Uncertainty and the Emergence of Insurance40 Questions
Exam 7: Uncertainty Applications and Criticisms40 Questions
Exam 8: The Discovery of Production and Its Technology40 Questions
Exam 9: Cost and Choice39 Questions
Exam 10: Cost Curves40 Questions
Exam 11: Game Theory and the Tools of Strategic Business Analysis39 Questions
Exam 12: Decision Making Over Time39 Questions
Exam 13: The Internal Organization of the Firm39 Questions
Exam 14: Perfectly Competitive Markets: Short-Run Analysis40 Questions
Exam 15: Competitive Markets in the Long Run40 Questions
Exam 16: Market Institutions and Auctions40 Questions
Exam 17: The Age of Entrepreneurship: Monopoly40 Questions
Exam 18: Natural Monopoly and the Economics of Regulation40 Questions
Exam 19: The World of Oligopoly: Preliminaries to Successful Entry39 Questions
Exam 20: Market Entry and the Emergence of Perfect Competition40 Questions
Exam 21: The Problem of Exchange40 Questions
Exam 22: General Equilibrium and the Origins of the Free Market and Interventionist Ideologies40 Questions
Exam 23: Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection: Informational Market Failures40 Questions
Exam 24: Externalities: the Free Market Interventionist Battle Continues40 Questions
Exam 25: Public Goods, the Consequences of Strategic Voting Behavior, and the Role of Government40 Questions
Exam 26: Input Markets and the Origins of Class Conflict40 Questions
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A refinement concept places a set of extra constraints on a Nash equilibrium in order to select among multiple equilibria if they exist or to simply make the equilibrium more plausible.
(True/False)
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A two-person game in which player 1 divides an amount of money between the two players and the opponent either accepts or rejects the proposal is called a(n)
(Multiple Choice)
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If one player in a game uses a mixed strategy that leaves the other player with a unique pure strategy best response, a mixed strategy equilibrium ___________ exist.
(Multiple Choice)
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To produce Nash equilibria in mixed strategy games, we must expand the definition of a strategy to include not only the choice of an action, but also the
(Multiple Choice)
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Strategies that define probability mixtures over all or some of the pure strategies in the game are called
(Multiple Choice)
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Whenever a game arrives at a unique outcome using the strong or weak version of the iterative elimination of dominated strategies, we call the game
(Multiple Choice)
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A 2 × 2 matrix game in which each player has a dominant strategy determining an equilibrium that is Pareto dominated is called the
(Multiple Choice)
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A threat that, if the game ever progresses to the point where the threat is supposed to be carried out will, in fact, be acted on is known as a(n)
(Multiple Choice)
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If strategy 1 weakly dominates strategy 2, which of the following must be true?
(Multiple Choice)
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The professor says to the student, "I have already told you ten times today not to text message during class. If I catch you doing it again, I will ask you to leave the classroom." In game theory terms, how would you describe the professor's statement?
(Essay)
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A visual depiction of an extensive form game that presents the rules and payoff contingencies of the game is called a game
(Multiple Choice)
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A game in which, when any player reaches a decision point, the player does not know all the choices of the other players who preceded is called a game of
(Multiple Choice)
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A dominant strategy is ______________ for a player no matter what the opposing players do.
(Multiple Choice)
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A complete plan of action for the player that tells us what choice the player should make at any node of the game tree or in any situation that might arise during the play of the game is known as
(Multiple Choice)
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Backward induction is a description of a game of strategy that provides a detailed description of the rules of the game.
(True/False)
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The equilibrium in a game in which all players use their dominant strategies is known as a
(Multiple Choice)
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The expected __________ of a strategy is the probability-weighted __________ the player can expect to receive.
(Multiple Choice)
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Exhibit 11-1
Player 2 Laft Right Tap +1,-1 -1,+1 Player 1 Battam -1,+1 +1,-1
-Refer to Exhibit 11-1. This game is shown in
(Multiple Choice)
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