Exam 23: Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection: Informational Market Failures

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If insurance companies cannot distinguish between the safe people and the risky people in a population because of a lack of information, the companies must charge everyone the same average premium.

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Explain why we cannot trust that all car repair experts are both competent and honest.

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If an insurance company must charge all customers a uniform rate that reflects the average cost of insuring any individual in the population, this average cost will be too _______ to attract _______ risks but too _______ to fully cover the losses produced by the _______ risks.

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An equilibrium to a game of incomplete information where players of different types take identical actions so that others are not able to learn their types from observing the actions they take is called a pooling equilibrium.

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A restaurant pays each waiter a salary and allows no tipping. The opportunity wage of good waiters (wg) is greater than the opportunity wage of bad waiters (wb). If the restaurant sets its salary equal to or greater than wg, it will attract

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When an insurance company cannot observe the characteristics of potential clients and offers a contract that is accepted by bad risks, the company suffers from

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A lack of information about the riskiness of potential customers forces insurance companies to sell insurance on the assumption that they will face the average number of accidents for the population.

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Asymmetric information causes _______________ for car repair experts.

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Assume that an insurance company lacks information about which potential customers fall into the safe group and which fall into the risky group. When an individual wants to purchase insurance, the company will assume that the potential customer is the

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A restaurant pays each waiter a salary and allows no tipping. The opportunity wage of good waiters (wg) is greater than the opportunity wage of bad waiters (wb). If the restaurant sets its salary between wb and wg , then it will attract only bad waiters.

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A restaurant pays each waiter a salary and allows no tipping. The opportunity wage of good waiters (wg) is greater than the opportunity wage of bad waiters (wb). If the restaurant sets its salary below wb, it will attract

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Adverse selection occurs in situations where one economic agent can observe the characteristics of another.

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There could be a car repair equilibrium in which all experts are both competent and honest.

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A market solution to adverse selection is

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In a pooling equilibrium in which all potential customers attend safety school, the insurance company will charge

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Compared to safe people, risky people are __________ willing to buy insurance.

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The car repair market can always have an equilibrium in which all experts are

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Car owners will continue to seek information about possible repairs until the marginal cost of obtaining one more opinion _________________ the expected marginal benefit from the information contained in that opinion.

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An insurance company ______________________ whether its potential clients are safe or risky.

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By allowing tipping, a restaurant can solve adverse selection in employing waiters by creating a

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