Exam 23: Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection: Informational Market Failures
Exam 1: Economics and Institutions: a Shift of Emphasis40 Questions
Exam 2: Consumers and Their Preferences40 Questions
Exam 3: Utilities Indifference Curves40 Questions
Exam 4: Demand and Behavior in Markets40 Questions
Exam 5: Some Applications of Consumer Demand, and Welfare Analysis40 Questions
Exam 6: Uncertainty and the Emergence of Insurance40 Questions
Exam 7: Uncertainty Applications and Criticisms40 Questions
Exam 8: The Discovery of Production and Its Technology40 Questions
Exam 9: Cost and Choice39 Questions
Exam 10: Cost Curves40 Questions
Exam 11: Game Theory and the Tools of Strategic Business Analysis39 Questions
Exam 12: Decision Making Over Time39 Questions
Exam 13: The Internal Organization of the Firm39 Questions
Exam 14: Perfectly Competitive Markets: Short-Run Analysis40 Questions
Exam 15: Competitive Markets in the Long Run40 Questions
Exam 16: Market Institutions and Auctions40 Questions
Exam 17: The Age of Entrepreneurship: Monopoly40 Questions
Exam 18: Natural Monopoly and the Economics of Regulation40 Questions
Exam 19: The World of Oligopoly: Preliminaries to Successful Entry39 Questions
Exam 20: Market Entry and the Emergence of Perfect Competition40 Questions
Exam 21: The Problem of Exchange40 Questions
Exam 22: General Equilibrium and the Origins of the Free Market and Interventionist Ideologies40 Questions
Exam 23: Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection: Informational Market Failures40 Questions
Exam 24: Externalities: the Free Market Interventionist Battle Continues40 Questions
Exam 25: Public Goods, the Consequences of Strategic Voting Behavior, and the Role of Government40 Questions
Exam 26: Input Markets and the Origins of Class Conflict40 Questions
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If insurance companies cannot distinguish between the safe people and the risky people in a population because of a lack of information, the companies must charge everyone the same average premium.
(True/False)
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Explain why we cannot trust that all car repair experts are both competent and honest.
(Essay)
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If an insurance company must charge all customers a uniform rate that reflects the average cost of insuring any individual in the population, this average cost will be too _______ to attract _______ risks but too _______ to fully cover the losses produced by the _______ risks.
(Multiple Choice)
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An equilibrium to a game of incomplete information where players of different types take identical actions so that others are not able to learn their types from observing the actions they take is called a pooling equilibrium.
(True/False)
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A restaurant pays each waiter a salary and allows no tipping. The opportunity wage of good waiters (wg) is greater than the opportunity wage of bad waiters (wb). If the restaurant sets its salary equal to or greater than wg, it will attract
(Multiple Choice)
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When an insurance company cannot observe the characteristics of potential clients and offers a contract that is accepted by bad risks, the company suffers from
(Multiple Choice)
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A lack of information about the riskiness of potential customers forces insurance companies to sell insurance on the assumption that they will face the average number of accidents for the population.
(True/False)
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Asymmetric information causes _______________ for car repair experts.
(Multiple Choice)
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Assume that an insurance company lacks information about which potential customers fall into the safe group and which fall into the risky group. When an individual wants to purchase insurance, the company will assume that the potential customer is the
(Multiple Choice)
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A restaurant pays each waiter a salary and allows no tipping. The opportunity wage of good waiters (wg) is greater than the opportunity wage of bad waiters (wb). If the restaurant sets its salary between wb and wg , then it will attract only bad waiters.
(True/False)
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A restaurant pays each waiter a salary and allows no tipping. The opportunity wage of good waiters (wg) is greater than the opportunity wage of bad waiters (wb). If the restaurant sets its salary below wb, it will attract
(Multiple Choice)
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Adverse selection occurs in situations where one economic agent can observe the characteristics of another.
(True/False)
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There could be a car repair equilibrium in which all experts are both competent and honest.
(True/False)
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In a pooling equilibrium in which all potential customers attend safety school, the insurance company will charge
(Multiple Choice)
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Compared to safe people, risky people are __________ willing to buy insurance.
(Multiple Choice)
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The car repair market can always have an equilibrium in which all experts are
(Multiple Choice)
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Car owners will continue to seek information about possible repairs until the marginal cost of obtaining one more opinion _________________ the expected marginal benefit from the information contained in that opinion.
(Multiple Choice)
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An insurance company ______________________ whether its potential clients are safe or risky.
(Multiple Choice)
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By allowing tipping, a restaurant can solve adverse selection in employing waiters by creating a
(Multiple Choice)
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