Question 1

Which is true of World War I?

Accepted Answer

A) Leaders expected the war to be the longest in history. 
B) Leaders thought the war would be an average length and prepared for it. 
C) Leaders expected the war to be short. 
D) Leaders had fairly realistic expectations for the war. 
A) Leaders expected the war to be the longest in history. 
B) Leaders thought the war would be an average length and prepared for it. 
C) Leaders expected the war to be short. 
D) Leaders had fairly realistic expectations for the war.

Question 2

Why is bargaining over future power especially difficult in international relations?

Accepted Answer

A) States cannot anticipate how much power they may gain in the future. 
B) States have secret sources of power that cannot be observed. 
C) It is impossible to verify whether a state is abiding by such an agreement. 
D) A state cannot make a credible commitment to not use increased power to make further demands. 
A) States cannot anticipate how much power they may gain in the future. 
B) States have secret sources of power that cannot be observed. 
C) It is impossible to verify whether a state is abiding by such an agreement. 
D) A state cannot make a credible commitment to not use increased power to make further demands.

Question 3

A state's resolve is determined by:

Accepted Answer

A) the amount of resources it is willing to devote to its war effort. 
B) whether it wins in the end. 
C) the superiority of its armaments. 
D) the quality of its military leadership. 
A) the amount of resources it is willing to devote to its war effort. 
B) whether it wins in the end. 
C) the superiority of its armaments. 
D) the quality of its military leadership.

Question 4

Why do states use brinksmanship?

Accepted Answer

A) States can signal a high level of resolve by making a threat that appears likely to trigger extraordinary costs. 
B) States can make significant threats but know they will always be able to hold back from starting a war. 
C) States know that there is no real possibility of a crisis escalating into a devastating nuclear war. 
D) A state can pretend to be taking a tough stand to please domestic groups while secretly negotiating a peaceful settlement with other states. 
A) States can signal a high level of resolve by making a threat that appears likely to trigger extraordinary costs. 
B) States can make significant threats but know they will always be able to hold back from starting a war. 
C) States know that there is no real possibility of a crisis escalating into a devastating nuclear war. 
D) A state can pretend to be taking a tough stand to please domestic groups while secretly negotiating a peaceful settlement with other states.

Question 5

Why is war a relatively rare occurrence?

Accepted Answer

Given the relatively

Question 6

Why might the city of Jerusalem be considered an indivisible good?

Accepted Answer

A) Israelis and Palestinians both claim the city as their capital. 
B) The good concerned is territory,which is difficult to divide. 
C) Neither side wants to give up any territory. 
D) Jerusalem doesn't hold enough value to be divided and still be considered a good. 
A) Israelis and Palestinians both claim the city as their capital. 
B) The good concerned is territory,which is difficult to divide. 
C) Neither side wants to give up any territory. 
D) Jerusalem doesn't hold enough value to be divided and still be considered a good.

Question 7

How can we make war less likely? In your answer,make sure to include a discussion of the costs of war,the credibility of commitments,and the divisibility of goods.

Accepted Answer

War can be made less likely by helping s

Question 8

Which of the following statements about compellence is true?

Accepted Answer

A) Compellence is an effort to preserve the status quo by threatening to use force. 
B) Compellence is an effort to force other actors to accept international mediation. 
C) Compellence is an effort to change the status quo by threatening to use force. 
D) Compellence is the effort to force other actors to fulfill their alliance obligations. 
A) Compellence is an effort to preserve the status quo by threatening to use force. 
B) Compellence is an effort to force other actors to accept international mediation. 
C) Compellence is an effort to change the status quo by threatening to use force. 
D) Compellence is the effort to force other actors to fulfill their alliance obligations.

Question 9

Why might states decide not to go to war over a disputed good?

Accepted Answer

A) The opposing side also has a legitimate claim. 
B) The costs of war are higher than the expected benefits from war. 
C) States always prefer to strike a deal rather than fight wars. 
D) To be unpredictable. 
A) The opposing side also has a legitimate claim. 
B) The costs of war are higher than the expected benefits from war. 
C) States always prefer to strike a deal rather than fight wars. 
D) To be unpredictable.

Question 10

Why have there been fewer conflicts over territory since the end of World War II?

Accepted Answer

States generally have less interest in p

Question 11

Which of the following is the most common reason states have historically gone to war?

Accepted Answer

A) Two states claim the same territory. 
B) A state resents another state's high tariffs on its imports. 
C) The populations of two states are composed of two conflicting ethnic groups. 
D) A state thinks another state is cheating on an arms-reduction agreement. 
A) Two states claim the same territory. 
B) A state resents another state's high tariffs on its imports. 
C) The populations of two states are composed of two conflicting ethnic groups. 
D) A state thinks another state is cheating on an arms-reduction agreement.

Question 12

What do states hope to achieve by engaging in coercive diplomacy?

Accepted Answer

A) To make an adversary reveal information about their preferences 
B) To force concessions by threatening to use force if no agreement is reached 
C) To make their threats appear credible 
D) To alter an opponent's ideal point 
A) To make an adversary reveal information about their preferences 
B) To force concessions by threatening to use force if no agreement is reached 
C) To make their threats appear credible 
D) To alter an opponent's ideal point

Question 13

Why do states often go to war even when there is usually some division of a good that exists that is more preferable than war?

Accepted Answer

Bargaining problems-including

Question 14

What is a preventive war?

Accepted Answer

A) A war launched to prevent human rights abuses in another state 
B) A war begun by a state to prevent an adversary from becoming a stronger threat in the future 
C) A war launched by a state that fears an adversary is about to attack 
D) A war authorized by an international organization to eliminate aggressive states that could threaten world peace 
A) A war launched to prevent human rights abuses in another state 
B) A war begun by a state to prevent an adversary from becoming a stronger threat in the future 
C) A war launched by a state that fears an adversary is about to attack 
D) A war authorized by an international organization to eliminate aggressive states that could threaten world peace

Question 15

Which of the following problems make states more likely to go to war?

Accepted Answer

A) Problems arising from conflicts over goods that are easily split between two states 
B) Problems arising from the difficulty of committing to honor a deal 
C) Problems arising from international organizations forcing states to comply with an agreement 
D) Problems arising from states with dissimilar amounts of power 
A) Problems arising from conflicts over goods that are easily split between two states 
B) Problems arising from the difficulty of committing to honor a deal 
C) Problems arising from international organizations forcing states to comply with an agreement 
D) Problems arising from states with dissimilar amounts of power

Question 16

Why do states fight wars?

Accepted Answer

A) Most states are inherently aggressive. 
B) They value something more than the cost of war and cannot come to an agreement. 
C) They have too much information about other states and realize they could win. 
D) They disagree over the rules of war. 
A) Most states are inherently aggressive. 
B) They value something more than the cost of war and cannot come to an agreement. 
C) They have too much information about other states and realize they could win. 
D) They disagree over the rules of war.

Question 17

Which of the following accurately describes a security dilemma?

Accepted Answer

A) American efforts to topple the communist regime in North Korea 
B) North Korea pursuing nuclear weapons in response to U.S.troops stationed in South Korea 
C) A weak state's inability to protect itself from stronger states 
D) Israel's threat to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons 
A) American efforts to topple the communist regime in North Korea 
B) North Korea pursuing nuclear weapons in response to U.S.troops stationed in South Korea 
C) A weak state's inability to protect itself from stronger states 
D) Israel's threat to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons

Question 18

A state covets a piece of territory that is valued at $100 million,yet it costs the state $40 million to attain it through war.How much must its adversary need to offer to make a peaceful settlement preferable to war?

Accepted Answer

A) At least $60 million 
B) More than $100 million 
C) At least $40 million 
D) Exactly $100 million 
A) At least $60 million 
B) More than $100 million 
C) At least $40 million 
D) Exactly $100 million

Question 19

Why is it difficult to make a threat of attack seem credible to an opponent?

Accepted Answer

A) States are rarely capable of actually attacking other countries. 
B) An opponent can often tell when the threatening state is bluffing. 
C) Opponents have access to enough information about the other state to discredit its threats. 
D) The threat of such a war can seem too costly to be a reasonable option. 
A) States are rarely capable of actually attacking other countries. 
B) An opponent can often tell when the threatening state is bluffing. 
C) Opponents have access to enough information about the other state to discredit its threats. 
D) The threat of such a war can seem too costly to be a reasonable option.

Question 20

How is extended deterrence different from general deterrence?

Accepted Answer

A) Extended deterrence continues for a long time. 
B) Extended deterrence applies to a large amount of territory. 
C) Extended deterrence applies to a state's allies rather than the state itself. 
D) Extended deterrence applies to a country's economic,political,and military infrastructure. 
A) Extended deterrence continues for a long time. 
B) Extended deterrence applies to a large amount of territory. 
C) Extended deterrence applies to a state's allies rather than the state itself. 
D) Extended deterrence applies to a country's economic,political,and military infrastructure.

Which is true of World War I?

Why is bargaining over future power especially difficult in international relations?

A state's resolve is determined by:

Why do states use brinksmanship?

Why is war a relatively rare occurrence?

Why might the city of Jerusalem be considered an indivisible good?

How can we make war less likely? In your answer,make sure to include a discussion of the costs of war,the credibility of commitments,and the divisibility of goods.

Which of the following statements about compellence is true?

Why might states decide not to go to war over a disputed good?

Why have there been fewer conflicts over territory since the end of World War II?

Which of the following is the most common reason states have historically gone to war?

What do states hope to achieve by engaging in coercive diplomacy?

Why do states often go to war even when there is usually some division of a good that exists that is more preferable than war?

What is a preventive war?

Which of the following problems make states more likely to go to war?

Why do states fight wars?

Which of the following accurately describes a security dilemma?

A state covets a piece of territory that is valued at $100 million,yet it costs the state $40 million to attain it through war.How much must its adversary need to offer to make a peaceful settlement preferable to war?

Why is it difficult to make a threat of attack seem credible to an opponent?

How is extended deterrence different from general deterrence?

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Understanding Interests, interactions, and Institutions

Domestic Politics and War

International Institutions and War

Violence by Nonstate Actors: Civil War and Terrorism

International Trade

International Financial Relations

International Monetary Relations

Development: Causes of the Wealth and Poverty of Nations

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Exam 3: Why Are There Wars

Which is true of World War I?

Why is bargaining over future power especially difficult in international relations?

A state's resolve is determined by:

Why do states use brinksmanship?

Why is war a relatively rare occurrence?

Why might the city of Jerusalem be considered an indivisible good?

How can we make war less likely? In your answer,make sure to include a discussion of the costs of war,the credibility of commitments,and the divisibility of goods.

Which of the following statements about compellence is true?

Why might states decide not to go to war over a disputed good?

Why have there been fewer conflicts over territory since the end of World War II?

Which of the following is the most common reason states have historically gone to war?

What do states hope to achieve by engaging in coercive diplomacy?

Why do states often go to war even when there is usually some division of a good that exists that is more preferable than war?

What is a preventive war?

Which of the following problems make states more likely to go to war?

Why do states fight wars?

Which of the following accurately describes a security dilemma?

A state covets a piece of territory that is valued at $100 million,yet it costs the state $40 million to attain it through war.How much must its adversary need to offer to make a peaceful settlement preferable to war?

Why is it difficult to make a threat of attack seem credible to an opponent?

How is extended deterrence different from general deterrence?

What Shaped Our World

Understanding Interests, interactions, and Institutions

Domestic Politics and War

International Institutions and War

Violence by Nonstate Actors: Civil War and Terrorism

International Trade

International Financial Relations

International Monetary Relations

Development: Causes of the Wealth and Poverty of Nations

International Law and Norms

Human Rights

The Global Environment

The Future of International Politics

Introduction

Foundations, War, and Peace

International Political Economy, Transnational Politics, and Looking Ahead

Filters