Consider a Cournot duopoly with the following inverse demand function: P = 100 - 2Q1 - 2Q2. The firms' marginal costs are identical and are given by MCi = 2. Based on this information, consumer surplus in this market is:

A) $16.33. B) $32.67. C) $1,067.11. D) $2,134.22. A) $16.33. B) $32.67. C) $1,067.11. D) $2,134.22.

Exam 9: Basic Oligopoly Models

With a linear inverse demand function and the same constant marginal costs for both firms in a homogeneous product Stackelberg duopoly, which of the following will result?

(Multiple Choice)

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Question 101

Which of the following is NOT true about a differentiated-product Bertrand duopoly?

(Multiple Choice)

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Question 102

Which of the following are quantity-setting oligopoly models?

(Multiple Choice)

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Question 103

If firms are in Cournot equilibrium, they could increase profits by:

(Multiple Choice)

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Question 104

"An oligopoly is an oligopoly. Firms behave the same no matter what type of oligopoly it is." This statement is true of:

(Multiple Choice)

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Question 105

Two identical firms compete as a Cournot duopoly. The inverse market demand they face is P = 80 - 4Q. The cost function for each firm is C(Q) = 8Q. The price charged in this market will be:

(Multiple Choice)

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Question 106

Which of the following is NOT a feature of Sweezy oligopoly?

(Multiple Choice)

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Question 107

Which of the following is true?

(Multiple Choice)

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Question 108

When MCI announced a price discount plan designed to induce small firms to use its services, the price of its stock immediately declined. Why do you think the stock market reacted negatively to MCI's plan to attract new customers?

(Essay)

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Question 109

Compare and contrast the output levels and profits for the Cournot, Stackelberg, and Bertrand models. Use the following cost and demand conditions for your comparison, and suppose there are two firms: P = 1,500 - 10Q. Each firm has a marginal cost of $20 and fixed costs of zero.

(Essay)

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Question 110

Consider a Cournot duopoly with the following inverse demand function: P = 100 - 2Q₁ - 2Q₂. The firms' marginal costs are identical and are given by MC_i = 2. Based on this information, consumer surplus in this market is:

(Multiple Choice)

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Question 111

Which of the following is true about a differentiated-product Bertrand duopoly?

(Multiple Choice)

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Question 112

The inverse demand in a Cournot duopoly is P = a - b(Q₁ + Q₂), and costs are C₁(Q₁) = c₁Q₁ and C₂(Q₂) = c₂Q₂. The government has imposed a per-unit tax of $t on each unit sold by each firm. The equilibrium output of each firm is the same as a situation where each firm's:

(Multiple Choice)

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Question 113

A market is NOT contestable if:

(Multiple Choice)

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Question 114

Industry profits are maximized in the figure below:

(Multiple Choice)

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Question 115

Which of the following is NOT a type of market structure?

(Multiple Choice)

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Question 116

The producer's surplus of all firms in an oligopoly is usually the least in the case of a:

(Multiple Choice)

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Question 117

Which of the following is true about a Sweezy oligopoly?

(Multiple Choice)

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Question 118

Which of the following is/are NOT price-setting oligopoly models?

(Multiple Choice)

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Question 119

The market demand in a Bertrand duopoly is P = 15 - 4Q, and the marginal costs are $3. Fixed costs are zero for both firms. Which of the following statement(s) is/are true?

(Multiple Choice)

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Question 120

Showing 101 - 120 of 134

With a linear inverse demand function and the same constant marginal costs for both firms in a homogeneous product Stackelberg duopoly, which of the following will result?

Which of the following is NOT true about a differentiated-product Bertrand duopoly?

Which of the following are quantity-setting oligopoly models?

If firms are in Cournot equilibrium, they could increase profits by:

"An oligopoly is an oligopoly. Firms behave the same no matter what type of oligopoly it is." This statement is true of:

Two identical firms compete as a Cournot duopoly. The inverse market demand they face is P = 80 - 4Q. The cost function for each firm is C(Q) = 8Q. The price charged in this market will be:

Which of the following is NOT a feature of Sweezy oligopoly?

Which of the following is true?

When MCI announced a price discount plan designed to induce small firms to use its services, the price of its stock immediately declined. Why do you think the stock market reacted negatively to MCI's plan to attract new customers?

Compare and contrast the output levels and profits for the Cournot, Stackelberg, and Bertrand models. Use the following cost and demand conditions for your comparison, and suppose there are two firms: P = 1,500 - 10Q. Each firm has a marginal cost of $20 and fixed costs of zero.

Consider a Cournot duopoly with the following inverse demand function: P = 100 - 2Q₁ - 2Q₂. The firms' marginal costs are identical and are given by MC_i = 2. Based on this information, consumer surplus in this market is:

Which of the following is true about a differentiated-product Bertrand duopoly?

The inverse demand in a Cournot duopoly is P = a - b(Q₁ + Q₂), and costs are C₁(Q₁) = c₁Q₁ and C₂(Q₂) = c₂Q₂. The government has imposed a per-unit tax of $t on each unit sold by each firm. The equilibrium output of each firm is the same as a situation where each firm's:

A market is NOT contestable if:

Industry profits are maximized in the figure below:

Which of the following is NOT a type of market structure?

The producer's surplus of all firms in an oligopoly is usually the least in the case of a:

Which of the following is true about a Sweezy oligopoly?

Which of the following is/are NOT price-setting oligopoly models?

The market demand in a Bertrand duopoly is P = 15 - 4Q, and the marginal costs are $3. Fixed costs are zero for both firms. Which of the following statement(s) is/are true?

The Fundamentals of Managerial Economics

Market Forces: Demand and Supply

Quantitative Demand Analysis

The Theory of Individual Behavior

The Production Process and Costs

The Organization of the Firm

The Nature of Industry

Managing in Competitive, Monopolistic, and Monopolistically Competitive Markets

Game Theory: Inside Oligopoly

Pricing Strategies for Firms With Market Power

The Economics of Information

Advanced Topics in Business Strategy

A Managers Guide to Government in the Marketplace

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Exam 9: Basic Oligopoly Models

With a linear inverse demand function and the same constant marginal costs for both firms in a homogeneous product Stackelberg duopoly, which of the following will result?

Which of the following is NOT true about a differentiated-product Bertrand duopoly?

Which of the following are quantity-setting oligopoly models?

If firms are in Cournot equilibrium, they could increase profits by:

"An oligopoly is an oligopoly. Firms behave the same no matter what type of oligopoly it is." This statement is true of:

Two identical firms compete as a Cournot duopoly. The inverse market demand they face is P = 80 - 4Q. The cost function for each firm is C(Q) = 8Q. The price charged in this market will be:

Which of the following is NOT a feature of Sweezy oligopoly?

Which of the following is true?

When MCI announced a price discount plan designed to induce small firms to use its services, the price of its stock immediately declined. Why do you think the stock market reacted negatively to MCI's plan to attract new customers?

Compare and contrast the output levels and profits for the Cournot, Stackelberg, and Bertrand models. Use the following cost and demand conditions for your comparison, and suppose there are two firms: P = 1,500 - 10Q. Each firm has a marginal cost of $20 and fixed costs of zero.

Consider a Cournot duopoly with the following inverse demand function: P = 100 - 2Q1 - 2Q2. The firms' marginal costs are identical and are given by MCi = 2. Based on this information, consumer surplus in this market is:

Which of the following is true about a differentiated-product Bertrand duopoly?

The inverse demand in a Cournot duopoly is P = a - b(Q1 + Q2), and costs are C1(Q1) = c1Q1 and C2(Q2) = c2Q2. The government has imposed a per-unit tax of $t on each unit sold by each firm. The equilibrium output of each firm is the same as a situation where each firm's:

A market is NOT contestable if:

Industry profits are maximized in the figure below:

Which of the following is NOT a type of market structure?

The producer's surplus of all firms in an oligopoly is usually the least in the case of a:

Which of the following is true about a Sweezy oligopoly?

Which of the following is/are NOT price-setting oligopoly models?

The market demand in a Bertrand duopoly is P = 15 - 4Q, and the marginal costs are $3. Fixed costs are zero for both firms. Which of the following statement(s) is/are true?

The Fundamentals of Managerial Economics

Market Forces: Demand and Supply

Quantitative Demand Analysis

The Theory of Individual Behavior

The Production Process and Costs

The Organization of the Firm

The Nature of Industry

Managing in Competitive, Monopolistic, and Monopolistically Competitive Markets

Game Theory: Inside Oligopoly

Pricing Strategies for Firms With Market Power

The Economics of Information

Advanced Topics in Business Strategy

A Managers Guide to Government in the Marketplace

Filters

Consider a Cournot duopoly with the following inverse demand function: P = 100 - 2Q₁ - 2Q₂. The firms' marginal costs are identical and are given by MC_i = 2. Based on this information, consumer surplus in this market is:

The inverse demand in a Cournot duopoly is P = a - b(Q₁ + Q₂), and costs are C₁(Q₁) = c₁Q₁ and C₂(Q₂) = c₂Q₂. The government has imposed a per-unit tax of $t on each unit sold by each firm. The equilibrium output of each firm is the same as a situation where each firm's: