Use the following information to answer the Questions: Twenty-nine voters must choose from among three alternatives: A, B, and C. The voters' preference schedules are shown below. $ \quad$$ \quad$$ \quad$$ \quad$$ \quad$$ \quad$$ \quad$$\text { Number of voters }$ $\begin{array} { l c c c c } & 12 & 8 & 6 & 3 \\ \text { First choice } & \mathrm { B } & \mathrm { C } & \mathrm { A } & \mathrm { C } \\ \text { Second choice } & \mathrm { C } & \mathrm { A } & \mathrm { B } & \mathrm { B } \\ \text { Third choice } & \mathrm { A } & \mathrm { B } & \mathrm { C } & \mathrm { A } \end{array}$ -Using the agenda A, B, C, and sequential pairwise voting, alternative B wins. Is there an agenda that produces A as a winner?

A) No, B always wins. B) Yes, the agenda A, C, B. C) Yes, the agenda C, B, A. D) Yes, the agenda B, A, C. A) No, B always wins. B) Yes, the agenda A, C, B. C) Yes, the agenda C, B, A. D) Yes, the agenda B, A, C.

Exam 10: The Manipulability of Voting Systems

Consider the following preference table for four voters to answer the Questions First choice Second choice Third choice Fourth choice Fifth choice -If a Borda count is used, can the third voter manipulate the outcome so that A wins?

(True/False)

4.7/5

(32)

Question 101

Use the following information to answer the Questions: Twenty-nine voters must choose from among three alternatives: A, B, and C. The voters' preference schedules are shown below. $\quad$ $\quad$ $\quad$ $\quad$ $\quad$ $\quad$ $\quad$ $\text { Number of voters }$ 12 8 6 3 First choice Second choice Third choice -Using the agenda A, B, C, and sequential pairwise voting, alternative B wins. Is there an agenda that produces A as a winner?

(Multiple Choice)

4.9/5

(31)

Question 102

Consider the following preference table for four voters to answer the Questions First choice B D A C Second choice Third choice Fourth choice Fifth choice -If a Borda count is used, can the third voter manipulate the outcome so that A wins?

(True/False)

4.8/5

(34)

Question 103

Determine whether Condorcet's method is manipulable.

(Essay)

5.0/5

(30)

Question 104

What is purpose of Copeland's Rule with regard to Condorcet's method of voting?

(Essay)

4.8/5

(37)

Question 105

Agenda manipulation is a technique to affect an outcome using:

(Multiple Choice)

4.8/5

(43)

Question 106

Consider the following preference table for four voters to answer the Questions First choice Second choice Third choice Fourth choice Fifth choice -If a Borda count is used, can the third voter manipulate the outcome so that A wins?

Consider the following preference table for four voters to answer the Questions First choice B D A C Second choice Third choice Fourth choice Fifth choice -If a Borda count is used, can the third voter manipulate the outcome so that A wins?

Determine whether Condorcet's method is manipulable.

What is purpose of Copeland's Rule with regard to Condorcet's method of voting?

Agenda manipulation is a technique to affect an outcome using:

Urban Services

Business Efficiency

Planning and Scheduling

Linear Programming

Exploring Data: Distributions

Exploring Data: Relationships

Data for Decisions

Probability: the Mathematics of Chance

Social Choice: the Impossible Dream

Weighted Voting Systems

Electing the President

Fair Division

Apportionment

Game Theory: the Mathematics of Competition

Identification Numbers

Information Science

Growth and Form

Symmetry and Patterns

Tilings

Savings Models

Borrowing Models

The Economics of Resources

Filters