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Managerial Economics
Exam 9: Basic Oligopoly Models
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Question 61
Multiple Choice
There are many different models of oligopoly because:
Question 62
Multiple Choice
Sue and Jane own two local gas stations.They have identical constant marginal costs, but earn zero economic profits.Sue and Jane constitute
Question 63
Multiple Choice
The spirit of equating marginal cost with marginal revenue is not held by
Question 64
Multiple Choice
Consider a market consisting of two firms where the inverse demand curve is given by P = 500 - 2Q
1
- 2Q
2
.Each firm has a marginal cost of $50.Based on this information we can conclude that consumer surplus in the different equilibrium oligopoly models will follow which of the following orderings.
Question 65
Multiple Choice
The producer's surplus of all firms in an oligopoly is usually the least in the case of a:
Question 66
Multiple Choice
With linear demand and constant marginal cost, a Stackelberg leader's profits are ___________ the follower.
Question 67
Multiple Choice
Both firms in a Cournot duopoly would enjoy higher profits if
Question 68
Multiple Choice
Ed just finished an empirical study of oligopoly.He found the following result: "In the examined industry, a firm's demand curve is such that other firm's match price increases but do not match price reductions." What kind of oligopoly is the examined industry?
Question 69
Multiple Choice
The peak of the isoprofit curve has which of the following characteristics?
Question 70
Multiple Choice
Two firms compete as a Stackelberg duopoly.The inverse market demand they face is P = 62 - 4.5Q.The cost function for each firm is C(Q) = 8Q.The outputs of the two firms are:
Question 71
Multiple Choice
The inverse demand in a Cournot duopoly is P = a - b (Q
1
+ Q
2
) , and costs are C
1
(Q
1
) = c
1
Q
1
and C
2
(Q
2
) = c
2
Q
2
.The government has imposed a per unit tax of $t on each unit sold by each firm.The equilibrium output of each firm is the same as a situation where each firm's:
Question 72
Multiple Choice
Consider a Stackelberg duopoly with the following inverse demand function: P = 100 - 2Q
1
- 2Q
2
.The firms' marginal cost are identical and given by MC
i
(Q
i
) = 2Q
i
.Based on this information the Stackelberg follower's marginal revenue function is
Question 73
Multiple Choice
A market is not contestable if:
Question 74
Multiple Choice
Consider a Stackelberg duopoly with the following inverse demand function: P = 100 - 2Q
1
- 2Q
2
.The firms' marginal cost are identical and given by MC
i
(Q
i
) = 2.Based on this information follower's reaction function is
Question 75
Multiple Choice
Which of the following is true about a differentiated-product Bertrand duopoly?
Question 76
Essay
Orion and Zeda are the only producers of a unique product that sold in a market where the inverse demand curve is
Question 77
Multiple Choice
In a market where two firms compete by setting quantity, the Cournot equilibrium has which of the following characteristics?
Question 78
Essay
You are the manager of a firm operating in a differentiated-product oligopoly.Show graphically your optimal response to an increase in marginal cost if a.You believe rivals will follow price reductions but not price increases. b.You believe rivals will hold output constant if you decrease output. c.You believe rivals will follow price increases but not price decreases. B.Thus, the manager of firm one should reduce output to maximize profits.
Figure 9-3b c.In this case, the demand curve is ABC in Figure 9-3c, while MR is ADEF.An increase in marginal cost from MC to MC* leads to a reduction in the profit-maximizing level of output. Figure 9-3c
Question 79
Multiple Choice
Consider a market consisting of two firms where the inverse demand curve is given by P = 500 - 2(Q
1
+ Q
2
) .If the Stackelberg leader's and follower's marginal costs are zero, the leader's marginal revenue is