With Regards to the Trust Game, the Fact That Often

Multiple Choice

With regards to the trust game, the fact that often trust does not pay may be attributed to the fact that:

A) Players do not necessarily attribute the same interpretation to game strategies and action sets as the experimenter; when the strategic contingencies underlying the game are explained, returns to trust increases.
B) Players always attribute the same interpretation to game strategies and action sets as the experimenter; they realize that a trusting move is not part of the Nash equilibrium of the game.
C) Players realize that trust and trustworthiness are in keeping with the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the sequential game (assuming purely money-maximizing preferences) but are not sure everyone else understands that.
D) Players do not necessarily attribute the same interpretation to game strategies and action sets as the experimenter; they do not realize that trust and trustworthiness are in keeping with the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the sequential game (assuming purely money-maximizing preferences) .