Multiple Choice
A manager has a utility function U = C 0.5 if she doesn't work hard and U = C 0.5 - 3 if she does.Expected profit will increase from 1,000 to 1,500 if she works hard.The manager receives compensation C equal to 144 plus a portion x of any profit in excess of 1,000.What is the value of x that will make the manager indifferent between shirking and working hard?
A) 0.09.
B) 0.105.
C) 0.19.
D) 0.162.
E) None of the above.
Correct Answer:

Verified
Correct Answer:
Verified
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