Question 1

A refinement concept places a set of extra constraints on a Nash equilibrium in order to select among multiple equilibria if they exist or to simply make the equilibrium more plausible.

Accepted Answer

A) True 
 B)False

Question 2

A two-person game in which player 1 divides an amount of money between the two players and the opponent either accepts or rejects the proposal is called a(n)

Accepted Answer

A)  trigger game 
B)  ultimatum game 
C)  grim strategy game

Question 3

If one player in a game uses a mixed strategy that leaves the other player with a unique pure strategy best response, a mixed strategy equilibrium ___________ exist.

Accepted Answer

A)  does not 
B)  does 
C)  It is not possible answer without knowing the probabilities

Question 4

To produce Nash equilibria in mixed strategy games, we must expand the definition of a strategy to include not only the choice of an action, but also the

Accepted Answer

A)  names of the players 
B)  probability of credible threats 
C)  probability of the action being chosen

Question 5

Strategies that define probability mixtures over all or some of the pure strategies in the game are called

Accepted Answer

A)  mixed strategies 
B)  super-pure strategies 
C)  gambles

Question 6

Whenever a game arrives at a unique outcome using the strong or weak version of the iterative elimination of dominated strategies, we call the game

Accepted Answer

A)  dominance-solvable 
B)  extensive 
C)  strictly dominated

Question 7

A 2 × 2 matrix game in which each player has a dominant strategy determining an equilibrium that is Pareto dominated is called the

Accepted Answer

A)  prisoner's dilemma game 
B)  second-auction game 
C)  centipede game

Question 8

Distinguish between strict and weak domination.

Accepted Answer

The answer of Distinguish between strict and weak domination....

Question 9

A threat that, if the game ever progresses to the point where the threat is supposed to be carried out will, in fact, be acted on is known as a(n)

Accepted Answer

A)  noncredible threat 
B)  credible threat 
C)  incredible threat

Question 10

If strategy 1 weakly dominates strategy 2, which of the following must be true?

Accepted Answer

A)  Strategy 1 is strictly better than strategy 2 when the opponent chooses strategy 1 and strictly better than strategy 2 when the opponent chooses strategy 2 
B)  Strategy 1 is just as good as strategy 2 when the opponent chooses strategy 1 and just as good as strategy 2 when the opponent chooses strategy 2 
C)  Strategy 1 is just as good as strategy 2 when the opponent chooses strategy 1 and strictly better than strategy 2 when the opponent chooses strategy 2

Question 11

The professor says to the student, "I have already told you ten times today not to text message during class. If I catch you doing it again, I will ask you to leave the classroom." In game theory terms, how would you describe the professor's statement?

Accepted Answer

The answer of The professor says to the student, "I...

Question 12

A visual depiction of an extensive form game that presents the rules and payoff contingencies of the game is called a game

Accepted Answer

A)  theory 
B)  tree 
C)  strategy

Question 13

A game in which, when any player reaches a decision point, the player does not know all the choices of the other players who preceded is called a game of

Accepted Answer

A)  perfect information 
B)  imperfect information 
C)  zero information

Question 14

A dominant strategy is ______________ for a player no matter what the opposing players do.

Accepted Answer

A)  best 
B)  indifferent 
C)  worst

Question 15

A complete plan of action for the player that tells us what choice the player should make at any node of the game tree or in any situation that might arise during the play of the game is known as

Accepted Answer

A)  pure strategy 
B)  normal strategy 
C)  extensive strategy

Question 16

Backward induction is a description of a game of strategy that provides a detailed description of the rules of the game.

Accepted Answer

A) True 
 B)False

Question 17

The equilibrium in a game in which all players use their dominant strategies is known as a

Accepted Answer

A)  Nash equilibrium 
B)  dominant-strategy equilibrium 
C)  dominated-strategy equilibrium

Question 18

The expected __________ of a strategy is the probability-weighted __________ the player can expect to receive.

Accepted Answer

A)  mixture, payoff 
B)  value, equilibrium 
C)  value, payoff

Question 19

Exhibit 11-1
$\begin{array} { | l | l | l | l | l |} 
\hline & & & \text { Player 2 } & \
\hline & & \text { Laft } & & \text { Right } \
\hline & \text { Tap } & + 1 , - 1 & & - 1 , + 1 \
\hline \text { Player 1 } & & & & \
\hline & \text { Battam } & - 1 , + 1 & & + 1 , - 1 \
\hline
\end{array}$
-Refer to Exhibit 11-1. This game is shown in

Accepted Answer

A)  normal form 
B)  extensive form 
C)  game tree form

Exam 11: Game Theory and the Tools of Strategic Business Analysis